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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The role of the European Investment Bank Group (EIB) ± comprising the European 
Investment Bank and European Investment Fund ± in Cohesion Policy has increased 
dramatically. Set against this background, the objective of this study is to provide a 
comprehensive analysis and assessment of how the EIB contributes to the achievement of 
Cohesion Policy objectives. 
Roles of the EIB in Cohesion Policy 
The EIB fulfils a number of important roles in the implementation of Cohesion Policy: 
 advisory and analytical services ± JEREMIE ex-ante evaluations, JESSICA evaluation 
studies, ad-hoc advice to managing authorities, advisory service to the European 
Commission;  
 (b)lending ± co-financing Cohesion Policy projects with direct loans, intermediate 
loans or global loans; providing framework loans (i.e. Structural Programme Lending) 
for financial intermediaries; and co-financing financial instruments; 
 mandate management of holding funds for financial instruments co-financed with 
Cohesion Policy funding; and 
 capacity-building activities ± the JASPERS and JASMINE initiatives, and other 
Technical Assistance activities linked to the Bank¶VEOHQGLQg activities. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of EIB activities 
 
Based on interview and survey evidence  the EIB activities are generally regarded as making 
a significant contribution to Cohesion Policy objectives and have a high level of added value 
and complementarity. Its advisory, capacity-building and (b)lending services are highly 
valued, in particular, by Member States Specifically in relation to Financial Instruments the 
EIB plays a crucial role in their development and implementation. The EIB¶V UROH LV VWLOO
evolving, and the effectiveness and efficiency of its activities in Cohesion Policies, 
particularly in quantitative terms, is not always well understood at an aggregate EU level, 
including its role in mandate management.  
 
Results from the survey for this study demonstrate that gap analyses and evaluations in the 
context of the JESSICA and JEREMIE initiatives were valued by managing authorities and 
stakeholders, although the recommendations on FIs were not always taken forward by 
national or regional authorities. The currently available data provide only limited insights into 
the comparative performance of HFs managed by the EIB relative to those managed by 
other institutions. According to these data, it appears that as holding fund manager the EIB 
absorption rates are lower than for non-EIB holding fund managers. Lower absorption rates 
may be partly explained by the weaker capacity of Member States where the EIB and EIF 
operate as well as the particularly severe effects of the financial crisis in these countries.  
 
Management fees for EIB and EIF holding funds are broadly equivalent to those managed by 
non-EIB institutions. However, a comparison of management fees for holding funds 
implemented by the EIF (enterprises) and those for the EIB (urban development) indicate 
that the latter are lower as a proportion of commitments. The reverse is true when 
comparing enterprise support holding funds of other institutions with those implemented by 
EIF. 
 
(,% OHQGLQJ PDNHV D PDMRU FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH (8¶V RYHUDOO &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ REMHFWLYHV
However, the scale of EIB lending to Cohesion Policy programmes and projects is not well 
understood and requires further research. 
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Accountability, transparency and visibility 
 
The dual role of the EIB (public institution and investment bank) causes some ambiguity in 
its accountability, transparency and visibility. Overall, Member States regard EIB activities as 
increasingly accountable, transparent and visible, but there are also some negative 
assessments. In recent years more information regarding EIB activities in Cohesion Policy 
has become available but not in relation to all its roles in Cohesion Policy. For example, 
there is relatively little information available with regard to the (b)lending activities of EIB 
activities in Cohesion Policy projects and programmes. 
 
Inter-institutional relations 
 
The increased use Financial Instruments in Cohesion Policy has required closer working 
relationships between the EIB and the European Commission (DG Regio). For the 
Commission, this has meant a steep learning curve and, to a certain extent, a reliance on 
EIB expertise in the development and implementation of FIs. For its part, the EIB has had to 
invest time and effort in understanding how FIs can be used efficiently and effectively in the 
Cohesion Policy context.  
 
The increased involvement of the EIB in Cohesion Policy requires reconsideration of the role 
of European Parliament and, in particular WKH 5(*, &RPPLWWHH LQ VFUXWLQLVLQJ WKH %DQN¶V
activities. European Parliament respondents interviewed for this study strongly favour more 
active, systematic and regular scrutiny of the EIB by the REGI Committee. Interviewees in 
the EP and Member States generally consider that the EIB makes a significant contribution 
WR(XURSH¶V*URZWK$JHQGD, and specifically to Cohesion Policy, but that the full implications 
of increased EIB involvement are not fully understood. 
 
Future  
 
The role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy is increasing in the 2014-20 period, drawing on the 
lessons learned from the experience of implementing FIs in 2007-13. The CPR provides a 
more robust framework for financial instruments in which the EIB and EIF will play a major 
role. Additionally, the provisions for the SME Initiative provide a further basis for EIB 
involvement in Cohesion Policy. The creation of the EFSI and its potential contribution to 
Cohesion Policy has also led to increased visibility of the EIB¶V responsibilities. These 
developments provide an opportunity and need for broader and deeper interaction between 
EIB and the Commission and European Parliament.  
 
Recommendations  
 
7KH(,%¶VLQFUHDVHGUROHLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\SDUWLFXODUO\WKURXJKWKHJUHDWHUSURILOHDQGXVH
of financial instruments, has major implications for the performance and results of Cohesion 
Policy. EIB lending is a major contributor to economic development expenditure in the 
Member States and a key component in the viability of many major projects. The problem in 
assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of these activities ± from a Cohesion Policy 
perspective ± is that the evidence base is (so far) relatively limited. 
 
The research for this study suggests a high level of satisfaction with the EIB among Member 
States, although more detailed analysis is required to provide a better understanding of the 
(,%¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ DQG LWV UHODWLRQ LQ 0HPEHU 6WDWHV 7KH RYHUDOO
assessment is that the EIB is effective across most areas of activity, and it appears to be 
doing well in supporting the objectives of Cohesion Policy. The challenge is to ensure that 
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the largely positive assessment can be substantiated by systematic evaluation ± and 
monitored on an ongoing basis to ensure that where problems exist they are being 
addressed. 
 
The main recommendation of this study is the need for the European Parliament to support 
the development of more systematic accountability on the role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy. 
It proposes that steps are taken for the REGI Committee to become more engaged in EIB 
ActiviWLHVE\H[SORULQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDFKDSWHURU$QQH[LQWKH(,%¶V$QQXDO5HSRUWZKLFK
specifically reports on those elements that contribute to the delivery of Cohesion Policy 
objectives and that are linked to Cohesion Policy instruments.  
 
In tandem with formal reporting requirement, a number of ways are suggested that would 
improve operational dialogue between the European Parliament and EIB: 
 
x at the political level, visits by the REGI Committee to the EIB similar to those to the 
European Central Bank (ECB);  
x regular invitations to the EIB to present the results of their activities in the context of 
Cohesion Policy to the REGI Committee; 
x organisation of seminars and workshops at the administrative level to promote 
knowledge exchange, improve the visibility of EIB activities and ensure active 
institutional engagement;  
x more detailed studies focussing on specific themes or issues  
x recruitment of personnel from other EU institutions/bodies that possess relevant 
know-how; and 
x drawing up own-initiative reports that target or include reflections on the role of the 
EIB in Cohesion Policy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Over the past two programme periods (2000-2006 and 2007-2013), the role of the 
European Investment Bank Group1 (EIB) ± comprising the European Investment Bank (EIB/ 
the Bank) and European Investment Fund (EIF) ± in Cohesion Policy has increased 
dramatically. The EIB has evolved into an important financial arm of the European Union 
responsible for implementing an increasingly heterogeneous range of internal and external 
policies.2,3 
The more expansive role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy originates in a shift from grant-based 
instruments to financial instruments (FIs). IQLWVUROHDVWKHµ(8%DQN¶Whe EIB is in a unique 
position to develop, implement, and animate such instruments. The introduction and 
increased use of FIs in which the EIB has a role in terms of implementation or providing 
advice can be regarded as a paradigm shift in a number of ways: 
x the technical knowledge required to implement the instruments; 
x the type of projects that are eligible for finance; 
x the way in which decisions on funding are made; and 
x the lines of accountability.  
The EIB has a number of different roles in relation to Cohesion Policy. In particular, the 
introduction of the so-called special support instruments in 2007-13 increased the scope and 
VFDOHRIWKH(,%¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\ 
x JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) ± an 
initiative of the European Commission developed in cooperation with EIB and the 
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) which enables Member States to channel 
Structural Funds into financial engineering instruments supporting sustainable urban 
development and regeneration projects;  
x JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro-to-Medium Enterprises) ± an initiative 
of the European Commission developed together with the EIF which promotes the use 
of financial engineering instruments to improve access to finance for SMEs via 
Structural Funds interventions; 
x JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions) ± a technical 
assistance partnership between DG Regional and Urban Policy, EIB and EBRD which 
provides independent advice to beneficiary countries to prepare high quality major 
projects to be co-financed by European Structural and Investment Funds and is 
available to the majority of EU and candidate countries; and 
x JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe) ± an initiative 
that provides both technical assistance and financial support to non-bank micro-credit 
providers to help them to improve the quality of their operations, to expand and to 
become sustainable (as well as promoting good practices in the field of micro-credit 
and good conduct among micro-credit institutions). 
                                          
1  The EIB Group is commonly referred to as EIB (for example see CPR Article 2.23). This convention will be 
followed in this study ± distinguishing where necessary between EIF and EIB. 
2  +DFKH]1DQG:RXWHUV - $UHVSRQVLEOH OHQGHU"7KH(XURSHDQ ,QYHVWPHQW%DQN¶VHQYLURQPHQWDO VRFLDO
and human rights accountability, Common Market Law Review, 49 (1) 47±95. In 2013 and 2014, just over 10 
percent of EIB funding went to non-EU Member States, including EFTA and candidate and potential candidate 
countries.     
3  In 2013 and 2014, just over 10 percent of EIB funding went to non-EU Member States, including EFTA and 
candidate and potential candidate countries. See European Investment Bank (2014b) Financial Report 2014, EIB 
Luxembourg available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/reports/fr2014en.pdf    
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The EIB has four main roles in Cohesion Policy, illustrated in Figure 1. First, the EIB has 
since the start of Cohesion Policy provided lending for projects funded through Cohesion 
Policy. This is often referred to as (b)lending. The loans can take the form of direct, 
framework loans (including Structural Programme Loans) intermediate or global loans 
depending on their size and structure (see Section 2.5). More recently, the Bank has also 
provided lending for financial instruments. 
 
Second, the EIB undertakes capacity-building activities. In some cases, EIB lending can 
be conditional on specific technical assistance requirements (e.g. the establishment of a 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU)). In the 2007-13 period, the JASPERS and JASMINE 
initiatives provided technical assistance to implementation bodies and financial 
intermediaries. In 2014-20, a new technical assistance platform, fi-compass, set up by the 
European Commission in partnership with the EIB, provides common and fund-specific 
guidance related to FIs, covering the whole FI implementation cycle. 
 
Third, the EIB provides advisory and analytical services to Cohesion Policy programme 
authorities, a role which has expanded over successive periods since 2000-06. In the 
context of the special support instruments in the 2007-13 period, the EIF conducted gap 
analyses for FIs targeting enterprises(i.e. JEREMIE initiative), and the EIB evaluation studies 
for instruments for urban development (JESSICA initiative). In 2014-20, ex-ante 
assessments are mandatory for any FI receiving Structural Funds support. The EIB has been 
heavily involved in developing methodologies for ex-ante assessment and can ± when asked 
by MAs ± be responsible for carrying them out. Furthermore, the EIB can provide ad-hoc 
advice to implementation bodies at the Member State and regional level. It also works 
closely with the Commission and provides technical expertise in relation to drafting 
regulations, acts and guidance.  
 
Fourthly, the EIB can implement Holding Funds for financial instruments set up by 
Member States and regions for enterprises and urban development when requested to do so 
(so-called mandate management). 4 The EIB and EIF also have a role in implementing new 
EU-level financial instruments in Cohesion Policy for the European Commission as well as the 
SME Initiative. 
 
Additionally, the EIB has a role in a number of other initiatives that are not considered part 
of the formal Cohesion Policy framework but which do have an important link to it, such as 
COSME, the Connecting Europe Facility, InnovFin and the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI). 
 
                                          
4  There is some confusion in the terminology used in relation to FIs for enterprises and urban development. Many 
managing authorities and Holding Fund Managers including the EIB refer to FIs for enterprises as JEREMIE and 
FIs for urban development as JESSICA in reporting and colloquial usage. However, technically the JEREMIE and 
JESSICA are only the technical assistance offered to develop and promote the use FIs for enterprises and urban 
development and not the actual FIs themselves. 
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Figure 1: Role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy 
 
Source: EPRC research 
The increasing role of the EIB raises important questions regarding the effectiveness and 
efficiency, accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB activities.5 These relate to:  
x the increased administrative complexities of FIs that are managed or supported by 
the EIB;  
x the lack of familiarity, expertise and capacity of public authorities to implement the 
instruments that are developed and offered by the EIB;  
x the lack of transparency in the reporting and monitoring of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of EIB activities;  
x the relationship between commercial imperatives (associated with a AAA credit 
rating) and public policy objectives;  
x the challenges of EIB activities in relation to legal complexities of State aid 
legislation; and  
x the extent to which the horizontal focus of the 2014-20 regulatory framework aligns 
with EIB activities (e.g. strategic coherence, result orientation, thematic 
concentration and performance framework). 
 
 
                                          
5  Michie R and Wishlade F (2011) Between Scylla and Charybdis: Navigating financial engineering instruments 
through Structural Fund and State aid requirements, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 29(2), European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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Such questions are particularly relevant considering that there is relatively little academic 
research on the role of the EIB in general and particularly in relation to Cohesion Policy.6 The 
limited academic work that is available is often dated and focuses on WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ
regional development and public policy role more generally7 and tends to be more focussed 
on its role as an external lender.8 The use of FIs in Cohesion Policy has received some 
academic interest but this has tended to focus on their general performance and 
implementation rather than the specific role the EIB may play.9 
1.1 Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Against the above background, the objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis and assessment of how the EIB contributes to the achievement of Cohesion 
Policy objectives. The analysis focuses on the following five key elements:  
 
 the role of the EIB in the implementation of Cohesion Policy; 
 the effectiveness and efficiency of the EIB activities in Cohesion Policy; 
 the accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB activities;  
 the relationships between EU institutions and the EIB; and 
 future expectations of the role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy, particularly in the 
context of the increased use of financial instruments and the implications of 
the adoption of the EFSI regulation. 
For each of the above categories, the main research questions are outlined in Box 1. 
  
                                          
6  5RELQVRQ17KH(XURSHDQ,QYHVWPHQW%DQN7KH(8¶V1HJOHFted Institutions, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 47(3): 651±73; Clifton J, Diaz-Fuentes D and Revuelta J (2013) Financing utilities: How the role of the 
European Investment Bank shifted from regional development to making markets, Utilities Policy, 29: 63±71. 
7  Clifton J, Diaz-Fuentes D and Revuelta J (2013) Financing utilities: How the role of the European Investment 
Bank shifted from regional development to making markets, Utilities Policy, 29: 63±71; Griffith-Jones S and 
Tyson J (2012) The European Investment Bank and its Role in Regional Development and Integration, in: Cintra, 
Marcos Antonio Macedo & Gomes, Keiti da Rocha (eds) The Transformations of the International Financial 
System, IPEA, available at: http://www.stephanygj.net/papers/EIBRegDevIntegration2012.pdf;  Pinder D, 
Edwards J B and Wise M (1995) The European Investment Bank, transport investment and European Union 
objectives: an exploratory analysis, Journal of Transport Geography, 3: 167-178. Honohan P (1995) The Public 
Policy Role of the European Investment Bank within the EU, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33:3, 315-330; 
Barnes I and Campbell J (1987) Local Authorities and the European Investment Bank, Local Government 
Studies,13:1, 25-33. 
8  Hachez and Wouters (2012) op cit. 
9  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op cit; 'ąEURZVNL 0 D µ'RLQJ PRUH ZLWK OHVV¶ RU µGRLQJ OHVV ZLWK OHVV¶"
$VVHVVLQJ(8&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\¶VILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWVIRUXUEDQGHYHORSPHQWRegional Studies, Regional Science, 
2:1, 73-96.  
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Box 1: Research questions 
The role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy 
:KDWLVWKHFXUUHQWUROHRIWKH(,%LQ(8&RKHVLRn Policy and how has it changed over time? 
 :KDW DUH WKH FXUUHQW LQVWLWXWLRQDO EXGJHWDU\ DQG SURFHGXUDO DUrangements of EIB involvement in 
Cohesion Policy? 
:KDWGRFKDQJHVLQWKHOHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUNPHDQIRUthe role of the EIB? 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the EIB and financial instruments in Cohesion Policy 
+RZGRHVWKH(,%FRQWULEXWHWRFRKHVLRn and regional development in Europe? 
 :KDW LV WKH DGGHG YDOXH RI (,% LQYROYHPHQW LQ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ" :KDW DUH WKH
advantages and the challenges experienced by the EIB itself, by its primary interlocutor, the 
Commission, and by national and regional authorities who engaged in EIB activities? 
 :KDW OHVVRQV FDQ EH GUDZQ IURP WKH DFFXPXODWHG H[SHULHQFH RI WKH (,% ZKHQ LW FRPHV WR WKH
implementation of financial instruments, and in particular what lessons have been learned from the 
special support instruments? 
+DVWKH(,%FRQWULEXWHGWRDFKLHYing the objectives of Cohesion Policy, and what available evidence 
exists about the results and effectiveness of its interventions? 
What have been the experiences in relation to FIs and the four special support instruments during 
the 2007-13 period? 
 :KHUH DUH WKH JDSV LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH DYDLODEOH HYLGHQFH RI WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI (,% DFWLYLWLHV LQ
Cohesion Policy? What are the reasons for such limitations and what can be done to address them? 
 :KDW EDODQFH LV VWUXFN LQ GHFLVLRQV RQ IXQGHG DFWLYLWLHV EHWZHHQ SURILWDELOLW\ DQG FRQWULEXWLRQ WR
Cohesion Policy objectives? 
Accountability, transparency and visibility 
+RZFDQ WKHSURFHVVHVRID ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQEHDOLJQHGZLWK Whose of Cohesion Policy, which is 
governed by specific regulations? Are monitoring, evaluation, reporting and auditing activities different 
and in what way from activities that apply to grants under Cohesion Policy? 
,VWKHUHDJDSLQGDWDDQGLQIRUPDWLRQ to track and oversee the contribution of the EIB to Cohesion 
Policy objectives, especially with regard to outputs and results of final recipients/borrowers? If such a 
gap exists, what are the reasons; can this be improved in future and how? 
+RZFDQ WKHgeneral and horizontal principles of Cohesion Policy, especially as put in place in the 
2014-20 period, be respected when it comes to FIs where implementation tasks are entrusted to the 
EIB? 
+RZWUDQVSDUHQWDQGYLVLEOHLVWKHIDFWWKDW(8EXGJHWDU\UHVRXUFHVDUHXVHGLQ(,%DFWLYLWLHV"+DYH
there been sufficient measures in place to ensure that 'clients', beneficiaries/final recipients are aware 
of this fact, and what is to be expected in future? 
Relationships between European Parliament, Commission and EIB  
 +RZ LV DQG KDV EHHQ WKH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ the EIB and the European Commission and European 
Parliament? 
+RZFDQIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVEHVWUHQJWKHQHd? 
 :KDW DUH WKH RSWLRQV IRU EDODQFLQJ WKH LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO PRGHO RI WKH (,% and the shared 
management of Cohesion Policy? 
Future expectations 
:KDWFKDOOHQJHVZHUHGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWKHOHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUNLQSODFHIRUILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV
in 2007-2013, and what is the assessment of the changes for the 2014-20 period? 
:KDWLVYLVLEOHWRGDWHDERXWWKH(,%LQYROYHPHQWLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\-2020, and what will be the 
level of uptake (in regions and Member States) of measures involving the EIB, proposed by the 
legislative framework? 
:KDWV\QHUJLHVPLJKW(6,)XQGVKDYHZLWKUHOHYDQW(8-level proposals and policy initiatives involving 
the EIB, such as the Investment Plan for Europe? What challenges and added value might such 
proposals bring about in conjunction with Cohesion Policy interventions? 
+RZGR),VDOLJQZLWKWKHUHVXOWRULHQWDWLRQDQGWKHPDWLFREMHFWLYHVVHWRXWLQ-20 regulations? 
:KDWDUHWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRI(,%LQYROYHPHQWLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\EH\RQG" 
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1.2 Methodological approach 
 
The methodology comprised five key interrelated tasks as shown in Figure 2 and described 
in detail in the following sections. The project followed an iterative process and benefited 
from ongoing dialogue with European Parliament officials, European Commission and the 
EIB. 
 
Figure 2: Work programme tasks 
 
 
 
1.2.1 Task 1: Academic, legislative and policy literature 
The starting point for the study was a systematic review of the key academic 
legislative and policy literature. Undertaken through desk research, this was intended to 
provide a critical assessment of: 
x WKH(,%¶VUROHLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\DQGKRZWKLVKDVHYROYHG 
x the effectiveness and efficiency of EIB-managed FIs that involve Cohesion Policy 
funding;  
x the framework in which institutional relations between the EIB, the Commission and 
the European Parliament are organised; and  
x the accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB activities   
The review covered existing academic and policy literature, legal texts, Cohesion Policy 
programme documents, country-specific evaluations, studies by EU institutions and the EIB, 
websites and other relevant sources. The findings of the review informed and further shaped 
the subsequent elements of the project.  
1.2.2 Task 2: Meta-analysis of FIs 2007-13 & scoping exercise for 2014-20 
A second element of the project consisted of a meta-analysis of FI initiatives in Cohesion 
Policy in 2007-13 in which the EIB had a role, including JESSICA, JEREMIE, JASPERS and 
JASMINE, and other EU initiatives in which the EIB is involved (e.g. InnovFin, COSME and 
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the Connecting Europe Facility). The research has drawn on previous EPRC work, notably a 
stock-take of FIs conducted for the EIB in 2012-13.10 Part of the analysis of effectiveness 
and efficiency RI (,% DQG (,) +)V LV EDVHG RQ GDWD IURP WKH µ6ummary of Data on the 
3URJUHVV0DGHLQ)LQDQFLQJDQG,PSOHPHQWLQJ)LQDQFLDO(QJLQHHULQJ,QVWUXPHQW¶KHUHLQDIWHU
referred to as the summary of data on financial instruments) published in December 2015.11  
 
A review of JESSICA evaluations and JEREMIE gap analysis in the 2007-13 period was 
undertaken through a desk-based research exercise, sourcing evaluations from the EIB and 
EIF websites.12  
 
This task also includes a scoping exercise of FIs in the 2014-20 period (based on the 
preliminary information becoming available) to identify shifts in emphasis and uptake in 
Member States, and particular attention will be afforded to those areas of specific interest to 
members of the European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development (REGI 
Committee) (e.g. SME Initiative Art. 39 of CPR). 
 
While the review of effectiveness and efficiency HQFRPSDVVHVDOORIWKH(,%¶VPDLQUROHVWKH
focus is particularly on financial instruments which have become increasingly important for 
the implementation of Cohesion Policy 7KH UHYLHZ RI WKH (,%¶V OHQGLQJ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
Cohesion Policy relies on secondary data. 
1.2.3 Task 3: Survey of Member State perceptions 
The third element of the study involved a comparative, online, cross-country survey of 
senior officials responsible for Cohesion Policy implementation in all 28 Member States to 
assess perceptions of the implementation of FIs and the effectiveness of the role of the EIB 
in Cohesion Policy. The survey was designed to EH D µOLJKW WRXFK¶ DQG DQRQ\PRXVZD\ RI
collecting the data needed for the study.  
 
The survey questionnaire addressed four analytical dimensions:  
 
(a) the role of the EIB in implementing FIs: role of the EIB as a (holding) fund 
manager; advisory role of EIB; role of the EIB as a lender; capacity-building activities 
provided by EIB in setting up FIs; 
(b) the effectiveness of the EIB activities in Cohesion Policy: added value of the 
(,%¶V UROHFRQWULEXWLRQRI(,% WR WKHREMHFWLYHVRI&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\DGYDQWDJHVand 
challenges of EIB activities; performance of the special support instruments; respect 
for the horizontal principles; 
(c) accountability, transparency and visibility: reporting and monitoring 
requirements; gaps in data provision and information; audit processes; transparency 
of use of FIs; visibility of use of FIs; and 
(d) future expectations: implications of the 2014-20 legislative framework for EIB 
activities and specifically FIs (with reference to strategic coherence, result 
orientation, thematic concentration and performance framework); implication of the 
EU Investment Plan and the role for of the EIB.  
                                          
10  European Investment Bank (2013a) Financial instruments: A stock-taking exercise in preparation for the 2014±
2020 programming period. Final Report. Brussels: EIB. 
11  European Commission (2015d) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing  
financial engineering instruments, September 2015, Brussels, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2015/summary-of-data-on-the-
progress-made-in-financing-and-implementing-financial-engineering-instruments-2014   
12  For access to all JESSICA evaluation studies, see: 
http://www.eib.org/products/blending/jessica/studies/evaluation.htm  
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A copy of the full questionnaire is provided in Annex 2. All 28 Member States were 
approached to participate in the survey. 19 responses from 18 Member States were 
received: AT, BE (Flanders), BG, CZ, DE, FI, FR, HU, HR, LT, LV, LU, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, 
and UK (England and Scotland). Due to the constitutional framework of some countries (BE 
and UK), representatives at the sub-national level were also invited to participate in the 
survey. In some Member States, the survey response involved inputs from several 
ministries.    
 
The survey provides an initial overview of the role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy and the 
perception of the added value and challenges of its role from an implementation viewpoint. 
The findings are subject to a number of caveats:  
 
x not all Member States responded to the survey (particularly the absence of responses 
from Member States in which the EIB is particularly active should be taken into 
account (EL, ES and IT); 
x the survey is a snapshot of views at the time of the survey, and perceptions and 
attitudes are best measured longitudinally; 
x survey responses are in some instances incomplete or contain contradictions with 
other data sources; 
x there are limitations in terms of the qualitative and context-specific nature of some 
responses; and 
x all surveys were conducted in English, which may in some cases have led to 
interpretation differences. 
Consequently, the results should be regarded as an indicative rather than definitive 
assessment of the added value and challenges of EIB activities in Cohesion Policy from an 
implementation perspective. 
1.2.4 Task 4: In-depth analysis of institutional relationships 
The fourth task of the study comprised an analysis of inter-institutional relationships 
between the EIB, European Commission and European Parliament in relation to the 
monitoring and reporting of EIB activities and specifically with respect to FIs. The research 
was conducted through a series of interviews with officials from the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the EIB.  
 
This part of the study involved two elements. One was a mapping exercise, covering the key 
formal and informal fora, platforms and processes of communications between the EIB, 
European Parliament and European Commission. The second element comprised an 
assessment of institutional perspectives on accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB 
involvement in Cohesion Policy. This included an assessment of: 
x strengths and weaknesses of current inter-institutional interactions; 
x lessons learned in relation to information exchange in the 2007-13 period; 
x communication/interaction gaps and requirements for additional 
communication/reporting interfaces;  
x options for deepening and strengthening institutional relationships; 
x alignment of processes in financial instruments with Cohesion Policy objectives; 
x monitoring and reporting requirements in each institution;  
x the relationships between REGI Committee and other European Parliament 
Committees (Committee on Budgetary Control and Committee on Budgets); 
x gaps in information provision in the monitoring process of the EIB contribution to 
Cohesion Policy; and 
x the transparency of beneficiary expectations and visibility of the use of FIs. 
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A full list of interview questions is provided in Annex 1. In order to ensure that questions 
were relevant for interviewees for each institution, appropriate questions were selected in 
each case, rather than addressing the full list. 
1.2.5 Task 5: Synthesis and recommendations 
The synthesis of the cross-country survey and the in-depth analysis of institutional relations 
were integrated with the findings from the literature review and meta-analysis, to draw 
conclusions and provide recommendations. Recommendations are provided for each of the 
relevant decision-making levels (EU, national and programme levels) and the different EU 
institutions. To support the work of the European Parliament, forward-looking 
recommendations are included to guide the future initiatives and oversight activities of the 
REGI Committee in the area of EIB relations. The recommendations specifically focus on:  
 
x KRZ (,% PHDVXUHV LQ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ FDQ EHWWHU FRQWULEXWH WR WKH SROLF\¶V PDLQ
objectives; 
x how the accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB measures can be improved 
and specifically how to address gaps in information provision and reporting facilities; 
x how the policy dialogue between the REGI Committee (and the European Parliament 
in general) and the EIB can be improved; and 
x the challenges in the implementation of EU-level initiatives that involve wider EIB 
activities (not just ESIF) and identify potential interplay and synergies (for example in 
relation to the European Fund for Strategic Investments). 
1.3 Structure  
 
7KHVWXG\¶VILQdings are presented as a synthesis of all the separate tasks rather than as a 
report on each task. The remainder of the study is structured as follows: 
 
 a background review of the EIB (history, governance, financial resources and 
European Investment Fund), ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV WKH(,%¶V UROH LQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\
and its involvement in other instruments (Chapter 2); 
 an overview of the effectiveness and efficiency of various EIB activities related to 
Cohesion Policy (Chapter 3); 
 an analysis of views on accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB activities in 
Cohesion Policy (Chapter 4); 
 an analysis of inter-institutional relationships between the EIB, Commission and 
European Parliament (Chapter 5); 
 an overview of changes in the 2014-20 period (Chapter 6); and 
 conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 7). 
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2 BACKGROUND  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
x The EIB has several roles in Cohesion Policy - advisory, (b)lending, capacity building 
and mandate management the implementation of holding funds for financial 
instruments. These roles vary across Member States.  
x The role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy has progressively expanded since the early 
2000s. In particular, tKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µVSHFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV¶ -(66,&$ -(5(0IE, 
JASPERS and JASMINE) in the 2007-13 period has led to deeper and wider 
engagement of the EIB in Cohesion Policy implementation. 
x The role of the EIB in providing co-financing for Cohesion Policy projects through 
loans, called (b)lending, which includes direct loans, global loans, framework loans 
and Structural Programme Lending is especially important in terms of financial scale 
and supports directly Cohesion Policy at the macro-scale. 
x The EIB provides advisory and analytical services through evaluations and gap 
analyses and ad hoc advice to managing authorities. These services are linked to the 
(,%¶V capacity-building activities and the technical assistance it provides for managing 
authorities, intermediary financial institutions, national authorities and the European 
Commission. 
x The legislative framework provides provisions for the involvement of the EIB in terms 
of consulting Member States in the development of Partnership Agreements and 
Operational Programmes. Moreover the EIB can provide appraisals of Cohesion Policy 
project.  
x In the context of the JEREMIE and JESSICA initiatives in the 2007-13 period, both the 
EIB and EIF have taken on management responsibilities for holding funds involving 
Structural Funds, known as µmandate management¶. For the EIF mandate 
management is its core business although it had no experience of this within Cohesion 
Policy framework, for the EIB mandate management was an altogether new 
responsibility. 
x The EIB has a significant role in the development, management and implementation  
of a wider set of Community instruments that do not operate within the Cohesion 
Policy framework but are closely linked (e.g., EFSI, COSME, INNOVFIN and CEF). 
 
7KLV FKDSWHU JLYHV D EULHI IDFWXDO RYHUYLHZ RI WKH (,%¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR &RKHVLRQ
Policy. The first section provides a brief history of the EIB. This is followed by a discussion of 
the legal framework in which the EIB Group operates in relation to Cohesion Policy. 
6XEVHTXHQW VHFWLRQV SURYLGH DQ RYHUYLHZ RI WKH (,%¶V DGYLVRU\ DQDO\WLFDO DQG FDSDFLW\
building services, holding fund management and blending and lending operations. It 
concludes with a brief discussion of EU-level instruments implemented by the EIB that are 
outside the Cohesion Policy legal framework but have synergies. 
 
2.1 Origins and operation of the European Investment Bank  
 
The EIB Group consists of the European Investment Bank (established in 1958) and the 
European Investment Fund (established in 1994). The EIB was established in 1958 under 
the Treaty of Rome to provide non-profit and policy-orientated lending, which was widely 
considered necessary for the establishment of a Common Market. More recently, Article 309 
RIWKH7UHDW\RQWKH)XQFWLRQLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7)(8FRQILUPHGWKDW µWKHWDVN of 
the European Investment Bank shall be to contribute by having recourse to the capital 
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market and utilising its own resources to the balanced and steady development of the 
internal market in the interest of the Union¶13 by facilitating and financing: 
x projects for developing less-developed regions; 
x projects for modernising or converting undertakings or for developing fresh activities 
called for by the establishment or functioning of the internal market, where these 
projects are of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the 
various means available in the individual Member States; and 
x projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or 
nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the 
individual Member States. 
Further, WKH(,%µVKDOOIDFLOLWDWHWKHILQDQFLQJRILQYHVWPHQWSURJUDPPHVLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWK
DVVLVWDQFH IURP WKH6WUXFWXUDO )XQGVDQGRWKHU8QLRQ)LQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV¶ As such, the 
TFEU provides the basis for EIB engagement in EU funding programmes.   
In this context, WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ WHUPV RI VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF FRKHVLRQ KDV EHHQ
defined as including the following components:14 
x lending to projects and programmes of investment in less-advantaged regions, often 
co-financing with EU funds and helping to attract other investors;  
x assisting governments to access EU Structural and Investment Funds by co-financing 
part of their respective national and/or regional contributions; 
x assisting governments to make the most of EU funds by using them to provide 
equity, loans and loan guarantees for sectors including regional, urban renewal and 
environmental projects and SMEs; and 
x providing advisory services to national and regional authorities to assist them in 
preparing and raising the quality of investment projects. 
 
In its current form, the EIB has a dual role. First, it acts as an investment bank that has to 
maintain its creditworthiness and protect its AAA rating in international financial markets. 
The AAA rating allows the Bank to offer loans at a lower financing cost to its borrowers. 
Second, it is a public institution tasked with implementing broader European policy 
objectives such as economic development, climate-change prevention, employment 
generation, financing SMEs and convergence.  
2.1.1 Development and role of the EIB  
+LVWRULFDOO\WKH(,%¶VPDQGDWHKDVDOZD\VKDGDUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWFRPSRQHQW
and it has a long history of supporting regional policy in the EU. The Treaty of Rome 
foresaw that its guiding principles of competition and free trade would be associated with 
uneven economic development across the regions of the (then) European Economic 
Community. It recognised that a self-reinforcing process would lead to more-developed 
regions becoming richer at the expense of less-developed regions. The EIB was established 
as one of a range of measures15 designed to facilitate development in less-favoured regions. 
Determining the functions and structure of the Bank was, however, not straightforward. 
Some Member States (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) argued that the 
organisation should be non-political, funded from capital markets, and should lend to 
                                          
13  Article 309 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 
0390. 
14  European Investment Bank (2014c) Promoting Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/economic_social_cohesion_en.pdf    
15  Other measures included the creation of the European Social Fund. 
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projects that might generate profits. Italy and France advocated a more dirigiste approach, 
advocating support through grants and funding for projects of a social nature. Germany was 
willing to compromise on the functions of the EIB (i.e. giving the Bank a regional 
development priority) but not on structure of financing, meaning the Bank would be non-
political and capitalised by financial markets.16 The proposed capital under Article 4 of the 
protocol annexed to the Treaty was 1 billion USD, which was distributed as follow:17 
 
x Luxembourg - 2 million 
x Belgium - 86.5 million 
x Netherlands - 71.5 million 
x Italy - 240 million 
x France - 325 million 
x Germany - 325 million 
Once established, EIB investment during the 1960s and 1970s was mainly channelled 
through state actors and largely concentrated on regional development.18 Southern Italy was 
the main beneficiary of EIB funding in these early years. Between 1959 and 1972 more than 
60 percent of EIB lending to Member States was granted to µSURGXFWLYH LQLWLDWLYHV DQG
JHQHUDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLPSOHPHQWHGLQ,WDO\DQGLQSDUWLFXODULQWKH0H]]RJLRUQR¶19  
 
7KH(,%¶VEXGJHWKDVLQFUHDVHG significantly since its foundation in 1958. This increase was 
driven by two processes. First, the successive rounds of EU enlargement played an 
important role in the development of the EIB 7KH %DQN¶V VXEVFULEHG FDSLWDO in 2015 
amounted to more than EUR 243 billioQ$IXOOEUHDNGRZQRIWKH(,%¶VFDSLWDOWKURXJKRXWLWV
history is provided in Table 1 and shows that, with each round of accession, the %DQN¶V 
overall capitaO LQFUHDVHG 7KH ILQDO FROXPQ SURYLGHV WKH FXUUHQW VKDUHKROGHU¶V FDSLWDO
SHUFHQWDJH E\ 0HPEHU 6WDWH 7KH VKDUHV DUH GLYLGHG DFFRUGLQJ WR HDFK 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V
economic weight in the EU (relative size of GDP). In the accession of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, EIB loans were often part of a larger package of funding to assist 
integration.20 
 
 
 
                                          
16  Coppolaro L (2010) Setting up the financing institution of the European Economic Community: the creation of 
the European Investment Bank (1955-1957), Journal of European Integration History, 15(2): 87±104.  
17  Bussière E, Dumoulin M and Willaert E (2008) The Bank of the European Union, The EIB, 1958-2008, p. 42. 
available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/the_eib_1958_2008_en.pdf  
18  Coppolaro L (2010) op. cit. 
19  Bussière et al. (2008) op. cit. p. 76. 
20  Griffith-Jones S and Tyson J (2012) op cit.; Bussière et al. (2008) op. cit. 
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Table 1: EIB Capital 1958-2013 
 
01/01/1958 01/01/1973 01/01/1981 01/01/1986 01/01/1995 01/05/2004 01/07/2013 Shareholder 
% 2013 
Germany 300 450 1575 5509 11017 26650 39195 16.1 
France 300 450 1575 5509 11017 26650 39195 16.1 
Italy 240 360 1260 5509 11017 26650 39195 16.1 
Netherlands 72 119 415 1527 3054 7387 10865 4.5 
Belgium 87 119 415 1527 3054 7387 10865 4.5 
Luxembourg 2 3 11 39 77 187 275 0.1 
United Kingdom - 450 1575 5509 11017 26650 39195 16.1 
Denmark - 60 210 773 1546 3740 5501 2.3 
Ireland - 15 53 193 387 935 1375 0.6 
Greece - - 113 414 828 2004 2947 1.2 
Spain - - - 2025 4050 15990 23517 9.7 
Portugal - - - 267 534 1291 1899 0.8 
Sweden - - - - 2026 4901 7208 3.0 
Austria - - - - 1516 3667 5393 2.2 
Finland - - - - 871 2107 3099 1.3 
Poland - - - - - 3411 5017 2.1 
Czech Republic - - - - - 1259 1851 0.8 
Hungary - - - - - 1191 1751 0.7 
Slovakia - - - - - 428 630 0.3 
Slovenia - - - - - 398 585 0.2 
Lithuania - - - - - 250 367 0.2 
Cyprus - - - - - 183 270 0.1 
Latvia - - - - - 152 224 0.1 
Estonia - - - - - 118 173 0.1 
Malta - - - - - 70 103 0.0 
Romania - - - - - - 1270 0.5 
Bulgaria - - - - - - 427 0.2 
Croatia - - - - - - 891 0.4 
Total 1001 2026 7202 28801 62011 163656 243283  
 
Source: Bussière et al. (2008); EIB (2015)
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The EIB grew significantly and assisted the integration of accession countries into the 
Common Market and fostered economic convergence. Table 2 provides a comparison of the 
scale of EIB and ERDF intervention between 1975 and 1982. Italy remained the main 
recipient of EIB funding after the first accession round. However, the UK and Ireland also 
became major recipients of EIB loans. In real terms, the total amount of EIB loans was 
higher than ERDF interventions with the exception of Luxembourg and Netherlands. 
Proportionally, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Italy received higher contributions from the 
EIB than the ERDF.   
 
Table 2:  Comparison of EIB and ERDF allocations 1975-1982 by Member State (in 
million ECU)  
Country 
ERDF 
interventions 
% of total 
ERDF budget 
EIB loans 
% of total EIB 
loans 
Belgium 70.26 0.98 545.4 3.00 
Denmark 84.48 1.20 728.80 4.00 
France 1128.48 15.80 2104.40 11.50 
Germany 392.08 5.50 559.50 3.00 
Greece 474.85 6.70 672.30 3.60 
Ireland 450.82 6.40 1759.10 9.60 
Italy 2740.03 38.30 8030.70 43.70 
Luxembourg 7.23 0.10 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 100.40 1.40 30.40 0.20 
United Kingdom 1707.19 23.80 3947.90 21.40 
Total 7155.82 100.00 18378.50 100.00 
Source: Romus P, Économie régionale européenne, 4th edition, Brussels University Press, Brussels, [1983], p. 256 
and the annual reports of the EIB from 1975 to 1982 
 
Second, the EIB broadened its scope of activities to include fields such as energy and 
environmental protection whilst increasing its cooperation with non-state actors.21 The 
energy crisis in the 1970s focused attention on (XURSH¶VHQHUJ\GHSHQGHQFH and led to the 
EIB changing LWV OHQGLQJSROLF\ WR IDYRXUSURMHFWVVSHFLILFDOO\GHDOLQJZLWK(XURSH¶VHQHUJ\
security. In the 1980s, environmental protection also became a focus for EIB activity. The 
Single European Act made environmental protection a separate Community objective to 
which the EIB would direct loans, for instance funding anti-pollution facilities, water 
treatment systems, river regulation works to prevent erosion, etc.22 
2.1.2  European Investment Fund 
In 1994, the European Investment Fund (EIF) was established to provide support for SMEs 
across Europe. The Fund was reformed in 2000 to become a specialist arm of the EIB Group 
for providing risk capital. With its own legal personality and financial autonomy,23 the EIF is 
a public-private partnership owned by the EIB (61.3 percent) the European Union through 
the Commission (26.5 percent) and 29 public and private institutions (12.2 percent).24 The 
last category includes financial institutions such as Barclays Bank plc in the UK and Banco 
Santander in Spain and national regional development banks (e.g. Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (BGK)25 in Poland, Banque publique d'investissement (BPI France)26 in France and 
                                          
21  Coppolaro L (2010) op. cit. 
22  Bussière et al. (2008) op. cit. p. 149. 
23  European Investment Fund (2014b) Statutes, available at: 
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/statutes.htm  
24  EIF (2016) Register of shareholder, 26 January 2016  available at: http://www.eif.org/who_we_are/shareholder/ 
25  The Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) is the State development bank of Poland. It is the main partner in the 
promotion of government-sponsored social welfare and economic programmes implemented to support 
entrepreneurship and infrastructure, as well as residential investments at national, regional and local levels. 
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some of the German Land banks) as well as development agencies (e.g. Scottish Enterprise 
in the UK).  
 
The EIF provides finance mainly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In terms of 
regional development, it has a diverse portfolio, including a range of risk-sharing and 
capacity-building activities. The Fund focuses on regional development alongside existing 
EU-wide SME/Mid-caps schemes.  
 
The main objectives of the EIF are:27  
x fostering EU objectives, particularly in the field of entrepreneurship, growth, 
innovation, research and development, employment and regional development; and 
x generating an appropriate return for its shareholders, through a commercial pricing 
policy and a balance of fee and risk-based income. 
 
It supports EU objectives through:28 
x the provision of guarantees as well as other comparable instruments for loans and 
other financial obligations in whatever form is legally permissible; 
x the acquisition, holding, managing and disposal of participations in any enterprise 
subject to the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 (i) of Article 12 of the statute of 
the European Investment Fund which states that µWKHJHQHUDOPHHWLQJ29 shall take 
DQ\GHFLVLRQDXWKRULVLQJWKH)XQGWRFRQGXFWRSHUDWLRQV¶ 
 
The authorised capital of the EIF is EUR 4.5 billion, divided into 4,500 shares each with a 
nominal value of EUR 1 million. These shares are open to subscription by the members of 
the Fund in accordance with Article 6 of the Statutes.30, 31 The capital may be increased by 
decision of the General Meeting acting with a majority of 85 percent of the votes cast. 
2.1.3 Governance 
The EIB is not classified DVDQµLQVWLWXWLRQ¶µ(8DJHQF\¶RU(8µDGYLVRU\ERG\¶EXW
LQVWHDGLVFODVVLILHGXQGHUWKHUHPDLQLQJFDWHJRU\RIµERG\¶. The EIB is not an agency 
under the (8¶V definition as it is specifically mentioned in the Treaty.32 Its governance 
structures enjoy a high degree of autonomy within the institutional framework of the EU. 
The EIB has its own legal personality which is distinct from the Union.33 It is also organised 
as an autonomous corporate structure whose shareholders are the Member States and the 
EU, and it is governed by a specific Statute laid down in Protocol No. 5 to the Treaties.34  
 
The EIB is an International Financial Institution (IFI), i.e. it is owned and jointly governed by 
a number of countries7KH%DQN¶VVKDUHKROGHUVDUHWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV of the EU, with 
QDWLRQDOVKDUHVDOORFDWHGDFFRUGLQJWRHDFK0HPEHU6WDWH¶VHFRQRPLFZHLJKWLQWKH(8based 
                                                                                                                                        
26  BPI France is a business development bank established in 2012 through the merger of a number of existing 
business support funds and organisations in France. BPI France is not a bank as such (it has no banking licence) 
but operates a number of financial instruments, principally targeted at SMEs. It operates nationally and has 
strong regional presence. 
27  For more information see: http://www.eif.org/who_we_are/  
28  European Investment Fund (2014b) op. cit.  
29  All members can participate in the general meeting. 
30  European Investment Fund (2014b) op. cit. Article 5.  
31  All shares are currently subscribed or allocated for subscription. 
32  Flinder M (2004) Distributed public governance in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 11:3, 
520-544, DOI: 10.1080/13501760410001694282 
33  Art. 308(1) of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 - 
0390. 
34  Hachez and Wouters (2012) op. cit. 
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on relative size of GDP (see Table 1). The governance of the EIB comprises four statutory 
bodies; three are decision-making bodies (the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors 
and the Management Committee) and one is a control body (Audit Committee). The main 
roles of each of these bodies are listed in Table 3, and an outline of the governance structure 
is provided in Figure 3. 
 
With respect to the functioning of the lending process, applications for loans can be made 
directly to the EIB or through the Commission or Member State. EIB loans can only be 
financed if they are approved by the Member State on whose territory the project is to be 
carried out. The process regarding the decision to grant finance is illustrated in Figure 4. In 
the first instance, EIB staff review the soundness and merits of a project proposal. Their 
appraisal of projects considers the following questions: 
 
x How does the project fit into the policies defined or supported by the European 
Union? 
x What is the contribution of the project to the economy and to society as a whole? Is 
the project sustainable from economic, financial, environmental, social and technical 
points of view? 
x How would the project benefit from EIB involvement, financially or otherwise? 
x Is the structure and risk level of the operation35 acceptable to the EIB? 
x Are the contractual terms and conditions proposed by the EIB acceptable to the 
beneficiary of the loan or investment? 
Subsequently, EIB staff report to the Management Committee which approves the 
submission of a financing proposal to the Board of Directors. Decision-making occurs by 
double majority (both the members of the Board and the amount of capital). These rules aim 
to act as a safeguard against unilateral decisions made by large shareholders while barring 
measures lacking their support.36 The Board of Directors requires unanimity if the 
Commission is against a proposal (which is rare). The Member State in which an operation is 
planned can veto decisions irrespective of the opinion of other Member States and the 
Commission (which is also very rare). The EIB will only sign a loan contract if the Board of 
Directors has formally approved the operations.37 
 
The Bank monitors each operation, not only for financial risk purposes but also to see 
whether the expected results of the project materialise. The Operations Evaluation Division 
of the Bank can conduct ex post evaluations of a selection of completed projects. The 
evaluation reports are submitted to the Management Committee and forwarded to the Board 
of Directors. These reports are also published on the EIB website.38 
 
In addition, the EIB has at its disposal all the controls that are normally found in a bank. The 
LPSDFWRIWKHRSHUDWLRQRQWKH%DQN¶VFUHGLWPDUNHWDQGRSHUDWLRQDOULVNVare assessed by 
the Risk Management Directorate. Legal risks are evaluated by the Legal Directorate. The 
services involved in the operation may see their procedures and specific cases reviewed by 
Internal Audit, to enhanFH HIILFLHQF\ /DVWO\ WKH (,%¶s Compliance Office conducts several 
checks to review the integrity and reputation of the participants in the operation.39 
 
                                          
35  Operation refers to a project, contracts, action or group of projects. 
36  Hachez and Wouters (2012) op. cit. 
37  European Investment Bank (2015c) The Governance of the European Investment Bank, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/governance_of_the_eib_en.pdf     
38  Ibid.  
39  Ibid. 
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Table 3: EIB governing bodies and roles  
Governing 
body 
Appointment Main Role  Decisions 
Board of 
Governors  
28 Ministers 
(usually Finance) 
designated by 
each Member 
State. 
- Guiding principles 
- High-level policies 
- Approval of annual 
accounts 
- Appointment and 
remuneration of 
members of the 
other governing 
bodies 
The Board of Governors lays 
down credit policy guidelines, 
approves the annual report 
and financial statements, gives 
authorisation on a country-by-
country basis for the Bank to 
operate outside the EU and 
decides on capital increases. 
Board of 
Directors  
29 directors, one 
from each Member 
State and one 
from the 
Commission. 
Appointed by 
Board of 
Governors for 
renewable period 
of five years. 
- Approval of 
financing operations 
- Approval of policies 
and the operational 
strategy 
- Control of the 
Management 
Committee 
The Board of Directors 
approves every decision to 
grant finance (e.g. EIB loan or 
guarantee) and the borrowing 
programme. It reviews 
borrowing and treasury 
operations and exerts control 
over the activities of the 
Management Committee. 
Management 
Committee  
One President and 
eight vice 
presidents (usually 
four from larger 
Member States 
and five 
nominated from 
other Member 
States.  
- Day-to-day 
management of the 
Bank under the 
authority of the EIB 
President 
Management Committee 
members are solely 
responsible to the Bank and 
independent in the 
performance of their duties. 
Staff come under the direct 
authority of the President. 
Audit 
Committee 
Six members and 
maximum of three 
observers 
appointed for a 
non-renewable 
six-year period. 
- Auditing of the 
annual accounts 
- Verifying that the 
%DQN¶VDFWLYLWLHV
conform to best 
banking practice 
The Audit Committee is an 
independent body, directly 
answerable to the Board of 
Governors. It is responsible for 
verifying that the operations of 
the Bank have been conducted 
and its books kept in a proper 
manner. The Audit Committee 
is also responsible for auditing 
WKH%DQN¶VDFFRXQWV,WYHULILHV
that WKH%DQN¶VDFWLYLWLHV
conform to best banking 
practice applicable to it. 
Source: Adapted from EIB (2015) The Governance of the European Investment Bank, EIB, Luxembourg 
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Figure 3: The EIB governance structure  
 
 
Source: European Investment Bank (2014d) EIB 2014 Annual Report, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg  
 
 
Figure 4: EIB (b)lending project cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Investment Bank (2015e) Governance of the EIB, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg 
 
EIB operations are subject to a number of controls:40 
x the Board of Governors is composed of Member State representatives and oversees 
the BDQN¶VDFWLYLWLHV 
x the European Parliament Committee for Budgetary Control (CONT) is responsible for 
FRQWUROOLQJWKH(,%¶VILQDQFLDODFWLYLWLHVZKLFKLQYROYHVH[DPLQLQJLWVDQQXDOUHSRUW; 
x EIB activities are also regularly evaluated by its internal operations evaluation 
division; and 
x there are mechanisms that allow individuals to complain about possible 
maladministration PHFKDQLVPV LQFOXGH WKH (,%¶V LQWHUQDO &RPSODLQWV PHFKDQLVP
the European Ombudsman for maladministration; and file an action with the Court of 
Justice of the EU41). 
                                          
40 Ibid. 
41  The EIB also has a Whistleblowing policy (for more information see: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/eib_s_whistleblowing_policy_en.pdf )   
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The EIF has a separate governance structure and legal personality, governed by the EIF 
Statutes. The chief executive is responsible for the day-to-day management of the EIF and 
reports to a Board of Directors whose members are designated by the three shareholder 
groups (see Section 2.1.2). The Board of Directors consists of seven members and is 
accountable to the Annual General Meeting.  
 
In terms of its selection of operations, the EIF only offers financing through intermediaries 
(e.g. banks, guarantee, leasing and microfinance institutions, private equity and venture 
capital funds) and does not directly provide finance to final recipients. 
 
2.2 The evolving legal basis for EIB activities in Cohesion Policy 
 
The EIB has been involved in the delivery of Cohesion Policy since the reform of the 
Structural Funds in 1988. Over successive funding periods, its role has developed with 
regard to the implementation of FIs in particular. As FIs have become more prominent 
and complex, demand for WKH(,%¶VH[SHUWLVHVNLOOVDQGNQRZ-how in this field has 
grown, and its involvement in developing FIs increasingly requested by Member 
States and the Commission.42 However, the EIB is also more fundamentally involved in 
VXSSRUWLQJDQGSURPRWLQJWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VFRKHVLRQREMHFWLYHVXQGHUWKH7)(8Article 
174 (ex Article 158 TEC) of tKHFRQVROLGDWHGYHUVLRQRIWKH7)(8DUWLFXODWHVWKH8QLRQ¶V
µFRKHVLRQ¶REMHctives regarding the reduction of disparities between regions. Further to this, 
Article 175 (ex Article 159 TEC) specifies that the Union will support its cohesion objectives 
µWKURXJK WKH 6WUXFWXUDO )XQGV (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, 
Guidance Section; European Social Fund; European Regional Development Fund), the 
European Investment Bank and the other existing Financial Instruments)¶. As such, the role 
of the EIB LV H[SOLFLWO\ OLQNHG WR WKH (8¶V FRKHVLRQ REMHFWLYHV LQ WKH (8¶V FRQVWLWutional 
foundation.  
2.2.1 Pre-2000 
Prior to 2000, there was no documented provision for the EIB to be directly 
involved in the implementation of the Structural Funds (i.e. mandate management ± 
see Section 2.4). The rules governing the 1994-99 funding period were laid out in a series of 
UHJXODWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKHµIUDPHZRUNUHJXODWLRQ¶&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQ((&1R. 2081/93, the 
title of which referred to the tasks of the Structural Funds and their coordination with the 
operations of the EIB.43 As inferred by this title, the EIB was then an institution which 
operated very much alongside the European Commission, providing measures such as loans. 
Whilst the framework regulation sought to promote complementarity between the Structural 
Funds and the actions of the EIB (for example, they both sought to provide support to 
Objective 1 regions)44, there was limited integration between their actions. The regulation 
refers to the EIB as a provider of financial assistance alongside the Structural Funds 
DQGµRWKHUH[LVWLQJ&RPPXQLW\ILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV¶.45  
                                          
42  It has been argued that the expansion of EIB activities in general is based on the somewhat vague notion that it 
RSHUDWHV µLQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI WKH 8QLRQ¶ IRU H[DPSOH VHH Dunnett (1994) 'The European Investment Bank: 
Autonomous instrument of common policy?' Common Market Law Review, 31, p. 721; Hachez N and Wouters J 
(2012) op cit. 
43  EEC (1993) Regulation No. 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88 on the tasks of the 
Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the 
operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, OJ L 193, 31.7.1993, 
pp. 5±19. 
44  Refers to those regions in the Union lagging behind in their development, undergoing restructuring or facing 
specific geographical, economic or social problems. 
45  7KHXVHRI WKHWHUP µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV¶ LQ WKH)UDPHZRUNUHJXODWLRQGLGQRWUHIHU WRUHSD\Dble (revolving) 
funds in the contemporary sense, but to financial assistance mechanisms in general. 
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2.2.2 2000-2006 period 
The general provisions governing the Structural Funds in the 2000-06 period, as laid out in 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999,46 were again less explicit in their provisions 
regarding the role of the EIB in delivering Structural Funds. Article 10(2) regarding 
µcRRUGLQDWLRQ¶ VSHFLILHG WKDW µ,Q RUGHU WR PD[LPLVH WKH VWLPXOXV SURYLGHG E\ WKH EXGJHW
resources deployed, making use of appropriate financial instruments, the Community 
assistance provided in the form of grants may be combined in an appropriate way with 
loans and guarantees7KLVFRPELQDWLRQPD\EHGHWHUPLQHGLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKH(,%¶. 
However, the use of financial instruments within Structural Funds programmes was 
very limited during this period. There were also multiple implementing regulations 
covering various aspects of the implementation of the Structural Funds in 2000-06, none of 
which touched on the role of the EIB.  
During this period, the EIB began to play a more significant role in supporting the delivery of 
the Structural Funds. It was mandated to provide expertise and advice; for example, EIB 
representatives were able to participate in Programme Monitoring Committees in advisory 
roles47 and the EIB could be involved in the preparation of programming documents.48 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQKDGWRFRQVXOWWKH(,%RQµPDMRUSURMHFWV¶ZKHUHQHFHVVDU\49 
However, EIB was less involved in the detailed implementation of Cohesion Policy and 
particularly financial instruments.  
2.2.3 2007-13 period 
The EIB played a more substantial role in the implementation and delivery of FIs 
under the Structural Funds in the 2007-13 period. However, while the regulatory 
framework provided some rules and conditions as to the role of the EIB at the start of the 
period, this evolved during the course of 2007-13 as the regulations were amended. Article 
36 of the general regulation for the 2007-13 period (Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1083/200650) laid out the rules regarding the participation of the EIB and EIF. Article 44 set 
out the broad provisions concerning FIs, and specified that financial institutions such as the 
EIB and EIF could manage Holding Funds (HFs). Where HFs were being set up, the Member 
State or the managing authority had several implementation options; one of these was to 
µDZDUG D JUDQW GHILQHG IRU WKLV SXUSRVH DV D GLUHFW ILQDQFLDO FRQWULEXWLRQ E\ ZD\ RI D
GRQDWLRQWRWKH(,%RUWRWKH(,)¶ (Article 44(b)(i) of the original iteration of the general 
regulation),51 This rule was subsequently amended through Council Regulation (EC) No. 
284/2009 of 7 April 2009. This amendment aimed to strengthen µthe possibility of provision 
by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF) of 
assistance to Member States in the preparation and implementation of operational 
programmes¶ DQG µWDNH DFFRXQW RI WKH VWDWXV RI WKH (,% DQG (,) DV ILQDQFLDO HQWLWLHV
recognised by the Treaty, when financial engineering operations are organised involving 
WKHPDVKROGLQJIXQGVLWVKRXOGEHSRVVLEOHWRGLUHFWO\DZDUGWKHPDFRQWUDFW¶.52 The same 
                                          
46  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds 
OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, pp. 1±42. 
47  Council Regulation (EC) op cit.,  Article 35. 
48  Council Regulation (EC) op cit.,   Article 15 (5). 
49  Council Regulation (EC) op cit.  , Article 26. 
50  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1260/1999. OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, pp. 25 ± 78. 
51  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, op. cit. 
52  Council Regulation (EC) No. 284/2009 of 7 April 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, OJ L 94, 
8.4.2009, pp. 10-12. 
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amendment added to Article 46(1) a second sub-paragraph to recognise WKDWµ7KH(,%RUWKH
EIF may, upon request of the Member States, WDNH SDUW LQ WHFKQLFDO DVVLVWDQFH DFWLYLWLHV¶
related to operational programme activities.53 
 
In 2007-13, the management costs and fees paid to bodies implementing FIs were 
calculated on the basis of services provided (e.g. investment strategy, number of FIs and 
number intermediaries, etc.) but are contractually expressed and reported as a percentage 
of the OP contribution to the HFs and FIs and were, in many cases, decoupled from their 
performance.54 Management costs and fees paid to the EIB were limited by the thresholds 
laid out in Implementing Regulation 1828/2006.55 These varied from a maximum of two to 
four percent of the funds allocated from the respective operational programme depending on 
the structure or facility.56  
 
In the context of the ongoing effects of the financial crisis and economic downturn, the 
general regulation was again amended to insert a new Article 36a, which introduced new 
µULVN-VKDULQJ LQVWUXPHQWV¶. This Article was to be implemented as an exception to the 
shared management approach applying to other Structural Funds expenditure. The 
amendment was the result of a request by Eurozone Member States to enhance synergies 
between EIB loan programmes and EU investment in the Member States most affected by 
the crisis.57 The measure was foreseen for countries in receipt of special macro-economic 
assistance (at that time, Greece, Ireland and Portugal), with the aim of supporting the 
initiation of projects co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or the 
Cohesion Fund, which were unable to proceed due to financial restraints (for example, 
infrastructure projects that generate net revenues, the value of which could not be covered 
by Cohesion Policy grants, or investments for which the maximum allowable public aid was 
capped by State aid rules).58 The amendment foresaw a possible role for the EIB, as the 
'risk-sharing instruments' could be established through cooperation agreements concluded 
by the Commission with the EIB (or with national or international financial bodies).  
 
As noted above, the original legislative provisions in 2007-13 were brief on the role of the 
EIB (and on the implementation of financial instruments in general). In addition to a series 
of reJXODWRU\ DPHQGPHQWV IRXU µJXLGDQFH QRWHV¶ RQ ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV ZHUH
issued E\WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VCoordination Committee of the Funds (COCOF).59,60 The COCOF 
                                          
53  Council Regulation (EC) No. 284/2009, op. cit. 
54  European Commission (2015a) Guidance for Member States on Article 42(1)(d) CPR ± Eligible management costs 
and fees ± for financial instruments managed in accordance with Article 38(4)(b) CPR; DRAFT, EGESIF_15-0021-
00, 08/06/2015. 
55  Commission Regulation (EC) 1828/2006 setting out the rules for the implementation of Council Regulation 
1083/2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Regional Development Fund, available at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02006R1828-20111201&from=EN  
56  Ibid. 
57  (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQF&RPPLVVLRQZHOFRPHV3DUOLDPHQW¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIULVN-sharing instruments for 
Member States worst hit by the financial crisis, to contribute to investment and job creation, Press Release 
IP/12/383 19 April 2012.  
58  Ibid.  
59  In 2007-13, COCOF was a standing committee of the European Commission attended by officials from Member 
States, with management and consultative powers. COCOF assisted the Commission in taking implementing 
decisions delegated to it by the Council and the European Parliament under the General Regulation (Council 
Regulation No 1083/2006). 
60  European Commission (2007) Note of the Commission Services on Financial Engineering in the 2007-13 
programming period, DOC COCOF/07/0018/01-EN FINAL of 16 July 2007; European Commission (2008) 
Guidance Note on Financial Engineering, COCOF 08/0002/03-EN of 22 December 2008; European Commission 
(2011a) Guidance Note on Financial Engineering Instruments under Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1083/2006, COCOF_10-0014-04-EN of 21 February 2011, and European Commission (2012b) Revised Guidance 
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notes provided additional guidance and clarification for managing authorities on the 
implementation of financial instruments under Structural Funds programmes. The first note 
confirmed that use of the EIB or EIF to manage Holding Funds was encouraged by the 
&RPPLVVLRQ UHIOHFWLQJ WKH VSHFLDO VWDWXV RI WKH (,% DQG(,) µDV&RPPXQLW\ ERGLHVZKLFK
emanate IURPWKH(&7UHDW\¶61 The reasons why the EIB and EIF are not subject to public 
procurement rules were elaborated in the subsequent notes.  
 
It is worth noting that, during the period, WKHµXPEUHOOD¶)LQDQFLDO5HJXODWLRQZKLFK lays out 
general rules regarding the EU budget underpinned the provisions with regard to the EIB 
DQG (,)¶V SRWHQWLDO UROH LQ IDFLOLWDWLQJ DQG LPSOHPHQWLQJ ),V XQGHU 6WUXFWXUDO )XQGV
programmes, referred to above.62 
2.2.4 2014-20 period 
In the 2014-20 period, the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) lays out the general 
conditions and objectives governing the ESI Funds (the ERDF, ESF, the Cohesion Fund, the 
EAFRD and the EMFF).63, 64 This includes several references to the role of the EIB in Cohesion 
Policy implementation. The CPR defines the EIB DV µthe European Investment Bank, the 
European Investment Fund or any subsidiary of the European Investment Bank¶65 
 
$UWLFOHRI WKH&35VHWVRXWEURDG UHTXLUHPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ WKH µpDUWLFLSDWLRQRI WKH(,%¶
such as its capacity as an advisory body. Article 38 of the CPR applies specifically to the 
implementation of FIs and outlines the direct role which the EIB can adopt. Article 
38(4)(b)(i) in particular specifies that a managing authority may entrust implementation 
tasks to the EIB. In such cases, the EIB is bound by the same liabilities, conditionalities and 
responsibilities applicable to other bodies that can implement HFs. These include, for 
example, the requirement either to open separate fiduciary accounts in the name of the 
managing authority WR PDQDJH WKH WUDQVDFWLRQV RI WKH ), RU WR µVHW XS WKH ILQDQFLDO
LQVWUXPHQWDVDVHSDUDWHEORFNRI ILQDQFH¶ZLWKLQ WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQLH WKH(,% However, 
where the EIB is designated as the implementing body responsible for a HF, the managing 
authority is obliged to mandate a firm(s) to carry out on-the-spot verifications and audits.66  
 
Article 39 of the CPR refers to the contribution which can be made by the ERDF (and the 
EAFRD) to uncapped joint guarantee and securitisation financial instruments in favour of 
SMEs where they are implemented by the EIB. The Regulation specifies that requests for 
payment to the Commission can be 100 percent of the amounts paid to the EIB, thus no 
national co-financing is required for allocating ERDF or EAFRD funds to the SME Initiative.67  
 
                                                                                                                                        
Note on Financial Engineering Instruments under Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, 
COCOF_10-0014-04-EN, Revised Version 08/02/2012. 
61  European Commission (2007) op. cit. 
62  Regulations (EU, EURATOM) No. 966/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 October 
2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, 
EURATOM) No. 1605/2002, OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, pp. 1±96. 
63  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down 
common provisions... OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, pp. 320±469, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0320:0469:EN:PDF  
64  There is also a series of Fund-specific Regulations, numerous Delegated Regulations and Implementing Acts, 
several relating specifically to FI implementation  (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/legislation/regulations/).  
65  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013, op. cit. Art. 2. 
66  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 480/2014 of 3 March 2014, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.138.01.0005.01.ENG 
67  Regulations (EU) 1303/2013 Art. 39(7), Also see: European Commission (2014c) Financial instruments in ESIF 
programmes 2014-2020; A short reference guide for Managing Authorities, Ares(2014)2195942, p. 12. 
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If not allocating ESI Funds to an EU-level instrument/the EU SME Initiative, the managing 
authority has several FI implementation options. They can undertake implementation tasks 
directly (for loans and guarantees only); they can invest in the capital of existing or newly 
created legal entities dedicated to implementing FIs and get them to undertake 
implementation; or they can entrust implementation tasks to several bodies. Entrusted 
entities can include the EIB, international financial institutions (IFI) or publically-controlled 
Member State financial institutions; or bodies governed by public or private law.68 Articles 
37(1), 38(4) and 38(5) of the CPR outline a series of general principles and specific 
provisions with which managing authorities must comply when selecting bodies 
implementing financial instruments. Delegated Regulation No. 480/201469 provides further 
detail on the selection of bodies and the management and control of FIs supplementing the 
CPR. Where the option to entrust is chosen and a body other than the EIB or EIF is used, 
Articles 7(1) and 7(2) specify a number of minimum requirements. Article 7(3) refers to the 
selection procedure of financial intermediaries by bodies implementing funds of funds 
(including by the EIB and the EIF). 
 
A competitive market process may also be applied, based on the discretion of the Member 
State. This should be in line with national and EU public procurement rules. However, it 
VKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHµHQWUXVW¶RSWLRQVRXWOLQHGDERYHIDOORXWside procurement rules (i.e. 
direct contracts with the EIB and EIF, and if certain conditions are met, IFIs and public 
RZQHGµLQ-KRXVH¶HQWLWLHV 
 
Some of the Commission guidance accompanying the legislation was still being prepared at 
the time of writing (September 2015). For example, a guidance on management costs and 
IHHVIRUILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWVXQGHU$UWLFOHEDQG$UWLFOHµ(OLJLEOHH[SHQGLWXUHDW
FORVXUH¶ RI WKH &35 has been released to the EGESIF, the Expert Group on European 
Structural and Investment Funds.70 A new approach to the calculation of management costs 
and fees for organisations implementing FIs has been introduced in the 2014-20 period. 
Fees are now partly calculated on the basis of performance, under Article 42(1)(d), (2), (5) 
and (6) of the CPR. The implications for the EIB (and other bodies such as national financial 
institutions) are that management costs and fees are linked to performance criteria which 
must be defined taking into consideration certain criteria including the rate of disbursement 
RI FRQWULEXWLRQV DQG µWKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI WKH ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW WR WKH REMHFWLYHV DQG
RXWSXWVRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶, amongst others. Delegated Regulation No. 480/201471 also lays 
out thresholds (i.e. caps) for costs and fees which the managing authority cannot exceed 
(Article 13). 
 
Additional draft Commission guidance has been released to EGESIF on the selection of 
bodies implementing FIs, including funds of funds.72 This confirms that contracts can be 
concluded with the EIB and EIF directly by managing authorities without the need for a 
competitive process/public procurement. Further, where this is the case, the EIB/EIF can 
select financial intermediaries to manage FIs on the basis of its internal procedures.  
 
                                          
68  CPR Article 38 (4) 
69  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 480/2014 of 3 March 2014, Article 9 available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.138.01.0005.01.ENG 
70  European Commission (2015a) op cit.  
71  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 480/2014 of 3 March 2014, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.138.01.0005.01.ENG  
72  European Commission (2015b) Guidance for Member States on the selection of bodies implementing FIs, 
including funds of funds; DRAFT, EGESIF_15-0033-00, 13/10/2015. 
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Additionally, the EIB can be involved in the monitoring and reporting processes of ESIF 
programmes. If the EIB contributes to a programme it may participate in the work of the 
monitoring committee in an advisory capacity (CPR Art. 48 (4)).73 Moreover, the progress 
reports to be submitted by the Member States must demonstrate how implementation 
mechanisms ensure coordination between ESIF Funds and other Union national funding and 
EIB instruments (Art. 52 (2)(b)).  
 
7KH&35DOVRUHIHUVWRWKH(,%¶VUROHLQUHODWLRQWRWHFKQLFal assistance. The EIB can provide 
assistance in terms of: 
 
x project preparation and appraisal (Art. 58 (2)(a));  
x evaluations, expert reports, statistics and studies (Art. 58(2)(e)); and 
x the strengthening of national and regional capacity regarding investment planning, 
needs assessment, preparation, design and implementation of financial instruments, 
joint action plans and major projects (Art. 58 (2)(j)). 
It is worth noting WKDW WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ SURYLGLQJ WHFKQLFDO DVVLVWDQFH IRU&RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\
operations extends to operations that are not explicitly laid down in the Regulation (e.g. 
JASPERS). 
 
2.3 The EIB advisory and capacity-building role 
 
7KHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQVKDYHRXWOLQHGKRZWKH(,%¶VUROHLQLPSOHPHQWLQJ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\JUHZ
over successive programme periods, particularly in relation to the implementation of 
financial instruments, and was underpinned by the regulatory provisions in place during each 
period. However, it was during the 2007-13 programme period that FIs became a more 
significant feature of Cohesion Policy implementation, thus boosting the role of the EIB.  
 
7KH(,%¶VUHPLWJRHVEH\RQGWKDWRIDILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQ. In addition to being a bank, it 
provides knowledge and advises on good practice in regional development (for 
example as part of JASPERS it advices beneficiaries on major project application).74 
The (,%¶V role in providing analytical expertise and ad-hoc advice has been an important 
area of expansion. In the 2000-06 period, the EIB began providing assistance for setting up 
FIs (for example in North West England, UK). However, in the 2007-13 period this role 
became more structured with dedicated units and staff to provide support, and its advisory 
role also expanded into areas beyond FIs. The EIB provides TA for major projects, 
particularly in central, eastern and southern European countries, and is involved in other 
capacity-building activities. For 2014-2020, the EIB also implements the technical assistance 
platform, fi-compass, established in partnership with the European Commission. fi-compass 
is financed from the EU budget to provide generic advisory and capacity-building services on 
the implementation of ESIF financial instruments and microfinance under the EaSI 
programme for Member States, MAs and microfinance providers (see Section 6.4). The 
following section discusses the role of the EIB in an advisory and technical assistance 
capacity. 
2.3.1 JESSICA and JEREMIE initiatives 
The JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) initiative 
was created in 2007 to help managing authorities set up investment funds supporting 
                                          
73  In practice the EIB already performed a similar role in some instances in 2007-13 (for example the SPL 
contractual agreement in 2007-13 period evolved into monitoring, reporting and advising.  
74  European Parliament (2015b) Report on the European Investment Bank ±Annual Report 2013, A8-0057/2015.  
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sustainable urban development, delivered to projects via Urban Development Funds (UDFs) 
and, if required, HFs. The creation of JESSICA was a policy initiative of the European 
Commission developed jointly with the EIB and in collaboration with the Council of 
Europe Development Bank (CEB). The main perceived benefits of setting up funds for 
urban development projects were seen as being: 
 
x to make Structural Funds support more efficient and effective by using 'non-grant' 
financial instruments, thus creating stronger incentives for successful project 
implementation; 
x to mobilise additional financial resources for public-private partnerships and other 
urban development projects with a focus on sustainability/recyclability; and 
x to use financial and managerial expertise from international financial institutions such 
as the EIB. 
Under the JESSICA initiative, the EIB was involved in  
x advising and assisting national, regional and local authorities in implementing funds 
supporting urban development projects using ERDF or ESF; this included carrying out 
evaluation studies (see Section 3.4); and 
x promoting the use of Urban Development Funds and best practice across Europe.  
The JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro-to-Medium Enterprises) initiative was 
created in 2006 to support national or regional managing authorities in using part of their EU 
Structural Funds to finance small and medium-sized enterprises by means of equity, loans or 
guarantees, through a revolving HF acting as an umbrella fund.  
 
The EIF had several roles in relation to financial instruments set up for enterprise 
support. These financial instruments were intended to be individually tailored to the needs 
of each Member State or region, following an evaluation of market failures and the 
appropriate remedies in the context of its OPs. These evaluations could be carried out by the 
EIF. 
 
The EIB and EIF set up dedicated task forces for the JESSICA and JEREMIE initiatives 
at the start of the 2007-13 programme period. These teams consisted of 10-15 people 
GUDZQ IURPWKH%DQN¶V WHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWGLYLVLRQV. The EIF established a separate unit for 
JEREMIE. The services were to an extent intertwined with the EIB¶Vcapacity-building role. 
One of the main advisory services offered by the EIB in the 2007-13 period was its analytical 
support function in terms of undertaking gap analyses and feasibility/evaluation studies for 
FIs under these initiatives (see also Section 3.4). By the end of 2011, c. 65 JESSICA 
feasibility studies in 21 Member States had been conducted with the support of the EIB 
and financed by the Commission. 75 Additionally, the EIF undertook 55 gap analyses for 
SME support (JEREMIE) in 19 EU Member States (mostly in Spain, France and Poland) early 
in the 2007-13 programme period.76 
 
Further, in response to the lack of experience and capacity in managing authorities with 
regard to implementing FIs, the EIB and EIF worked with DG REGIO to develop the 
JEREMIE and JESSICA Networking Platforms (launched in 2009) to support the 
exchange of experience and best practice in implementing FIs.77  
                                          
75  '*5(*,2RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQILQDQFHGSHUFHQWRIWKHVWXGLHV¶FRVWDQGWKH(,)WKHUHPDLQLQJ
percent. 
76  European Court of Auditors (2012) Financial instruments for SMEs co-financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund, Special Report No. 2, Luxembourg.  
77  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit.  
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In 2014-20 the generic Technical Assistance for ESIF financial instruments, including those 
for urban development and energy efficiency is provided under fi-compass (see Section 6.4). 
HoweverWKHWHUPµ-(66,&$¶FRQWLQXHs to be associated with urban development FIs also in 
the 2014-20 period. Similarly, the technical support on ESIF financial instruments for 
enterprises is available through fi-compass in the 2014-SHULRGµ-(5(0,(¶also remains in 
use by certain MAs or fund managers as shorthand for financial instruments for enterprise 
support, including when set up using HFs (or fund of funds, as HFs are known in the 2014-
20 period). 
2.3.2 JASPERS 
JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions) is a joint 
initiative by the Commission (DG REGIO), EIB and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD),78 initially established in late 2005. The Memorandum of 
Understanding79 signed by the EIB with the Commission and EBRD in 2006 and the 
Framework Partnership Agreement signed by the Commission and EIB in 2014 state that the 
main objective of the JASPERS initiative is to support Cohesion Policy and to improve the 
quality of investment by providing technical advice to project promoters.  
 
JASPERS provides independent advice to beneficiary countries - 16 EU Member 
States and three IPA countries -80 in order to prepare high-quality major projects of above 
¼PLOOLRQHOLJLEOHFRVWs IRUWUDQVSRUWDQGDERYH¼PLOOLRQHOLJLEOHFRVWIRURWKHU sectors, 
which will be co-financed by ESIF. JASPERS can also work on smaller assignments below 
these thresholds and horizontal assignments that are not related to a specific project. 
JASPERS has headquarters in Luxembourg but operates to a large extent from external 
offices in Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Warsaw and Sofia. 
 
JASPERS is located within the EIB (Advisory Services Department). Oversight is provided by 
a Steering Committee which includes representatives from DG REGIO, the EIB and the 
EBRD. The Steering Committee meets at least twice a year. It is important to note that the 
JASPERS facility provides advice for Member States on project applications, whereas the 
decision to provide grant assistance remains with the European Commission.81  
 
At the end of 2014, the JASPERS initiative was reorganised into seven divisions, intended to 
ensure consistency in advice delivered across the beneficiary Member States:82 
x Roads; 
x Rail, Air and Maritime; 
x Water and Waste; 
x Energy and Solid Waste; 
x Smart Development; 
x Networking and Competence Centre; and 
x Independent Quality Review (IQR). 
 
                                          
78  Between July 2008 and December 2013, KfW Bankengruppe was also a partner of JASPERS. 
79  European Commission, European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(2006) Memorandum of Understanding in respect of Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in European Regions 
(JASPERS) between the European Commission, the European Investment Bank and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/documents/mou-jaspers.pdf   
80  EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. IPA beneficiaries: Montenegro, Serbia and fYROM 
81  AECOM Economics (2012) op. cit.  
82  For more information, see: http://www.jaspers-europa-info.org/content/organisational-structure  also see: 
European Investment Bank (2015a) op. cit. 
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Assistance from the JASPERS initiative may cover:83 
x project development support for Member States: 
o upstream project screening ± assessment of the viability and suitability of 
projects for EU grant finance; 
o project development ± all stages of the project cycle from pre-feasibility and 
feasibility through to final grant applications; 
x independent Quality Review of projects ± includes evaluation of strategic, 
technical, economic and financial aspects of projects to ensure compliance with EU 
policies and legislation - and is a new function of JASPERS provided by the Common 
Provisions Regulation for 2014-2020, under which Member States may notify the 
Commission of major projects which have received a positive review by independent 
experts;84 
x post-submission appraisal - all Major Projects submitted directly to the 
Commission will be appraised by JASPERS; 
x horizontal assignments ± guidance for beneficiaries on how to prepare projects to 
take into account relevant issues; report/workshops/presentations on issues related 
to a whole sector or series of projects (e.g. cost-benefit analysis (CBA), State aid, 
environment, funding-gap methodology); 
x strategic support ± guidelines or generic documentation; comments on or 
recommendations for draft strategic documents; project pipeline identification; and 
x capacity-building, including Competence Centre ± operational support/training; 
guidelines or generic documentation; training workshops and workshop 
documentation. 
JASPERS also provides services in the context of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and 
can assist the European Investment and Advisory Hub (EIAH).  
2.3.3 JASMINE 
The JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions) initiative was 
established in 2007 to help non-bank microfinance institutions to scale up their operations 
and maximise the impact of microfinance products on microenterprises development and 
unemployment reduction within the European Union. The overall financial envelope for 2008-
13 was EUR 6 million. The facility was primarily funded by DG Regio (95 percent) and co-
financed by the EIF (5 percent). 
 
Managed by the EIF, the instrument has provided free technical assistance selected 
European microcredit providers. The JASMINE WHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHµSDFNDJH¶FRPSULVHs:85  
(i) an institutional assessment or a rating exercise, delivered by specialised 
microcredit rating agencies based in Europe (MicroFinanza Rating and Planet 
Rating); and  
(ii) training delivered by the Microfinance Centre (MFC) in association with the 
Deutsches Mikrofinanz Institut (DMI). 
 
                                          
83  For more information, see: http://www.jaspers-europa-info.org/content/what-we-offer also see: European 
Investment Bank (2015a) JASPERS in the 2014-2020 programming period, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/jaspers_leaflet_2015_en.pdf 
84  See also: Regulations (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit, art. 101 
85  European Commission (2013c) Evaluation of JASMINE Technical Assistance Pilot phase, final report, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/thefunds/doc/instruments/jasmine/jasmine_evaluation_final_report.
pdf  
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Business development tools and services made available to the entire microcredit sector 
comprise:86  
 
(i) the European Code of Good Conduct for Microcredit Provision, 
encapsulating recognised good practice in the EU microcredit sector;  
(ii) a JASMINE Helpdesk to assist all individuals and institutions looking for specific 
information on the microcredit sector in the EU;  
(iii) microcredit workshops to disseminate good practice in microcredit in the EU; and  
(iv) JASMINE OnLine, a web-based information platform (under development at 
time of writing in September 2015).  
 
The JASMINE Helpdesk and specialised workshops are delivered by the European Microcredit 
Network (EMN). 
 
The instrument has demonstrated a complementarity with existing and forthcoming EU 
financing programmes in 2014-20, such as financial instruments under the European 
Progress Microfinance Facility,87 as well as the EU Programme for Employment and Social 
Innovation (EaSI).  
 
For the 2014-20 period, the generic technical assistance for microfinance is part of the fi-
compass advisory platform (see Section 6.4).88 
2.3.4 Other Technical Assistance 
In the context of Structural Programme Lending (SPL) (see Section 2.5.1), the EIB also 
offers other technical assistance to managing authorities. Depending on WKH EHQHILFLDULHV¶
implementation capacity, the Finance Contract for a SPL can include risk-mitigation 
measures such as a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and/or technical assistance 
(TA) (see Box 2). The PIU functions as a coordination centre for the EIB and national 
governments (including Cohesion Policy implementation bodies). According to EIB staff 
interviewed for this study, PIUs can be a major factor in the success of SPL implementation.  
 
Box 2: Technical Assistance pilot initiative in Greece 
 
In Greece, the EIB developed a new TA pilot initiative for SPL. The financed the SPL with EUR 2 billion 
for co-financing, comprising small-and-medium projects throughout the Greek regions. As part of the 
SPL, technical and advisory assistance for the improvement of project risks assessment and 
implementation through the collaboration of EIB experts seconded to the Greek administration 
supporting the PIU was set up. This led to the identification of the potential for projects implemented 
by local beneficiaries and identified best practices. The monitoring activities of the TA pilot initiative 
were also used in Portugal in early 2014. 
 
Source: EPRC interviews 
  
                                          
86  Ibid. 
87  The European Progress Microfinance Facility (Progress Microfinance), launched in 2010, increases the availability 
of microcredit ± ORDQVEHORZ¼, 000 ± for setting up or developing a small business. The facility is supported 
by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, and managed by the European Investment 
Fund. 
88  European Investment Fund (2014c) What is Jasmine? http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/microfinance/JASMINE/  
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2.4 EIB holding fund management 
 
The role of the EIB (and EIF) in mandate management89 for FIs in Cohesion Policy is 
relatively new. There do not appear any cases in the 2000-06 period where the EIB 
had a management role in FIs financed with Cohesion Policy funding. However, 
during the 2007-13 period, managing authorities were able to appoint the EIB or EIF to 
manage holding funds (and FIs) under their Cohesion Policy programmes. The EIB could 
manage FI HFs for urban development (Article 44 (1)(b)) (colloquially also referred to 
as JESSICA FIs) and the EIF could act as HF manager for enterprise support FIs 
(Article 44 (1)(a)) (colloquially also referred to as JEREMIE FIs). 
 
The urban development FIs supported sustainable urban development by supporting projects 
in the following areas: 
x urban infrastructure ± including transport, water/waste water, energy;  
x heritage or cultural sites ± for tourism or other sustainable uses;  
x redevelopment of brownfield sites ± including site clearance and decontamination;  
x creation of new commercial floor space for SMEs, IT and/or R&D sectors;  
x university buildings ± medical, biotech and other specialised facilities; and 
x energy efficiency improvements. 
Contributions could be made from ERDF and ESF to UDFs and invested in public-private 
partnerships or other projects included in an integrated plan for sustainable urban 
development. These investments could take the form of equity, loans and/or guarantees. 
Alternatively, managing authorities could decide to channel funds to UDFs using HFs set up 
to invest in several UDFs.90 
The EIF could also act as a manager for holding funds for enterprises when requested by the 
Member State or regional authorities to do so.91 Sources of finance outside Structural Funds, 
including the EIB, the EIF (which could participate in JEREMIE at the FI level if not managing 
the HF) and the private sector, could also be engaged to maximise the leverage effect.92  
 
The EIF had a µWRROER[¶RIILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV for enterprises which included:93 
x guarantees, co-guarantees and counter-guarantees; 
x equity guarantees; 
x micro-loans; 
x export̻credit insurance; 
x securitisation; 
x venture capital; 
x business angel matching funds; and 
x investment in technology transfer funds. 
  
                                          
89  Mandate management for central and EIB as well as regional mandates  has always been a core activity for the 
EIF.  
90  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
91  According to the summary report (European Commission 2015d), the EIF appears to be managing a specific fund 
in France (PACA). This is a reporting error. The PACA HF is correctly mentioned on the EIF website as a Holding 
Fund. 
92  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
93  The EIF refers to this as the JEREMIE Toolbox 
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The management and operational structures of FIs set up in 2007-13 vary 
considerably from country to country. At the end of 2014, a total of 73 holding funds 
were reported by the Managing Authorities to the European Commission, of which 28 
involved the EIB or EIF.94 However, there are discrepancies between the reported data and 
LQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKH(,%¶VZHEVLWH 
 
According to the EIB in 2007-13, the EIB had mandates for managing 18 HFs set up for 
urban development, although this number fell to 16 during the period (see  Table 4).95 At 
the end of 2014,96 the EIF was HF manager for 15 funds set up under the enterprise FIs (see 
Table 5).97 Generally, the mandates for enterprise HFs funds were signed earlier ± between 
2008 and 2011 in the majority of cases ± than was the case for urban development FIs, 
where the first HFs were not established until 2010. Both enterprises and urban 
development HFs offer a variety of products including loans, guarantees and in a 
more limited number of cases equity. Enterprise FI HFs tend to have a commitment 
period until mid-2016, but in some cases the commitment takes into account a longer legacy 
period (e.g. the period in which recycled funds from projects are expected to reach the 
fund). The EIB can provide loan capital to funds set up under both initiatives. 
 
  
                                          
94  European Commission (2015d) op cit.  
95  The Funding Agreements between the EIB and the managing authorities for Moravia-Silesia and West Pomerania 
were signed for a pre-determined period, with the aim of assisting the managing authorities to set up an optimal 
fund structure and select appropriate financial intermediaries. In 2014, these goals were achieved, and when the 
funds became fully operational the managing authority decided to take over their management. Therefore, the 
number of mandates for EIB HFs was reduced from 18 to 16. 
96  European Commission (2015d) op cit.  
97  In 2011 and 2012, management of two HFs was transferred to the relevant managing authority. 
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Table 4: Holding funds managed by the EIB (at 31 December 2014) 
HF Urban Development Funds Year 
Amount signed 
(million)*** 
HF Bulgaria 
Regional Urban Development Fund AD 2011 18.9 (37 BGN) 
Fund for Sustainable Urban Development of Sofia JSC 2012 12.6 (24.6 BGN) 
HF Moravia-Silesia* Contera Urban Development Fund Member State s.r.o. 2012 11.2 (309.3 CZK) 
CMZRB - ýHVNRPRUDYVNi]iUXþQtDUR]YRMRYiEDQNDDV 2012 6.2 (171 CZK) 
HF Greece Pancretan Cooperative Bank and TT Hellenic Postbank 2011 15 
National Bank of Greece S.A. 2011 83 
Investment Bank of Greece 2011 49 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A. 2012 67 
Piraeus Bank 2012 39 
HF Campania Iccrea BancaImpressa SPA 2012 31.9 
Banco di Napoli SPA 2012 63.8 
HF Sardinia Fondo Sardegna Energia (Equiter) 2012 33.1 
Banco di Sardegna S.p.A. 2012 33.1 
HF Sicily Fondo di Rigenerazione Urbana Sicilia SRL(Equiter) 2011 90.3 
ICCREA BancaImpresa 2012 53.2 
HF Lithuania Siauliu Bankas AB 2012 18 
Swedbank AB 2010 30 
Siauliu Bankas AB 2010 10 
SEB Bank 2010 6 
VIPA/CPMA 2013 20 
Siauliu Bankas AB 2013 40 
VIPA/CPMA 2013 28 
HF Mazovia Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 2012 36.5 (155.9 PLN) 
HF Pomerania Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 2011 38.9 (166.5 PLN) 
Bank Ochrony Srodowiska S.A. 2011 16 (68PLN) 
HF Silesia Bank Ochrony Srodowiska S.A. 2011 59 (251.2 PLN) 
HF Westpomerania** Bank Ochrony Srodowiska S.A. 2011 15.6 (64.9 PLN) 
Bank Zachodni WBK SA 2010 19.3 (80.6 PLN) 
HF Wielkopolska Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 2011 68.9 (294.6 PLN) 
HF Portugal Banco BPI S.A. 2010 69.8 
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. 2011 40.6 
Turismo de Portugal IP 2011 17.1 
HF Andalucía AC JESSICA Andalucía, S.A. 2011 80.5 
HF FIDAE (ES) AC JESSICA FIDAE, S.L. 2014 20 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 2012 32.2 
Banco Santander S.A 2014 20 
Unallocated funds for HF FIDAE 2014 54.3 
HF London Foresight Environmental Fund LP 2011 44.9 (35 GBP)  
Amber Green LEEF LP 2011 6.4 (5 GBP) 
Amber Green LEEF 2 LLP 2011 72.6 (56.5 GBP) 
The Housing Finance Corporation Ltd (THFC) 2013 15.4 (12 GBP) 
HF North West England North West Evergreen LP 2011 63.4 (49.3GBP) 
Chrysalis LP 2012 50 (38.9 GBP) 
HF Scotland Amber Green SPRUCE LP 2011 10.3 (8 GBP) 
Amber Green SPRUCE 2 LLP 2011 51.4 (40 GBP) 
Total   1,662.5 
 
Source: EIB website 
* Funding agreement ended February 2014 
** Funding agreement ended July 2014 
***Exchange rate is average rate in year of signing 
 
  
Review of the Role of the EIB Group in European Cohesion Policy 
 
 
45 
Table 5: Holding funds managed by the EIF (at 31 December 2014) 
Holding fund Product Year signed 
End of 
commitment 
Amount 
nominal 
resources 
(EUR  
million) 
Bulgaria Multi**** 2009 2025** 349 
Calabria (IT) Loans 2011 2015 45 
Campania (IT) Loans 2008 2015 90 
Cyprus Guarantees 2009 2015 20 
Extremadura (ES) Loans 2012 2015 19 
Greece Multi 2008 2015 250* 
Languedoc-Roussillon (FR) Multi 2008 2015 30 
Lithuania ± Structural Funds 
Equity 
2009 2015 42 
Lithuania Non-Structural Funds (post 2015) 2013 2024** 25 
Malta Guarantees 2010 2015 12 
Provence-Alpes-&{WHG¶$]XU)5 Guarantees 2011 2015 20 
Romania Multi 2008 2022** 150 
Sicilia (IT) Loans 2009 2015 60 
Sicilia ESF (IT) Loans 2010 2015 15 
Slovakia Multi 2008 2015 100 
Sub-total 1227 
Holding Fund management transferred*** 
Latvia Multi 2008 2011 13 
Lithuania 
Loans/ 
Guarantees 2009 2012 55 
Total 1295 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2014. 
2IZKLFK¼PLOOLRQLVDFWLYHO\PDQDJHG 
** End of legacy 
*** Resources corresponding to the absorbed Structural Funds 
**** Multiple products offered 
 
2.5 The (,%¶V%OHQGLQJUROH 
 
7KH(,%¶V EOHQGLQJ activities in Cohesion Policy have a long history, with well-developed 
structures to facilitate the blending of EIB finance with other sources of finance. In financial 
terms the EIB role as a lender is much greater than its involvement in FIs. The EIB assists 
Cohesion Policy objectives and regional development more generally through several types 
of long-term loans.98  
x Direct loans (investment loans) are provided for private or public sector 
promoters of projects where investment costs generally exceeds EUR 50 million. The 
financing terms (maturity and grace period) are tailored to the type of investment, 
and appropriate security is required. 
x Framework Loans (FL) are instruments for financing multi-component investments 
where, due to incomplete information being available at the appraisal stage, decisions 
concerning the financing of specific sub-projects have to be taken after approval of 
the overall operation by the Board. FLs can be single or multi-sector, single or multi-
promoter, financially intermediated or coordinated through a central body. FLs should 
be differentiated from investment programmes, which are multi-sub-project 
operations with one (or more) common features (e.g. one sector or objective, such 
as corporate R&D programmes or infrastructure programmes). Such investment 
programmes fall under the category of Investment Loan and do not therefore require 
a two-stage submission to the Management Committee or the Board.  
 
                                          
98  For more information, see European Investment Bank: 
http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/instruments/loans/index.htm  
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x Structural Programme Loans (SPLs) are a subset of the FL category. SPLs are 
aimed at co-financing multi-sub-project investments managed by public authorities 
included within an Operational Programme to meet EU economic and social cohesion 
objectives and supported by grants from the EU Structural or Cohesion Funds. 
 
x Intermediated loans are credit lines to local intermediary banks and leasing bodies, 
which on-lend in order to finance investment undertaken by SMEs or local authorities. 
The intermediary adds its own resources to the fund, and loans which include EIB and 
intermediary funds are offered to projects. In contrast with framework loans, 
beneficiaries are offered loans at a 100 percent rate (so no co-financing is required).  
 
x Global loans typically cover a group of smaller projects with costs below EUR 25 
million. These loans are managed by intermediaries, usually a financial institution. 
Typically, the EIB is less involved in the management of global loans than framework 
loans.  
 
7KH(,%¶VOHQGLQJWRVXSSRUWEU social and economic cohesion objectives amounted 
to EUR 147 billion in 2007-13 (38 percent of total EU lending) (see Figure 5). EIB 
loans make available co-financing for projects in areas such as: key infrastructure, including 
trans-European networks and sustainable energy, water, waste management, forestry and 
food security; small, medium-sized and innovative firms; education and training; 
information and communication technologies; and municipal lending for improved urban 
living environments. Loans vary considerably from country to country and depend on the 
size of the Member State and the number of less-developed regions. However, operations 
need to be contextualised; size of operations is not equivalent to impact. Spain received the 
largest amount of funding both in real terms (EUR 30.7 billion) and as a proportion (20.9 
percent) of the total EIB cohesion lending, closely followed by Poland.  
Lending conditions are subject to a contractual arrangement which is based on risk factors. 
However, the EIB can also use its lending arrangements to incentivise certain projects that 
are in line with specific EU policy objectives, for example, it can offer loans at a lower rate to 
projects that target a specific issue. 
The EIB¶V lending activity is intended to make a wider contribution to regional development 
and regional convergence in the EU. 7KH %DQN¶V 2014 Statistical Report identifies those 
projects that contribute to the Bank¶V µFRQYHUJHQFH¶REMHFWLYH99 Of 441 projects which the 
Bank supported, 229 supported its convergence objective with a total value of EUR 36 
billion, representing 52.3 percent of the Bank¶V WRWDO LQYHVWPHQW, mostly in Spain, Poland 
and Italy but also in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic (see Table 6 for further details).  
For the 2014-20 period, Cohesion is again a transversal priority for the EIB with the aim to 
support Less-Developed Regions and Transition Regions. It is also increasing its focus on 
blending grants with loans, financial instruments and advisory services with an aim to 
enhance the use of EU funds. 
                                          
99  European Investment Bank (2014e) Statistical Report 2014, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/reports/st2014en.pdf  
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Figure 5: EIB cohesion lending in 2007-2013 
  
Source: European Investment Bank (2014c) Promoting Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe, Luxembourg 
¼%Q 
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Table 6: EIB funding for Convergence regions 
Country 
Total no. of 
projects 
Funding value 
± all projects 
(EUR million) in 
2014 only 
No. of projects 
supporting 
Convergence 
Funding value ± 
Convergence projects 
(EUR million) in 2014 
only 
% of projects 
supporting 
Convergence 
% of funding 
supporting 
Convergence 
AT 13 1,496.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
BE 13 1,915.6 3 550.0 23 28.7 
BG 4 610.0 4 610.0 100 100.0 
CZ 10 1,198.4 10 1,198.4 100 100.0 
CY 4 265.0 4 265.0 100 100.0 
DK 7 874.9 2 562.0 29 64.2 
DE 43 7,725.8 19 2,647.0 44 34.3 
EE 4 251.6 4 251.6 100 100.0 
IE 8 931.8 2 243.0 25 26.1 
EL 12 1,555.8 10 1,390.7 83 89.4 
ES 50 11,897.7 38 9,974.4 76 83.8 
FI 12 1,038.9 3 97.5 25 9.4 
FR 50 8,212.8 15 2,104.8 30 25.6 
HR 6 535.0 6 535.0 100 100.0 
HU 8 756.0 7 699.6 88 92.5 
IT 75 10,887.8 28 5,872.3 37 53.9 
LT 3 80.4 3 80.4 100 100.0 
LU 1 50.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
LV 2 107.5 2 107.5 100 100.0 
NL 11 2,194.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
PL 36 5,495.5 34 5,084.9 94 92.5 
PT 10 1,319.5 8 1,297.0 80 98.3 
RO 8 589.9 7 544.9 88 92.4 
SE 9 1,411.2 1 8.0 11 0.6 
SI 3 111.0 2 111.0 67 100.0 
SK 11 555.5 11 555.5 100 100.0 
UK 28 7,012.9 6 1,316.0 21 18.8 
TOTAL 441 69,080.8 229 36,106.5 52 52.3 
Source: EPRC research based on EIB country factsheets and EIB statistical report 2014
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2.5.1 Structural Programme Loans 
Structural Programme Loans (SPLs) are investment programmes comprising 
projects from one or more operational programmes. They are a subset of the FL 
category. SPLs are aimed at co-financing multi-sub-project investments managed by public 
authorities included within an Operational Programme to meet EU economic and social 
cohesion objectives and supported by grants from the EU Structural or Cohesion Funds. . 
SPLs place greater reliance on the financial intermediary than is the case with Investment 
Loans but less than is the case with Global Loans.100  
 
SPLs allow the EIB to target previously unsupported or partly supported areas of regional 
development. The SPL were first introduced in the 2000-06 period in the context of fiscal 
consolidation pressures in Member States associated with euro membership.101 Member 
States faced an implementation gap: liquidity problems (expenditure has to be made before 
receipt of payment) and lack of co-financing resources. SPLs offer complementary 
lending through long-term loans for the national and/or regional authorities, 
particularly in regions with comparatively smaller financing or borrowing capabilities. 
Geographically, SPLs are concentrated in Southern and Eastern Europe. Over the 2007-2013 
period, Hungary Greece, Portugal and Poland were the largest recipients of SPL (see Figure 
6). 
 
SPLs are designed to blend with Cohesion Policy funds and, where appropriate, are 
accompanied by advisory services.102 One advantage is that the implementation period is 
in principle aligned with the Cohesion Policy programme period (other forms of EIB lending 
are often project-based). A further advantage is that SPLs offer flexibility throughout the 
project cycle due to the timing of disbursements and allocation of funds, as well as longer 
maturity dates and lower costs of finance than those provided by commercial banks.103 In 
terms of finance, the EIB covers an average of ten percent of the investment costs. The size 
of the SPL loan portfolio in 2007-13 ranged between EUR 50 million and EUR 2.1 billion. 
SPLs are usually managed by public authorities which can include national or sub-national 
governments, public companies, national or local banks, special purpose vehicles, private 
concessionaires or private companies that act as intermediaries. The final recipients of the 
SPLs comprise of public and private entities whose investment is being financed under ESIF. 
 
 
 
                                          
100  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (2012) Ex post evaluation of the use of Framework Loans to 
finance EIB investment in the EU, 2000-2011, Synthesis Report prepared for the EIB, EIB: Luxembourg. 
101  Kazamaki-Ottersten E and Sioliou M (2014) Structural Programme Loans: Blending ESI Funds with EIB Loans, 
European Structural Funds and Investment Journal, Vol. 2, p. 127.  
102  Ibid.  
103  Field B, Kazamaki-Ottersten E and Sioliou M (in print) Funding Integrated Territorial Development: The Role of 
the European Investment Bank in supporting European Policies. 
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Figure 6: Geographical distribution of SPLs in the 2007-2013 period   
 
Source: Kazamaki-Ottersten and Sioliou (2014) op. cit 
 
2.6 Other instruments  
 
The EIB is also involved in the implementation or management of other instruments that 
target economic and social cohesion. Although managed by parts of the Commission other 
than DG REGIO, they have a close link to Cohesion Policy objectives. They include a wider 
set of instruments which have important synergies with Cohesion Policy activities.104 
This study considers three such instruments:105 
x COSME ± aims to improve access to finance for SMEs through loan guarantees 
and equity;  
x InnovFin ± Horizon 2020 equity-sharing and risk-sharing instruments for 
innovative SMEs but also other research-orientated institutes; and 
x Connecting Europe Facility ± finance for projects that fill the missing links in 
(XURSH¶VHQHUJ\WUDQVSRUWDQGGLJLWDOnetwork.  
                                          
104  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
105  Other instruments include EaSI, ERASMUS and instruments entrusted by Member States and regions also have 
linkages to Cohesion Policy. 
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2.6.1 COSME 
COSME (the programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises) aims to facilitate access to finance for SMEs through two EU-level FIs (loan 
guarantees and equities), available since August 2014. The COSME FIs build on experience 
from the FIs under the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) that 
ran from 2007-13 and also sought to facilitate access to loans and equity finance for SMEs 
where market gaps had been identified. The programme is run by DG Growth ± Internal 
Market Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 
 
The EIF is responsible for the implementation of FIs under COSME. According to EU 
Decision No. 1639/2006/EC106 establishing the CIP, the operation by the EIF of Community 
),V IRU 60(V RQ EHKDOI RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ KDV µEHHQ FRQVLGHUHG D JRRG SUDFWLFH E\
LQGHSHQGHQW HYDOXDWLRQV¶ 7KHUHIRUH WKH (,) ZDV HQWUXVWHG ZLWK RSHUDWLRQal tasks with 
regard to two of the CIP instruments ± predecessors of the two COSME FIs. The EIF has 
retained its implementation role in the 2014-20 period: the COSME FIs are managed by the 
EIF under a European Commission mandate. However, the COSME Basic Act107 also foresees 
the possibility of implementation by other entrusted entities, an option that the CIP Basic 
Act108 did not envisage.  
 
The EIB (along with EBRD and other international financial institutions) also had an advisory 
role in the Capacity-Building Scheme, which aimed to boost the capacity of financial 
intermediaries by improving the investment and technology expertise of funds and other 
financial intermediaries investing in innovative SMEs or SMEs with growth potential. The 
scheme was foreseen in the CIP legal basis with an initial budget of EUR 73 million. 
However, there was no uptake for this service, and the funds have been reallocated to other 
initiatives.109 
 
COSME FIs include the following.  
x The Loan Guarantee Facility (LGF) provides guarantees and counter-guarantees 
to selected financial intermediaries to help them provide loans and leases to SMEs 
(focusing on higher-risk SMEs). LGF is a successor to the SME Guarantee Facility 
(SMEG), developed and implemented also by the EIF under the CIP. The SMEG 
Facility covered four business lines (loan, micro-credit and equity guarantees as well 
as securitisation). Reportedly, since 2007, over EUR 19.3 billion in loans have been 
mobilised, and more than 340,000 SMEs have benefited from a guaranteed loan or 
lease thanks to the SMEG.110 
 
x The Equity Facility for Growth (EFG) invests in selected venture capital and 
private equity funds ± acting as financial intermediaries ± that provide funding to 
SMEs predominantly in their expansion and growth stages, in particular those 
operating across borders. Through EFG, the EIF invests in selected funds ± acting as 
WKH (,)¶V ILQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDULHV While there is no specific sector focus, potential 
target companies must not be active in any of the EIF restricted sectors. The EIF 
selects intermediaries on a continuous basis following a due diligence process based 
                                          
106  Decision (EC) No. 1639/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing 
a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007 to 2013). 
107  Regulation (EU) No. 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing a Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(COSME) (2014 ± 2020) 
108  Decision (EC) No. 1639/2006/EC .op. cit. 
109  European Commission (2014b) COSME programme for the competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs 2014-20: 
entrepreneurship & innovation Programme Implementation report 2013, COS-04-2014, 20 February 2014 
110  For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/access-to-finance/cosme-financial-instruments/index_en.htm 
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on established selection criteria. EFG is a successor to the High Growth and 
Innovative SME Facility (GIF), developed and operated by the EIF under the CIP. 
There, EIF invested in venture capital funds to increase the level of equity for 
innovative SMEs both in the early stages (GIF1) and in the expansion phase (GIF2). 
In contrast, within the 2014-20 framework, COSME deals only with FIs in line with 
GIF2, while those in line with GIF1 are addressed by Horizon 2020. Reportedly, since 
2007, GIF has mobilised more than EUR 2.3 billion in equity investments.111  
The Cohesion Policy thematic objective of enhancing SME competitiveness (TO 3, Article 9 
CPR) has strong linkages with the overarching goal pursued by COSME, particularly as both 
are grounded in the Europe 2020 framework. Both the CPR and the COSME-establishing 
regulation foresee a scaling-up in the use of FIs in the 2014-20 period. Both ESIF 
and EU-level FIs under the COSME and Horizon 2020 programmes aim to increase support 
to SMEs.112 At the same time, the ways of achieving this common goal by COSME and ESIF 
differ113 (e.g. non-territorial approach of COSME as opposed to place-based ESIF approach; 
directly managed COSME instruments versus ESIF shared management with national and 
regional public intermediaries, etc.). In addition, synergies between the two types of 
approaches may be found, for example in the COSME co-funded Enterprise Europe Network, 
which provides business and innovation support services customised to the needs of SMEs in 
a territory and focusing on place-EDVHG VXSSRUW ZLWK µLQIRUPDO SUH-allocation of funds to 
0HPEHU6WDWHUHJLRQV¶WDNLQJSart.114  
 
It was envisaged that &260(¶V HTXLW\ DQG JXDUDQWHH IDFLOLWLHV VKRXOG EH
FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WR WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ XVH RI ),V IRU 60(V LQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI
Cohesion Policy. However, as mentioned, overlaps still exist. Among other things, the 
CPR115 provides a legal base for ensuring coordination between ESIF and other EU 
programmes (including COSME) in Partnership Agreements and OPs (Art.15, 96). Point 4.3 
of Annex I (Common Strategic Framework)116 of the CPR states that Member States and the 
&RPPLVVLRQ VKDOO KDYH µGXH UHJDUG WR VWUHQJWKHQLQJ FRRUGLQDWLRQ V\QHUJLHV DQG
FRPSOHPHQWDULWLHV¶ EHWZHHQ WKH (6,) +RUL]RQ  &260( DQG RWKHU UHOHYDQW FHQWUDOO\
managed EU funding programmes.117 Similarly the COSME Regulation calls for close 
synergies between COSME programme and the CPR.118 
 
The Reference Guide on FIs for 2014-20119 DOVR VWUHVVHV WKDW µV\QHUJLHV DQG
FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ VKRXOG EH VRXJKW¶ ± FIs through ESIF should take account of and work 
together when justified with other EU instruments, including FIs. Moreover, the development 
of Smart Specialisation Strategies requires a so-called µHQWUHSUHQHXULDO GLVFRYHU\ SURFHVV¶
which might involve collaborative work between different authorities involved in designing 
SME and industry policy and R&I policies (including, e.g., Horizon 2020 actors and COSME-
                                          
111
  For more information, see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/access-to-finance/cosme-financial-instruments/index_en.htm  
112  European Commission (2013b) Ex-ante assessment of the EU SME Initiative. Commission Staff Working 
Document (prepared with input from the EIB and the EIF), available at: 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/00/60/EU_06000/imfname_10426876.pdf  
113  European Commission (2014c) Enabling synergies between European Structural and Investment Funds, Horizon 
2020 and other research, innovation and competitiveness-related Union programmes ± Guidance for policy-
makers and implementing bodies. 
114  European Commission (2014c) op. cit. 
115  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit. 
116  The Common Strategic Framework establishes strategic guiding principles to facilitate the programming process 
and the sectoral and territorial coordination of Union intervention under the ESI Funds and with other relevant 
Union policies and instruments. (Article 10 CPR). 
117  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit.  
118  Regulation (EU) no 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 
a Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014 - 
2020) and repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC. 
119  European Commission (2014e) op. cit.  
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supported entities).120 Furthermore, there are synergies between COSME and Cohesion 
Policy instruments in the SME Initiative (see Section 6.3). As a joint instrument, 
blending EU funds available under COSME and Horizon 2020 and ESIF, it utilises synergies 
between existing SME support programmes at national and EU levels and allows managing 
authorities to contribute ERDF and EAFRD resources to EU-level FIs. Its legal framework is 
based on a combination of the existing COSME and Horizon 2020 legal acts, the Financial 
Regulation and the CPR.121 
2.6.2 Risk-sharing instrument and InnovFin SME Guarantee Scheme 
7KH ,QQRY)LQ60(*XDUDQWHH)DFLOLW\ LV SDUW RI µ,QQRY)LQ ± EU Finance for Innovators¶, an 
initiative launched by the European Commission and the EIB in the framework of Horizon 
2020. InnovFin SME Guarantee, managed by EIF, provides guarantees and counter-
guarantees on debt financing between EUR 25,000 and EUR 7.5 million, in order to 
improve access to loans, financial leases and loan guarantees for research-based 
and innovative SMEs and Small Mid-caps122 up to 499 employees. This facility is rolled 
out through financial intermediaries, which are guaranteed or counter-guaranteed against a 
portion of their potential losses by the EIF.  
 
The InnovFin SME Guarantee Facility is a demand-driven instrument that builds on the 
experience of the Risk-Sharing Instrument (RSI), developed under the 7th Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013). RSI was a pilot 
guarantee scheme managed and implemented by EIF, launched at the end of 2011 in 
cooperation with the EIB and the Commission. RSI aimed at improving access to debt 
finance of highly innovative SMEs and small Mid-caps to support their R&I projects. Within 
RSI, the EIF provided guarantees to banks and leasing companies. The instrument helped 
SMEs and Mid-caps to obtain cheaper loans to finance additional investments, working 
capital needs and R&D projects.123 RSI was part of the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), 
which operates outside Cohesion Policy and was launched by the Commission in 
collaboration with the EIB. Managed by the EIB, it aimed to improve access to debt-financing 
for promoters of R&I investments (of different sizes and forms) by sharing the underlying 
risks between the EU and the EIB. 
 
EIF acts as the implementing body in the InnovFin SME Guarantee Facility. Following the 
launch of a Call for Expression of Interest, published on the (,)¶VZHEVLWH it selects financial 
intermediaries after a due diligence process and signs an agreement with them. RSI was 
also managed and implemented by EIF. In general terms, with regard to access to risk 
finance, both EIB and EIF have played an important role, implementing different FIs on 
behalf of the Commission. While the EIB generally provides guarantees to banks that lend to 
medium-to-larger companies, EIF caters for those lending to small and medium-sized firms 
and Mid-caps.  
 
                                          
120  European Union (2012) Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisations (RIS 3), available 
at: http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=e50397e3-f2b1-4086-8608-
7b86e69e8553  
121  European Parliament (2013a) Financial Engineering Instruments in Cohesion Policy, Study to the European 
Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policy, 
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/495870/IPOL-
REGI_ET(2013)495870_EN.pdf  
122  No EU-wide definition for Small Mid-caps exists. However, for the purpose of Horizon 2020, the Commission 
defined the Small Mid-cap as an enterprise which has up to 499 employees and is not a micro, small or medium-
sized enterprise (For more information, see: European Commission (2014a) Activities relating to financial 
instruments etc., at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0335). 
123  European Parliament (2013a) op. cit. 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
54 
The EIB also had a role in terms of evaluation of RSI and as such significantly 
contributed to its development (see Section 3.7.2). Additionally, the EIB has been carrying 
out related accompanying measures, e.g. providing technical assistance concerning access 
to risk finance. The EIB and DG Research and Innovation have developed a loan-matching 
platform to provide access to information on European financing for innovation projects.124 
The ESIF thematic objective on strengthening research, technological development and 
innovation125 is consistent with the overarching goal pursued by Horizon 2020 and its 
instruments. Both ESIF and Horizon 2020 instruments are based on the same long-term 
Europe 2020 strategy and are largely associated with the same flagship initiative of 
Innovation Union. Accordingly, post-2013 ESIF Programmes have been prepared with an 
increased focus on the research and innovation dimensions, in line with the principle of 
thematic concentration foreseen / provided for by the new (2014-20) regulatory framework 
for Cohesion Policy.126 
 
The CPR127 provides a legal base for ensuring coordination between ESIF and other 
EU programmes (including Horizon 2020). Arrangements to ensure coordination and 
consistency between ESIF (in PAs and OPs) and Horizon 2020 both at the strategic and 
operational levels are also provided for in other sections of the CPR (Art.15, 96, Annex 1) as 
well as in the Horizon 2020 Basic Act.128 Furthermore, for 2014-20 both ESIF and Horizon 
2020 foresaw a scaling-up in the use of FIs. Synergies between their FIs may be seen, such 
as in the SME Initiative, based on FIs of COSME and Horizon 2020 jointly funded by the EU 
budget and ESIF allocations. This relates to the ambition to expand risk-sharing instruments 
between the Commission, Member States and the EIB to leverage private sector and 
incentivise capital market investments in SMEs, for the 2014-20 programme period for which 
provisions have been incorporated into the Common Provisions Regulation have been made 
in order to enable the use of ESI funds for the SME Initiative (see Section 6.3). 
2.6.3 Connecting Europe Facility  
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), established in December 2013, supports trans-
European networks and infrastructure in the sectors of transport, telecommunications and 
energy. It aims to act as a catalyst for further private and public funding by giving 
infrastructure projects credibility and lowering their risk profiles, thereby attracting 
investors. It also finances technical assistance programmes. 
 
2QHRIWKH&()¶VNH\HOHPHQts is a more systematic use of innovative FIs to provide a 
funding alternative to traditional grants and fill financing gaps for strategic infrastructure 
investments. Investment needs identified for the EU transport system, reduction of national 
infrastructure investments programmes and restrictions of bank lending for long-term or 
risky projects have been among the catalysts IRUWKHGHPDQGIRU),V¶ZLGHUXVHLQWKHCEF. 
Regulation No. 1316/2013129 provides for the FIs usage for actions with a clear European 
added value. The contribution from the EU budget to the FIs should not exceed ten percent 
of the overall financial envelope of the CEF. It provides support for: equity instruments (such 
                                          
124  For more information, see: http://helpingyouinnovate.eib.org 
125  Thematic objective 1, Article 9 CPR. 
126  The regulatory framework for Cohesion Policy in 2014-2020 (see CPR Articles 9 and 18) envisages thematic 
concentration of expenditure on a limited number of objectives in order to maximise the contribution of Cohesion 
Policy to the priorities of the Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (with 'strengthening 
research, technological development and innovation' being one of the associated 11 thematic objectives). 
127  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit. 
128  Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 
Horizon 2020 - the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020)  and repealing Decision No 
1982/2006/EC 
129  Regulation (EU) No. 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 
the Connecting Europe Facility. 
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as investment funds with a focus on providing risk capital for actions contributing to projects 
of common interest); and loans and/or guarantees facilitated by risk-sharing instruments 
(including the credit-enhancement mechanism for project bonds). 
 
The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative (PBI), implemented by the EIB, is one of the 
CEF FIs. It is a joint initiative by the Commission and the EIB, the pilot phase of which 
started operations in 2012. It is designed to revive project bond markets and enable eligible 
infrastructure projects promoters, usually public-private partnerships, to attract additional 
private finance from institutional investors.  
 
The CEF builds on the experience gained in the implementation of FIs in the 2007-13 period, 
such as the Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European Transport Networks 
projects (LGTT), equity investments through the 2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate 
&KDQJHDQG,QIUDVWUXFWXUHWKHµ0DUJXHULWH)XQG¶DQGWKHSLORWSKDVHRI the PBI. 
 
The EIB has been working closely with the Commission as well as other financial 
institutions tR H[SORLW LQYHVWRUV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ ORQJ-term infrastructure investment 
opportunities and to develop related FIs. The instruments ± predecessors to the CEF FIs 
± were put in place in cooperation with the EIB. For instance, the LGTT was set up and 
developed jointly by the Commission and the EIB, aiming to facilitate a larger participation 
of the private sector in financing TEN-T infrastructure. The EIB and the Commission have 
also been working together on a number of options to extend the range of debt instruments 
under the CEF. The EIB has had a role in implementing the PBI (which was the first 
instrument developed by the EIB and the Commission under the CEF) and in developing 
further FIs within it (e.g., the Project Bond Credit Enhancement (PBCE) facility as a PBI-
subordinated instrument). The activities of the initiative seek to build on the existing 
experience with joint Commission-(,% LQVWUXPHQWVDQG WRXWLOLVH WKH (,%¶V H[SHUWLVH LQ(8
infrastructure financing. Within the initiative, while the Commission determines general 
eligibility criteria, the EIB has a role in selecting specific projects and types of support, the 
Commission and the EIB sharing the associated risk. According to an ad-hoc audit of the 
pilot phase of the PBI,130 the role of the EIB may also be seen in the fact that its 
LQYROYHPHQWKDVEHHQDVVHVVHGDVEULQJLQJ µFUHGLELOLW\¶DQG µFRPIRUW¶ WR LQYHVWRUV ORZHULQJ
project-associated risks. Additionally, according to Regulation No. 1316/2013,131 the EIB 
should have a role in providing, at the request of the Commission RU0HPEHU6WDWHVµWHFKQLFDO
DVVLVWDQFHLQFOXGLQJRQILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXULQJWRSURMHFWVRIFRPPRQLQWHUHVW¶ 
 
According to the Commission,132 µV\QHUJLHVDQGFRPSOHPHQWDULW\VKRXOGEHVRXJKW¶and FIs 
through ESIF should take account of and work together when justified with other EU FIs. The 
CPR133 provides a legal base for such synergies, covering arrangements to ensure 
coordination between ESIF and other EU programmes in PAs and OPs. The Regulation notes 
the CEF role in accelerating development of infrastructure across the EU, and 
states that ERDF and Cohesion Fund interventions should be planned in close 
cooperation with the support provided from the CEF, to ensure complementarity and 
optimal linkage of different types of infrastructure at various spatial levels. Appropriate 
coordination and technical support mechanisms should also be put in place, to ensure 
complementarity and effective planning. In the context of smart specialisation strategies, 
the commitment to the Digital Agenda for Europe can also be supported by joining forces of 
Cohesion Policy with the CEF along with Horizon 2020.134 
 
                                          
130 EY (2014) Ad-hoc audit of the pilot phase of the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, Final Report, 17 June 2014. 
131 Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit. 
132 European Commission (2014e) op. cit.  
133 Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit. 
134  European Union (2012) op. cit. 
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Within ESIF, the support to trans-European infrastructure networks in the three 
sectors covered by the CEF has remained important for the achievement of the 
cohesion objective. Overlaps should be avoided by means of the different application 
objectives of Cohesion Policy funds and the CEF. For example, in transport, while CEF 
instruments concentrate on projects of high EU added value, ESIF allocate support to TEN-T 
projects of more regional and national immediate impact. While the Structural Funds support 
broadband roll-out projects135 where there is no business case, CEF FIs seek to make 
specific projects commercially viable. 
 
As of 2014, in conjunction with the CEF, support from Cohesion Fund should be 
provided to projects implementing core networks for transport infrastructure 
projects of European added value.136 In total, EUR 10 billion is allocated under the 
Cohesion Fund for actions in this field.137 Member States are eligible under the specific rules 
for the Cohesion Fund and the selection of projects has to follow the national allocations 
under the Cohesion Fund. However, selection of projects will take place under the rules of 
the CEF regulation. These measures are in line with the ambition to ensure synergies and 
complementarities between different kinds of interventions targeting transport infrastructure 
in various spatial contexts. The transferred funds are earmarked exclusively for transport 
infrastructure projects in the Member States eligible for the Cohesion Fund allocations, and 
projects thus supported can benefit from more favourable financial support conditions. Such 
a mechanism aims to eliminate the risk of the CEF becoming an instrument used only by 
economically more-advanced Member States and to ensure that complex transport projects 
with high EU added value can be delivered in the Cohesion Member States. 
 
 
  
                                          
135  The EU recognises the strategic importance of broadband, notably in the Digital Agenda for Europe, a flagship 
initiative of the Europe 2020 strategy. This is supported by the Structural Funds, see for example the ERDF 
investment priority 'Extending broadband deployment and the roll-out of high-speed networks and supporting 
WKHDGRSWLRQRIHPHUJLQJWHFKQRORJLHVDQGQHWZRUNVIRUWKHGLJLWDOHFRQRP\
WKHµ%URDGEDQGWDUJHW¶&35 
136  Regulation (EU) No. 1300/2013  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006, recital 9; Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 
op. cit., recital 80. 
137  For more information, see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.1.3.html  
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3 THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF EIB 
ACTIVITIES IN COHESION POLICY 
 
  KEY FINDINGS 
x There has been a significant expansion in the roles that the EIB plays in implementing 
Cohesion Policy. These include advisory and capacity-building services, (b)lending, 
and mandate management.   
x The EIB activities are generally regarded as making a significant contribution to 
Cohesion Policy objectives by senior officials responsible for implementing European 
Structural and Investment Funds in the Member States. These activities are 
considered to represent high added value and complementaritySDUWLFXODUO\WKH(,%¶V 
advisory, capacity-building and (b)lending services.   
x Specifically in relation to Financial Instruments, the EIB plays a crucial role in their 
development and implementation. This role is still evolving, and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of WKH(,%¶V activities in Cohesion Policies is not always well understood at 
EU level.  
x Gap analysis and evaluations in the context of the JESSICA and JEREMIE initiatives 
are generally valued by managing authorities and stakeholders, although the EIB and 
EIF recommendations are not always followed by national and regional authorities.  
x An assessment of the mandate management role of the EIB and EIF is impaired by the 
limited availability of data and the relatively short experience of implementing these 
FIs%DVHGRQGDWDSURYLGHE\0HPEHU6WDWHV LQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXPPDU\UHSRUW
the absorption rate of HFs managed by the EIB is lower than non-EIB managed HFs. 
In addition, the EIB and EIF appear to have a lower absorption rate when considering 
the absorption of funds by final recipients, compared to non-EIB HFs. However, the 
lower absorption rate may be partly due to the weak capacity of Member States where 
the EIB and EIF operate as well as the particularly severe effects of the financial crisis 
in these countries. 
x 'DWDIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VVXPPDU\UHSRUW LQGLFDWHWKDWPanagement fees for EIB 
and EIF holding funds are broadly equivalent to those managed by non-EIB 
institutions. However, a comparison of management fees for holding funds 
implemented by the EIF (enterprises) and those for the EIB (urban development) 
indicate that the latter are lower as a proportion of commitments. The reverse is true 
when comparing enterprise support holding funds of other institutions with those 
implemented by EIF.  
x The scale of EIB lending to projects funded through Cohesion Policy is not well 
understood. There is no aggregate EU-level data available which give an overview of 
co-financing to Cohesion Policy projects and instruments provided by the EIB. 
This chapter considers the effectiveness and efficiency of the various EIB activities in 
Cohesion Policy. It draws from primary sources (interviews and surveys) and secondary 
sources (evaluations, data summary reports, etc.). The chapter should be considered as a 
review rather than a comprehensive evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency of EIB Group 
activities. :KLOHWKHUHYLHZHQFRPSDVVHVDOORIWKH(,%¶VPDLQUROHVWKHIRFXVLVSDUWLFXODUO\
on financial instruments which have become increasingly important for the implementation 
of Cohesion policy. The chapter starts by discussing the different roles of the EIB. The 
subsequent sections examine synergies between EIB and Cohesion Policy, Financial 
instruments in Cohesion Policy and how effective the EIB is in each of its roles in the 
following order: advisory and capacity-building services; mandate management; and 
(b)lending. The penultimate section considers the effectiveness of COSME, Innovfin and CEF. 
7KHILQDOVHFWLRQDVVHVVHVWKH(,%¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\EDVHGRQVXUYH\UHVXOWV 
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3.1 The different roles of the EIB 
 
7KH(,%¶Vinitial activities in Cohesion Policy were largely restricted to (b)lending, but it has 
increasingly adopted different types of functions and services. As noted earlier, the EIB has 
four main roles in the implementation of Cohesion Policy: 
(i) advisory ± involvement at early-stage feasibility study or gap analysis (JESSICA 
and JEREMIE);  
(ii) (b)lending ± investing EIB loans in activities that include Cohesion Policy 
funding, blending refers to a specific facility for financing Cohesion Policy projects 
(for example Structural Programme Lending or contributions to FIs); µRUGLQDU\¶
facilities (e.g. global loans, direct loans or framework loans) can be used in 
combination with Cohesion Policy funding but have a wider application;  
(iii) management ± managing a holding fund or specific fund for financial 
instruments for enterprises and urban development ; and  
(iv) capacity-building ± organising TA platforms that provide a forum for MAs to 
engage in knowledge-exchange activities (e.g. the JASPERS initiative).138  
 
For this study, a short online survey (see for details Section 1.2.3 for methodology and 
Annex 2 for questions) sought to identify where and how these different roles are fulfilled. 
Senior-level officials responsible for Cohesion Policy implementation at Member State level 
were asked to identify which roles the EIB fulfils in their country/region. The results are 
provided in Table 7 which maps the role of the EIB in relation to Cohesion Policy in 19 
Member States. The findings should be regarded as indicative rather than conclusive; there 
are indications that the roles identified (or those that are not) do not always correspond with 
secondary sources. On the other hand, there is insufficient documentary evidence to 
establish fully the range of roles the EIB fulfils in each Member State.  
 
There are four Member States (Austria, Finland, Germany and Luxembourg)139 where, 
according to respondents, the EIB does not fulfil any role in relation to Cohesion Policy 
implementation. By contrast, in Bulgaria the EIB appears to fulfil a wide range of roles 
including advisory, (b)lending, management and capacity-building. In nine Member States, 
the EIB provided an advisory role. In eight Member States, the EIB is a HF manager, and, 
according to respondents, it provides co-financing ((b)lending) for FIs in five Member States. 
The Bank provides loans for Cohesion Policy-funded projects in nine Member States. It 
provides capacity-building services in seven Member States. In some cases, µRWKHU¶ UROHV
were identified, mainly related to the provision of structural programme lending. For 
example, in Poland the EIB granted the Polish State Treasury credit on two occasions (the 
first of EUR 2.13 billion and the second of EUR 700 million with scope to increase to EUR 1.3 
billion) intended to finance the expenditure incurred by the state budget as national co-
financing of projects implemented under the 2007-13 and 2014-20 Operational 
Programmes. 
 
Lastly, a number of Member States reported EIB activities that contribute to regional 
development but are not directly linked to Cohesion Policy. This mainly involves the EIB¶V
activities in relation to infrastructure projects but also activities such as providing 
guarantees for an enterprise development agency and specific schemes such as the Baltic 
Sea Investment Fund which is co-financed by the EIF. Certain EU-level programmes that had 
complementarities with Cohesion Policy were also mentioned, e.g. COSME, InnovFin, etc. 
(see Section 2.6). 
                                          
138  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
139  Most of these countries do not have any Lesser Developed or Transition regions and therefore EIB activities may 
be less relevant.  
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Table 7: Role of the EIB in Member States (according to survey responses)140 
Member State Advisory (B)lending Management 
Co-
financing 
for 
projects 
Capacity 
building 
and TA 
Other No role 
    enter-
prises 
urban energy enter- 
prises 
urban energy         
Austria            
Belgium (Fla)            
Bulgaria            
Croatia            
Czech Rep.            
Finland            
France            
Germany            
Hungary            
Latvia            
Lithuania            
Luxembourg            
Netherlands            
Poland            
Portugal            
Slovakia            
Slovenia            
Sweden            
UK (England)            
UK (Scotland)            
Source: EPRC survey research
                                          
140  For example if the information from Table 4 is compared with Table 7 it shows that Czech Republic did have a HF until 2014,Poland had five HFs of which one was terminated 
in 2014. There is no HF in Slovakia where the EIB is manager. A HF was created in Scotland in 2010 and HF in Greece, Spain and Italy are not mentioned. 
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3.2 Synergies between EIB and Cohesion Policy 
 
The mechanisms used by the EIB and Cohesion Policy differ, most notably because EIB loans 
have to be repaid whereas most Cohesion Policy expenditure is made available through 
grants although the introduction of FIs which also need to be repaid has blurred the 
distinction. The EIB approach and Cohesion Policy framework differ in terms of: 141 
x products ± the EIB offers financial products (loans, guarantees, equity) that are 
offered based on market conditions, whereas ESI Funds are mainly grant-orientated; 
x implementation timeframes ± Cohesion Policy is implemented over a seven-year 
programme period,142 whereas the EIB provides project loans that can have a shorter 
but usually a longer time span;  
x relationship ± ESI funds are implemented under the principle of shared 
management, whereas EIB products are governed by a contractual relationship 
between, in the case of SPLs and global loans, the Bank and a managing authority or 
an intermediate body and in the case of investment loans and some framework loans 
between the Bank and a promoter; 
x types of beneficiaries ± the EIB tends to do business with a relatively small group 
of trusted institutions,143 often financial intermediaries, whereas Cohesion Policy 
programmes have a broad range of local and regional stakeholders;  
x selection mechanisms ± Cohesion Policy programme activities are selected using 
predetermined criteria based on policy objectives. By contrast, WKH (,%¶V VHOHFWLRQ
processes are established through a process of due diligence and consist of a 
combination of policy objectives and measures of profitability (or at least 
economically justified); 
x support ± Cohesion Policy programmes have dedicated secretariats and contact 
points for support at the Member State level (national or regional), whereas the EIB 
has expert teams working on country desks; and  
x decision-making structures ± Cohesion Policy programmes are steered by 
monitoring committees based on a partnership principle involving a broad set of 
stakeholders, ZKHUHDV WKH (,%¶V XOWLPDWH GHFLVLRQ-making body is the board of 
governors with project activities approved by a board of directors consisting of 28 
national officials and a Commission representative. 
 
There are also important similarities in that both EIB activities and Cohesion Policy activities 
are based on providing match funding and their activities are meant to be additional.144 
Furthermore, Cohesion Policy and the EIB both prioritise economically disadvantaged 
regions.145  
The added value of EIB activities in Cohesion Policy can be considered in both financial and 
non-financial terms.146 Financially, EIB loans are seen as an important source of match 
                                          
141  European Parliament (2006) The Synergy between EU Cohesion Policy and European Investment Bank Activities, 
Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/study_ao_ip-b-st-regi-2005-
106_280806_/study_ao_ip-b-st-regi-2005-106_280806_en.pdf   
142  Loans under Cohesion Policy can also be granted for a longer periods. 
143  This is not necessarily the case for all products, for example for framework loans and investment loans a public 
body can be the borrower. 
144  Although in the case of the ESIF additionality is more direct, in that EU funds should not be a substitute for 
national funds. For the EIB, it is less direct in that EIB lending aims to have a similar, additional, effect through 
leveraging money which otherwise would not have become available.  
145  Robinson (2009) op. cit.  
146  Field et al. (forthcoming) op. cit. 
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funding, DQG LWV OHQGLQJ LV LQIRUPHG E\ WKH (8¶V WHUULWRULDO DJHQGD DQG &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\
objectives. The EIB offers complementary lending for Operational Programmes (see Section 
2.6) funded by ESI Funds. At the same time, the EIB offers a range of financial products that 
support Cohesion 3ROLF\REMHFWLYHVWKDWGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\µEOHQG¶ZLWK&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\IXQGV 
Other expected financial complementarities that were identified at the start of the 2007-13 
period included:147 
 
x financial instruments can stimulate a leverage effect for private investment and 
increased the net result of Cohesion Policy funding;  
x EIB activities can lead to a stURQJHULQWHJUDWLRQRIWKH%DQN¶VLQYHVWPHQWVLQWR
ESIF programmes; 
x the combination of grants and loans can lead to a concerted action of public 
grants and private investment within defined priorities and targeted geographical 
areas; 
x the inclusion of financial intermediaries to deliver FIs improves the access of 
applicants to a wide range of financial products (venture capital, guarantees, 
etc.); and 
x the pooling of financial and human resources allows for more efficient handling of 
the increasing number of activities concerned with project application, project 
appraisal, monitoring and evaluation. 
With respect to potential non-financial benefits, the EIB activities are considered to bring 
added value to Cohesion Policy in a number of ways:148 
x EIB activities can improve the capacity of Cohesion Policy implementation bodies 
to overcome institutional deficiencies which are obstacles to efficient project 
development and implementation; 
x the integration of EIB project experience can lead to more mature and better-
developed projects and therefore facilitate appraisal procedures; 
x the joint initiatives / special support instruments can provide regional implementing 
bodies with access to financial products and knowledge on financial 
engineering; 
x the joint initiatives complement the single-project logic from EIB investments and 
lead them to a programme-like approach with potential integration gains;  
x the H[FKDQJH RI FRPSOHPHQWDU\ VNLOOV (,%¶V NQRZOHGJH Rf large-scale projects, DG 
5(*,2¶Vimplementation experience) can improve capacity to respond to growing 
complexity in an increasing number of different Member States and institutional 
settings; 
x the harmonisation of procedures leads to a simplification of the wide range of 
financial products on the market for potential applicants; and 
x joint information policies can better promote the whole range of financial products 
and services to a wider audience of potential applicants. 
 
 
 
                                          
147 European Parliament (2006) op. cit.  
148 European Parliament (2006) op. cit.  
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3.3 Financial instruments in Cohesion Policy 
3.3.1 The case for financial instruments 
FIs have gained prominence in Cohesion Policy programmes over successive programme 
periods, increasing from EUR 570 million under ERDF in 1994-99, to EUR 1.3 billion in 2000-
06 and EUR 17 billion in OP commitments 2007-13. There was heightened interest in the 
2007-13 period with the launch of the JEREMIE and JESSICA initiatives, and the use of FIs 
is set to continue to play an important role in programme implementation in 2014-
20 (see Section 6.1). Former Regional Policy Commissioner Johannes Hahn described the 
use of FIs DV D µSURIRXQG FXOWXUDO VKLIW¶,149 and current &RPPLVVLRQHU &RULQD &UH ?X DOVR
considers FIs WR µUHSUHVHQW WKH IXWXUH RI FRKHVLRQ IXQGV¶150 The European Parliament also 
µUecognises the leverage effect of new financial instruments and their potential to mobilise 
investment, supports increased financing from credit in general¶, and has called for µthe use 
of revolving financial instruments to be extended to those areas eligible for funding which 
prove to be appropriate¶151 Moreover, in its resolution on the 6th Cohesion Report, the EP 
highlights 'the role of financial instruments in mobilising additional public or private co-
investments in order to address market failures in line with the Europe 2020 strategy and 
with cohesion policy priorities' and calls on the Commission µto make all efforts to make 
financial instruments easily usable and tempting for Member States and regions' and 
emphasises 'the need to ensure transparency, accountability and scrutiny for financial 
instruments that involve EU money'.152 
The justification of using such instruments is that they address market imperfections in 
the availability of capital, either because of information asymmetries (lack of track record 
leads private sector not to fund projects) or because commercial assessments do not 
necessarily capture all positive externalities or wider social benefits. It is also argued that FIs 
generate better-quality projects (because funds have to be repaid and commercial expertise 
can enhance project selection) and that they are a more cost-effective way of using public 
funds (because they recycle funds and private sector lending is leveraged).153  
 
In relative terms, FIs only make up a small proportion of the total Cohesion Policy 
budget.154 The main rationale for establishing FIs is their potentially revolving nature and 
the ability to attract additional capital from financial institutions.155 In this sense, the 
impetus for establishing FIs is based on efficiency. FIs are also considered to be innovative 
tools for delivering Cohesion Policy objectives, with the potential for providing added value. 
However, the extent to which FIs have been effective in contributing to achieving 
Operational Programme goals is difficult to discern, partly because the monitoring system 
had limited scope to measure the effects of FIs in 2007-13 but also because the added value 
of FIs can often only be determined in the long term.  
                                          
149  Hahn J (former Commissioner) (2010) Keynote address to the conference JEREMIE and JESSICA: Towards 
successful implementation, 29-30 November 2010, Brussels. 
150  &UH ?X & &RPPLVVLRQHU &RULQD &UH ?X D , H[SHFW 5RPDQLD WR XQGHUVWDQG WKDW ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV
represent the future, AGERPRES, 28 January 2015, available at: 
http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2015/01/28/commissioner-corina-cretu-i-expect-romania-to-understand-that-
financial-instruments-represent-future-14-33-53  
151  European Parliament (201D(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWUHVROXWLRQRI-XO\RQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VILIWK&RKHVLRQ
Report and the strategy for post-2013 cohesion policy (2011/2035(INI)) 
152  European Parliament (2011a) (XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWUHVROXWLRQRI6HSWHPEHURQµ,QYHVWPHQWIRU jobs and 
JURZWKSURPRWLQJHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGWHUULWRULDOFRKHVLRQLQWKH8QLRQ¶,1, 
153  Wishlade F and Michie R (2015) Financial instruments in 2014-20: learning from 2007-13 and adapting to the 
new environment, paper presented at the 2nd joint EU Cohesion Policy conference, Riga 4-6 February 2015. 
154  European Parliament (2012) Overview of Financial instruments used in the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 
period 2007-DQG WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOV IRU-2020. Analytical Study. DG for Internal Policies, 
Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, Brussels. 
155  European Investment Bank (2013a) op.cit. 
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In the 2007-13 programme period, considerable experience was built up in relation to 
the use of FIs in Cohesion Policy. The exact number of FIs is difficult to establish (see 
Section 4.2). According to data in the annual summary report, by the end of 2014 a total of 
1,025 FIs (73 HFs and 952 specific funds) were established in 25 Member States (only 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Croatia were not recorded as using FIs), which benefited from EUR 
17.1 billion of committed funds from 164 ERDF and 19 ESF Operational Programmes.156 The 
number of FIs ranged between one (Finland) or two (Austria, Malta) to 170 (Hungary) and 
248 (Poland).157 Around 92 percent of funds dispersed to final recipients were for enterprise 
support, five percent for urban development and two percent for energy 
efficiency/renewable energy.  
Loans are the most common type of finance offered by FIs. They are regarded as the least 
expensive form of external funding, suitable for comparatively low-risk operations and 
businesses with sufficient cash flow to service capital and repayments; they also allow 
entrepreneurs to retain control of their businesses. Guarantees are typically coupled with 
loans, allowing firms to access capital that would otherwise not be available to them, and 
are offered by various guarantors. Equity is better suited for a small number of high-growth 
firms that lack cash flow to cover debt and interest payments, but may offer high returns in 
the long run.  
FIs are regarded as playing an important role in the delivery of Cohesion Policy objectives. 
Their purpose is to enable public sector capital to be used on a market orientated 
basis (e.g. through HFs, venture capital funds, loan funds and guarantee-fund mechanisms) 
and, in some cases, to stimulate the participation of private sector capital in order to 
increase the scale, effectiveness and efficiency of policy measures. In theory, they have 
three important attributes: they increase the sustainability of public investment; they have a 
leverage effect; and they enable policymakers to make use of private sector skills and 
expertise. A recent Committee of the Regions report summarises the main potential benefits 
of FIs when compared to grants, as follows:158  
 
x leverage of resources and increased impact of EU programmes; 
x efficiency and effectiveness gains due to the revolving nature of funds, which stay in 
the programme area for future use for similar objectives; 
x greater quality of projects as investment must be repaid; 
x improved access to a wider spectrum of financial tools for policy delivery and private 
sector involvement and expertise; 
x a move away fURPDµJUDQWGHSHQGHQF\¶ culture; and 
x attraction of private sector support (and financing) to public policy objectives. 
Lastly, FIs have been found to promote cross-sectoral interactions and facilitate learning. 
They have also changed the emphasis on economic viability in the selection of public 
investment.159 
                                          
156  European Commission (2015d) op. cit. 
157  The number of financial instruments may be measured differently between Member States. For the purposes of 
UHSRUWLQJ PDQDJLQJ DXWKRULW\ GDWD WR WKH &RPPLVVLRQ µILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQW¶ UHIHUV WR QXPEHU RI IXQGLQJ
agreements signed (between MA and a HF, between MA and a specific fund (no HF), and between HFs and a 
specific fund (FIs)). Numbers may therefore reflect the different types of financial instruments being 
implemented or the number of financial intermediaries involved. See Committee of the Regions (2015) Financial 
instruments in support of territorial development, available at: 
http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/financial-instruments-territorial-development.pdf  
158  Committee of the Regions (2015) op. cit. 
159  'ąEURZVNL0op cit.  
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3.3.2 Implementation challenges 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits outlined in the previous section, research and 
evaluation indicates that the implementation of FIs has hitherto proved to be challenging. 
While there is a range of examples of FIs improving access to finance, the evidence base 
for their impact on economic development is limited as yet - particularly in terms 
of leverage of private finance, sustainability, and effects on productivity and 
employment ± and is crucially dependent on implementation capacity.160 Box 3 
provides illustrative cases of evaluation findings on the effectiveness of FIs for enterprises 
supported by Cohesion Policy funding. 
 
Box 3: Evaluation of Financial instruments for enterprises 
 
In Germany DQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH (8 µ15:(8 0LNURGDUOHKHQ¶161 found that the FI disbursed 305 
micro-loans in the period up to June 2010, leading to 200 new enterprises of which 134 were start-ups 
by formerly unemployed people, with a high number of female entrepreneurs. The indirect effects of 
re-animating a business pioneer culture in the regional economy were found to be much more 
important. There was a more critical view of the efficiency of the FI, as transaction costs were 
relatively high for micro-loans. However, a European Court of Auditors study on FIs came to different 
conclusions for Nordrhein-Westfalen, where FIs were considered to be ineffective and unsustainable, 
with a poor leverage effect, and insufficient diversification of the risk taken by the FI.162 
In the United Kingdom, the mid-term evaluation of JEREMIE Wales concluded that the fund was 
being implemented and managed effectively. Investment targets throughout the first period of 
RSHUDWLRQV ZHUH ODUJHO\ PHW ZKLOH ERWK WKH LQYHVWPHQW VWUDWHJ\ DQG WKH IXQG¶V RSHUDWLRQV ZHUe 
adjusted and strengthened in response to emerging patterns of investment activity and performance. 
Although the initial target for gross job creation in the business plan was too high, when evaluated the 
fund was found to be on target to meet its (adjusted) lifetime investment, realisation and repayment 
targets. Although most of the investments were at an early stage, there was some evidence that the 
expected economic development impacts had already started to come to fruition.163 
A horizontal evaluation study of FI implementation under the NSRF 2007-13 in Poland showed that 
repayable financing products offered with public assistance matched the needs of entrepreneurs and 
reduced the financial gap. Nevertheless, the products did not always address the highest-risk projects. 
An important element of the study was to evaluate the net effect of support in the form of loans, 
guarantees and equity. The evaluation found that loans increased investment expenditure in the year 
the loan was granted and in two subsequent years. However, there was no confirmation of any impact 
on the net income of the enterprises. The slight increase in employment among borrowers was not 
statistically significant. The analysis also suggested that guarantees did not help increase investment 
expenditure but only accelerated investments. Again, no considerable impact on net income was found, 
but guarantees did increase employment. 
In Lithuania, counterfactual impact evaluations of Lithuanian FIs in 2014164 showed that credits 
provided under the PHDVXUH µ3URYLVLRQ RI 6PDOO &UHGLWV ± 6WDJH ,,¶ GLG QRW KDYH D VWDWLVWLFDOO\
significant impact on any of the three relevant parameters, i.e. change in annual turnover, number of 
employees, and profitability in the supported enterprises. Although there were small positive effects on 
annual turnover and the number of employees, neither effect was statistically significant. Most of the 
loans provided under the scheme were working capital credits. 
                                          
160  'ąEURZVNL0op. cit. Wishlade F. and Michie R. (2015) Financial instruments in 2014-20: learning from 
2007-13 and adapting to the new environment, Paper to the 2nd joint DG Regio ± RSA EU Cohesion Policy 
FRQIHUHQFH µ&KDOOHQJHV IRU WKH 1HZ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ -20: an Academic and Policy Debate, Riga, 4-6 
February 2014.   European Parliament (2015f)  Financial Instruments under Cohesion Policy 2007-13: How 
have Member States and Selected Financial Institutions Respected and Preserved EU Financial Interests?, Study 
for the European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, 
European Parliament, Brussels. 
161  MR Gesellschaft Für Regionalberatung (2010) Evaluation NRW/EU Mikrodarlehen, Bremen. 
162  European Court of Auditors (2012) op. cit.  
163  Regeneris (2012) Mid-term evaluation of the Wales JEREMIE Fund, Report to Finance Wales, WEFO and the 
Welsh Government, Regeneris Consulting Ltd, Manchester. 
164  BGI Consulting (2014) (XURSRV 6ąMXQJRV VWUXNWźULQŏV SDUDPRV SRYHLNLR VPXONLDMDP LU YLGXWLQLDP YHUVOXL
vertinimas, *DOXWLQŏYHUWLQLPRDWDVNDLWD 
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In Portugal, an interim evaluation of the OP 'Thematic factors of competitiveness'165 assessed the 
change in employment and turnover of enterprises benefiting from the subsidisHGFUHGLWOLQHVRIµ30(
,QYHVWH,DQG,,¶E\WKHHQGRIThe evaluation compared the corresponding pre- and post-project 
figures.166 Employment and turnover had increased by 13 percent and 33 percent respectively. The 
average change was higher in the sub-sectors that received less overall support. 
In Spain, the HYDOXDWLRQRI WKH µ&DWDORQLD¶23PHDVXUHV WR IRVWHU LQQRYDWLRQEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQW 
and the knowledge economy167 DVVHVVHG WKHPDLQ UHVXOWV RI WKH ), µ,)(0 -(5(0,(¶ 7KHHYDOXDWLRQ
found that capital injections to mutual guarantee schemes and convertible debt enabled SMEs to grow 
and consolidate, which led to an increased number of employees of 9 percent for mutual guarantees 
and 4 percent for convertible debt. The pioneer equity FI promoted innovative projects with high 
impact potential. Some difficulties were noted for microcredits, which were due to a lack of previous 
experience or insufficient specialisation with microcredits in the financial institutions. 
In Denmark LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH IXQGV¶ RXWFRPHV ZDV OLPLWHG +RZHYHU DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH
LQYHVWPHQWVRIµ&$7,QYHVW=HDODQG¶IRXQGWKH\KDGDQRWLFHDEOHHIIHFWRQHPSOR\PHQW&RQVHUYDWive 
estimates from the companies that received capital indicate that the capital secured 60 to 65 jobs, 
which is more than the fund had anticipated. According to the assessment of the companies that 
received capital from the fund, the investments could result in 175 to 230 more jobs within three 
years. This figure is based on estimates, but the evaluation team considered this a positive and 
satisfactory result. Most portfolio companies, however, found it very difficult to tell what impact (other 
than on employment) they had created for the region.168 
 Source: EPRC research.   
 
Commission documentation and studies have identified a number of well-documented 
challenges in terms of implementing FIs in Cohesion Policy.169 While the following list is not 
exhaustive and does not necessarily relate to FIs involving the EIB in particular, it does give 
an indication of the types of challenges related to the introduction of FIs. For the 2014-20 
period the Commission and co-legislators have aimed to resolve some of these challenges. 
 
x Limited capacity of MAs to implement FIs ± MAs have been setting up and 
implementing complex co-funded FIs in an uncertain economic climate, often facing a 
steep learning curve. In some cases, this has led to delays in implementation. The 
Commission and the EIB have sought to address the capacity issue through various 
platforms, including fi-compass (see Section 6.4). 
 
x The impact of the economic crisis meant that the capacity of FIs either to leverage in 
private sector funding or to incentivise SME investment may prove to be limited.170 
 
x Unspent resources has been one of most serious concerns. This stems partly from the 
practice in the 2007-13 period of allocating of resources to FIs which subsequently 
remained in the funds instead of being disbursed to the final recipients and circumvent 
the automatic de-commitment rule. However, the redesign of the investment 
strategy and thus the creation and approval (State aid clearance) of new products in 
response to the crisis, made it challenging to roll out FIs according to the timescales that 
were originally envisaged. The CPR (Art. 41) specifies the phasing of payment for FIs. 
Interim payments cannot exceed 25 percent of programme contributions committed, and 
                                          
165  Augusto Mateus & Associados and PwC Portugal (2013) Estudo de Avaliação Intercalar do Programa Operacional 
Fatores de Competitividade (COMPETE): Relatório Final. 
166  For a project that started in 2010 and finished in 2011, the pre-project year corresponds to 2009 and the post-
project year to 2012. 
167  PWC (2011) Evaluación Estratégica del PO FEDER de Catalunya 2007-2013 Eje 1: Economía del conocimiento e 
innovación y desarrollo empresarial. 
168  Oxford Research A/S in cooperation with Hoegenhaven Consult (2014) Ekstern Evaluering af CAPNOVA Invest 
Zealand og CAPNOVA. 
169  For examples, see: European Commission (2012a) Financial instruments in Cohesion Policy,  
Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/financial/financial_instruments_2012_en.
pdf ; Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. and (2015) op. cit.  
170  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
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the second interim payment can only be claimed when at least 60 percent of the first 
interim payment has actually been spent. 
 
x Shortcomings have been identified in the financial gap analysis. In a few cases, 
funds have been transferred to FIs before mature business plans for these funds were in 
place. Room for improvement has been identified in the areas of setting up clear exit 
strategies and winding-up provisions. The CPR (Art. 37) requires an ex-ante 
assessment before funds can be committed to FIs. Methodological guidance to support 
this process has been provided by the Commission and by fi-compass (see Section 6.4). 
The ex-ante assessment culminates in a funding agreement or a strategy document if 
the managing authority implements the FI itself (annex IV of the CPR) which must 
provide an exit policy for the contribution from ESIF. 
 
x There have been concerns in relation to the management fees, which have varied 
widely, and have not always been linked to the performance of the funds. For the 2014-
20 period, the requirements for management costs and fees are much more stringent. 
Specifically, Delegated Regulation 480/2014 provides for an overall cap on fees as well 
as a performance-related component. 
 
x The unavailability of key data for monitoring and reporting purposes has been a major 
concern in the 2007-13 period. For 2014-20, data requirements have been established 
from the outset for FIs in Implementing Regulation 821/2014 (Annex I). While most of 
the data sought for 2007-13 was voluntary, for 2014-2020 it is mandatory (see Section 
4.2). 
 
x The legal framework on FIs in Cohesion Policy in 2007-13 was not always fit for 
purpose and did not contain sufficient detail for effective implementation of FIs. This 
was considered a significant hurdle for fund managers and made it difficult to develop 
products and meet market requirements. The 2014-20 CPR is significantly more detailed 
and complemented by Commission implementing and delegated regulations covering 
specific aspects, and Commission guidance on key issues (e.g. use of working capital, 
combining support, selection of intermediaries). However, from the (,%¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKH
2014-20 regulatory framework continues to present challenges and ESIF FIs are still 
regarded as being less efficient as EU level instruments which are considered to provide 
more regulatory clarity, are easier to use and more attractive for financial intermediaries. 
On the other side, it may be difficult to tailor such instruments to the specific situation in 
Member States and regions.  
 
x The rules on State aid have often been a key source of frustration in relation to 
FIs.171 In the 2007-13 period, Commission documentation dealing with FIs stressed 
continually that State aid rules should be respected, but the State aid rules (with 
exception of de minimis rules) were relatively ill-equipped to deal with FIs. For 2014-20, 
the situation has evolved on several counts. First, a new General Block Exemption 
Regulation (651/2014) makes specific provision for support for access to finance for 
SMEs. Second, the Commission has adopted new Guidelines on Risk Finance aid (OJEU 
C19/4 22/1/2014). Last, so-FDOOHGµRIIWKHVKHOI¶LQVWUXPHQWVVHH Section 6.5) have been 
designed by the Commission to be State-aid compliant on the basis of the so-called de 
minimis Regulation (1407/2013).172 This regulation does, however, involve significant 
administration for managing authorities. 
 
                                          
171 Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
172  De minimis does not involve reporting to the Commission, but th
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3.4 Effectiveness of the (,%¶VDGYLVRU\DQGFDSDFLW\-building role 
 
As noted in Section 2.3, the EIB provides advisory and capacity-building services to MAs. In 
many cases, EIB support and advice is offered alongside FIs, and in some instances advice is 
RIIHUHG DV SDUW RI D µSDFNDJH¶ VSHFLILFDOO\ WDUJHWHG DW WKH LQLWLDWLRQ DQG Lmplementation of 
FIs. However, advisory services can also be provided under other OP priorities on a more ad-
hoc basis. The EIB provides services in terms of market assessment, gap analysis and 
feasibility studies for JESSICA and JEREMIE instruments. Additionally, it is involved in 
capacity-building activities as part of its JASPERS and JASMINE initiatives. Lastly, the EIB 
also works closely with the Commission on the implementation of FIs and has an advisory 
and capacity-building role in this context.  
3.4.1 JEREMIE gap analyses and JESSICA evaluations 
The JEREMIE initiative, aimed at supporting MAs to set up FIs for enterprise support, was 
established in 2005, whilst Member States were engaged in the programming process for 
the 2007-13 period. Following this, the EIF undertook a programme of gap analyses / 
evaluation studies across interested Member States and regions. The initiative can to 
an extent be considered a pilot and should be evaluated as such; the gap analyses 
undertaken by the EIF were not a regulatory requirement and involved an untested method. 
The main aim of the gap analyses was to assess and provide recommendations on the 
suitability of the FI for enterprise support as a means of addressing SME-based economic 
weaknesses in these selected areas. In all but one case, the analysis was based on 
secondary data that were in some cases complemented by stakeholder interviews. The gap 
analyses were valued by MAs DVSURYLGLQJDQH[SHULHQFHGDQGµREMHFWLYHYLHZ¶The analyses 
were intended to go beyond existing studies by providing an assessment of possible HF/FIs 
µIURPDSRUWIROLRSHUVSHFWLYH¶173 In total, 48 evaluations174 are reviewed here, of which 18 
addressed entire Member States and 30 focused on regions or macro-regional areas,175 for 
example, the Eastern Regions of Poland.  Most evaluations were delivered in 2007. 
 
A review of these evaluations reveals some common trends (see Table 8). Every 
evaluation recommended the use of an HF for enterprise support in 2007-13, i.e. that 
it would be of value in addressing some of the SME-related weaknesses identified in each 
country/region. In each case, the creation of a HF structure was proposed, along with 
specific funds under Article 44 (1)(a)176 of the implementing Regulation 1828/2006, which 
were judged to be an appropriate means of targeting the various identified business needs 
and/or taking the form of specific types of undertaking . The positive recommendations for 
adopting HFs can also be seen as contributing to raising the awareness and profile of 
FIs in Cohesion Policy.  
 
In some instances, enterprise support FIs were recommended at the national level but were 
subsequently only implemented at the regional level. For example, the EIF conducted a 
JEREMIE evaluation study for Spain as a whole, as well as for nine Spanish regions 
individually. In this case, enterprise support HFs were subsequently set up within selected 
regions, but no nationwide HF was established. 
 
 
                                          
173  European Investment Bank   (2013a)  op. cit. 
174  In total the EIF carried out 55 evaluations (see Section 2.5.1).  
175  This refers to macro-regional areas at the national level, not those developed at the supra-national level linked 
to macro-regional strategies. 
176  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006 op cit. 
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Table 8: EIF JEREMIE gap analyses and Member State/region actions, 2007-13* 
 
Number of 
evaluations 
Number of 
evaluations 
recommending 
enterprise 
support HF/FI 
(Art. 44a) 
Number of 
MS/regions which 
have since 
implemented an 
enterprise support* 
HF/FI (Art.44a) at 
the same spatial 
scale 
Number of MS/regions 
in which the EIF/EIB is 
the designated 
manager of at least 
one such enterprise 
support HF at the same 
spatial scale 
Member 
States 
18 18 11 7 
Regions 
(incl. macro-
regions) 
30 30 13 3 
Source: EPRC Research 
*This table captures JEREMIE-type structures (see Annex 3), i.e. revolving HF structures under which one or more 
specific funds supporting Article 44a are implemented. These HFVPD\QRWEHH[SOLFLWO\QDPHGµ-(5(0,(¶ Funds. 
 
Although enterprise support FIs were implemented in some Member States and regions 
subsequent to the publication of an EIF evaluation, this is not evidence of a direct causal link 
between the two developments. For example, in some regions such as Catalunya (Spain) the 
regional government (Generalitat de Catalunya) had already made the decision to allocate 
ERDF funds to create a HF for enterprise support.177 However, the EIF can be seen to have 
contributed in an advisory role in all of the cases above. 
 
The reasons for the non-implementation of enterprise support HF/FI are also of note 
in some instances. In Estonia and Denmark, for example, a lack of sufficient ERDF funds 
was a reason for non-implementation. In other cases such as Lorraine (France), the regional 
authority did not perceive that an enterprise support HF/FI would be the optimal 
choice despite EIF recommendations.178 
 
In most of the EIF evaluations, the EIF itself was proposed or suggested as HF 
Manager. As per Article 44 of EC Regulation 1083/2006, the EIB or EIF can be directly 
assigned as the HF manager by the MA. Alternatively, national administrations or financial 
institutions (by way of tender) may be assigned. The EIF acted as the HF manager in seven 
of the 11 national-level funds assessed (Table 8). However, the EIF was assigned as the HF 
manager only in a minority of regions for which EIF evaluations were produced, specifically 
Extremadura in Spain and Languedoc-Roussillon and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in France. 
Regional governments or regional-level enterprise agencies such as the Innovation and 
Development Agency of Andalucía (IDEA) ± or purposely established enterprise support fund 
management organisations such as Finance Yorkshire in England (UK) ± were more 
commonly the JEREMIE HF managers in 2007-13. 
 
The gap analyses were funded by the EIF and the Commission. From an MA perspective, this 
free service was attractive and played a significant role in the decision not only to 
undertake the analyses but also to proceed in the establishment of FIs. 
Furthermore, without the skills and expertise of EIF personnel the delivery of the analyses 
would have at best been more limited and constraint and at worst not been carried out at 
all. The costs of the gap analysis varied significantly, but most MAs would have been 
unwilling to fund the analyses themselves, particularly because many of them were 
                                          
177  European Investment Fund (2007) Estudio de evaluación del acceso a la financiación de la PYME en CATALUÑA, 
p. 4. 
178  European Investment Fund (2009b) JEREMIE ± Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises; 
Progress Report on Evaluation and Implementation Activities in 27 EU Member States, p. 20, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/funds/2007/jjj/doc/pdf/jeremie/jeremie_narrativeprogressreport_09
0701.pdf 
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unconvinced of the feasibility and added value of using FIs.179 While the studies were 
considered a positive contribution, there were also challenges:180 
x substantial delays ± taking up to two years of a seven-year programme period; 
and  
x variation in approach despite the common template ± some evaluations 
involved quite general statistical analyses (mostly due to a lack of data at the sub-
national level), whereas others included very detailed descriptions from different 
actors 
On the other hand, Gap Analysis and evaluations have become a standard and obligatory 
practice in the 2014-20 period, to a great extent based on the EIB and EIF examples. 
 
In a similar exercise to the JEREMIE evaluations outlined above, the EIB delivered a number 
of feasibility studies / evaluation studies for the JESSICA initiative. Most EIB JESSICA 
evaluation studies were published in either 2009 or 2010 (see Annex 3). A distribution of the 
45 evaluation studies,181 and the subsequent actions of the Member States and regions 
evaluated, and summarised in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: EIB JESSICA evaluations and Member State/region actions, 2007-13 
 
Number of 
evaluations 
Number of 
evaluations 
recommending 
Urban 
Development HF 
Number which have 
since implemented 
one of more urban 
development HFs 
(Art.44b) 
Number in which the 
EIF/EIB is the 
designated manager of 
at least one urban 
development HF 
Member 
States 
13 13 5 4 
Regions 
(inc. macro-
regions) 
32 32 14 13 
Source: EPRC research 
Each of the EIB JESSICA evaluation studies conducted a needs analysis, and all 45 
supported the use of Urban Development HFs (or JESSICA-type instruments) as a 
mechanism for addressing urban development projects, typically due to a lack of existing 
finance options. Most reports also provided recommendations on the number and scale of 
possible JESSICA funds.  
 
A minority of the evaluated Member States and regions opted to implement urban 
development instruments, partly due to the emphasis given to competitiveness and 
enterprise support in 2007-13 OPs. Hungary, for example, did not establish any urban 
development HF/FIs in 2007-13, despite the fact that the JESSICA evaluation study had 
concluded that a urban development HF/FI ZRXOG µDGG WR WKH UDQJH RI IXQGVDYDLODEOH IRU
sustainable urban development'.182 However, a national-level umbrella HF was set up for 
enterprise support. 
 
                                          
179  European Investment Bank (2013a) op. cit. 
180  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (2011) Ex post evaluation of JEREMIE Evaluation Phase as it 
relates to the EIF, Synthesis Report, April 2011. 
181  In total the EIB produced 65 JESSICA evaluations. The EIB also produced thematic JESSICA evaluations in some 
cases, such as a JESSICA Legal Study for Germany and an evaluation for solid waste management in Greece. 
These thematic evaluations are not reviewed here.  
182  European Investment Bank (2011) Implementing JESSICA Instruments in Hungary; evaluation study, Final, 
Public Version, p. 9, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/funds/2007/jjj/doc/pdf/jessica/19-
jessica_hungary_en.pdf  
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In some instances, the choice not to set up a urban development Fund was due to the 
prioritisation of FIs supporting interventions under Article 44 (1)(c):183 energy efficiency and 
renewable energy in buildings. In Slovakia, for example, no urban development HF was set 
up after the EIB evaluation, but a State Housing Development Fund FI was set up in 2013. 
Where urban development type funds have been set up, the EIB has played a substantial 
implementation role at HF level.184 In 13 of the 14 regions and four of the five member 
states which were reviewed and subsequently introduced urban development HFs, the EIB 
implements the HF.185  
 
Some interviewees questioned that the effectiveness of JESSICA feasibility studies, 
particularly considering the costs involved. However, the studies were viewed as 
valuable in promoting uptake of financial instruments and could be regarded as a first 
step towards animating MAs on the potential use of FIs and building consensus on 
the approach. Furthermore, EIB personnel are noted for their high level of expertise and 
know-how. They often work across whole sectors in different countries and are therefore 
able to draw from experiences accumulated in these countries and regions and apply them in 
others. 
 
Lastly, the EIB and E,)¶V role as advisor and privileged position as HF managers can be 
perceived as a conflict of interest.186 It could lead to a situation where the EIB provides 
recommendations that favour its position as a HF manager. It should be noted that the 
ultimate decision with regard to HF management lies with the managing authority and not 
with the EIB and EIF. Furthermore, JEREMIE and JESSICA were pilot initiatives and required 
EIF and EIB expertise in their development. The EIB and EIF have undertaken a number of 
steps to address this risk. First, in the 2007-13 period, large parts of the evaluations were 
outsourced to an external consultant under a framework contract. Second, in the case of 
FIs for enterprises the 2014-20 compulsory ex-ante assessment which must be carried 
out before OP resources can be committed to FIs consists of two steps, a market 
assessment and a µGHOLYHU\DQGPDQDJHPHQW¶EORFNZKLFKLQFOXGHVDSURSRVHGLQYHVWPHQW
strategy. MAs can choose whether they want the EIF to carry out the investment plan after 
the assessment has been carried out (see Section 6.2). Third, for 2014-20 the generic 
advisory services for all ESIF financial instruments have been grouped in a single 
technical assistance platform ± fi-compass ± a joint initiative by the EIB and EC which 
can operate independently from its mandate management divisions (see Section 6.4). 
3.4.2 JASPERS  
Since 2006, the JASPERS facility has completed over 1000 assignments. During the 
2007-13 period, a total of 470 applications for funding for major projects were submitted to 
the Commission, 435 of which were approved and received assistance from the JASPERS 
initiative. The total investment cost for the major projects supported by the JASPERS 
initiative from 2007 to 2014 was EUR 71.7 billion, of which EU grants made up EUR 42.4 
billion.187 
                                          
183  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006 op. cit. 
184  The EIB does not implement specific funds (i.e. Urban Development Funds ± UDFs). 
185  Some regions, such as Galicia in Spain, are covered by more than one multi-region Article 44b HF. 
186  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (2011) op. cit. 
187  European Investment Bank (2015a) JASPERS in the 2014-2020 programming period, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/jaspers_leaflet_2015_en.pdf   
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A 2012 evaluation notes that the JASPERS facility has a broad reach in terms of scale 
(i.e. the average number of themes per major project) and scope (i.e. the types of services 
it offers). Other findings included:188  
x a reduction in the decision duration of projects by an average of 114 days (from 
386 to 272 days); 
x no difference in interruption rates189 by DG REGIO in comparison to non-JASPERS 
projects; 
x positive impact on the quality of project development as well as on the 
underlying quality of projects; and 
x JASPERS work on individual projects and its horizontal assignments have the 
potential to increase administrative capacity among stakeholders in the Member 
States. 
3.4.3 JASMINE technical assistance 
From 2010 to 2013, the EIF, through the JASMINE initiative, provided TA to 70 selected 
microfinance institutions across Europe. This included 22 rating reports, 62 assessment 
reports and 921 training days. In total, 30 microcredit providers benefited from the JASMINE 
facility in 2013  
 
A 2013 evaluation notes concrete evidence of the benefits of the JASMINE facility.190 The 
instrument has introduced changes in the way microfinance providers operate, which 
resulted in improvements to operational efficiency, productivity and/or external relations 
(with customers and/or investors). However, it is difficult to attribute tangible outcomes to 
the business development services. JASMINE TA is also judged to have strong added value, 
and its business development services are regarded as highly relevant for enhancing the 
capacity, professionalism and performance of the European microcredit sector. Furthermore, 
it is noted that there is evidence of positive feedback from beneficiaries and a growing 
demand for both JASMINE TA and a wider range of TA (see Table 10). 
  
                                          
188  AECOM Economics (2012) op. cit.  
189  Interruptions are one of a range of measures that the Commission can apply to be able to guarantee that 
Community funds are spent well and properly and respond to irregularities (i.e. interruption of payments, 
suspension of payments, financial corrections). 
190  European Commission (2013c) op. cit. 
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Table 10: Beneficiaries of JASMINE support in 2013 
Country Microfinance institution 
Bulgaria 
Mikrofond AD 
Nachala Cooperative 
France Créa-Sol  
Germany 
Goldrausch 
HSZ Consulting 
Mikrofinanzwerk 
Objektiv 
Smart Mikrokredit 
VS Finance GmbH 
Greece Business and Cultural Development Centre (KEPA)  
Italy 
ACAF Italia 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo (BCC) Mediocrati 
Banca di Credito Cooperativo (BCC) Emilbanca 
MAG Verona 
PerMicro 
Prestiamoci 
Un raggio di Luce 
Poland 
Lublin Development Foundation 
Warmia and Mazury Regional Development Agency 
Kujawsko-Pomorski Loan Fund 
Romania 
C.A.R. Sanatatea 
C.A.R. CFR 
C.A.R. Invatamant 
C.A.R. Sanitar Valcea 
C.A.R. Sanitar Brasov 
C.A.R. Tractorul Brasov 
Opportunity Microcredit Romania (OMRO) 
Patria credit 
Spain Seed Capital de Bizkaia  
UK WCVA (Wales) 
Source: EIF website (September 2015) 
3.4.4 Advising the Commission and Managing Authorities 
The EIB and EIF can also be informally consulted by the Commission to asses some technical 
provisions of the regulations and its "feasibility" in implementation. In the early 2000s, when 
DG REGIO sought to develop its use of FIs, it relied upon the EIB as well as other DGs that 
had already built up experience (e.g. DG ECFIN). Also for the 2014-20 period the EIB was 
informally consulted by the Commission services. However, the EIB and EIF, similar to other 
consulted stakeholders, assess the implementation of the provisions on the basis of their 
own implementation methods, legal and financial context (liabilities and risk assessment 
with the banks own rating requirements) and financial returns of the potential contributions 
and participations of the bank. Whilst the introduction of FIs meant that the Commission 
relied on the EIB for technical expertise and had to build up capacity, the EIB increased 
involvement in Cohesion Policy meant it had to build up expertise in terms of understanding 
the complexities of the Policy. At a legislative level, the EIB and EIF provide practical and 
informal policy advice rather than setting policy objectives. The EIB and EIF are a policy 
delivery body and do not provide direct policy advice in terms of content.  
 
However, interviewees noted that the (,%¶V position of having direct understanding and 
interactions with financial intermediaries and also working in close cooperation with the 
Commission means that it is well positioned to understand the practical implementation of 
the regulations and the type of issues that intermediaries may face when implementing FIs 
funded through Cohesion Policy. In other words, because of its expertise and experience the 
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EIB is can provide the Commission with insights on whether, from the EIB and 
(,)¶V SHUVSHFWLYH the regulatory provisions are workable and attractive to 
financial intermediaries.191 It is important to note, however, that the EIB and EIF do not 
have a formal role; drafting the regulatory framework is the responsibility of the 
Council, Commission and European Parliament; their suggestions and comments are 
treated as advisory by the Commission and can be rejected or diluted.  
 
In addition the EIB and EIF services also provide advisory services in the context of its 
mandate management activities. These services are not part of its contractual 
arrangement. The EIB and EIF argue that these services contribute significantly to building 
capacity in those Member States where implementation structures for FI are weaker. The EIF 
notes that its role in designing products and seeking clarification from the Commission with 
regards to the legal framework were considered valuable by managing authorities for which 
it acted as HF manager. The EIB also worked closely with the Commission (DG Regio) to 
build capacity among Commission staff in relation to FIs, for example through a secondment 
programme. 
 
Lastly, the EIB also offered advisory services as part of its (b)lending activities (e.g. 
National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) implementation associated to SPLs and FLs; 
lessons learned and best practice; strategy advice; and monitoring). 
 
3.5 Mandate management 
 
$VPHQWLRQHGLQ6HFWLRQWKH(,%¶VUROHDVKROGLQJIXQGPDQDJHUVLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\ZDV
new in the 2007-13 period. However the EIF, for whom mandate management is a core 
function, has over twenty years of experience in this area. At the start of 2007-13 period, 
the EIB (including the EIF) did not anticipate taking up positions as fund managers of HFs. 
However, appropriate HF managers with sufficient levels of expertise (especially in relation 
to urban development) could not always be found at the Member State level and hence the 
EIB was asked to become HF manager. This demonstrates the additionality of the EIB and its 
ability to fill market gaps. Currently, the EIB employs around 45 staff in its role as HF 
manager.  
3.5.1 Effectiveness of urban development and enterprise support holding funds 
The effectiveness of holding funds can be measured in different ways. At a very basic level, 
this involves the extent to which final recipients are able to absorb funding that has been 
made available. In terms of advisory services and capacity-building activities, it relates to 
the extent to which these practices are able to generate relevant projects. Subsequently, 
these projects are expected to achieve certain results that contribute to the policy 
objectives. The Cohesion Policy framework for 2014-20 provides a structure that ultimately 
aims to measure the result of activities in terms of their contribution to policy. 
 
Currently, effectiveness is mainly measured in terms of financial absorption and 
inputs and very little is yet known about the actual outputs and results of FIs. 
There are also few data available on repayments or the full extent of management costs for 
operating FIs. This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of financial instruments.  
 
 
 
                                          
191 Other stakeholders and national financial institutions can perform a similar role.  
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In terms of financial commitments and payments, IRXUW\SHVRIµVSHQG¶FDQEHLGHQWLILHG192  
x OP contributions committed in funding agreements (policy intent); 
x OP contributions paid to HF or specific funds; 
x OP contributions paid by HFs (where they exist) to specific funds; and 
x OP contributions invested in final recipients in the form of loans, guarantees and 
equity.  
Analysis suggests that there is an insufficient level of absorption. The total amount 
of OP contributions committed to FIs (policy intent) by the end of 2014 was in the region of 
EUR 17.1 billion, of which over EUR 16 billion had been paid into either a HF or a specific 
fund. Although there are some questions about the accuracy of the data (see also Section 
4.2), it appears that by the end of 2014 EUR 9.2 billion had reached the final recipient ± an 
increase of almost 40 percent compared to 2013, and meaning that 57.4 percent of the OP 
contributions were paid into FIs.193 The low rate of disbursement of Cohesion Policy funding 
in financial instruments to final recipients has previously been a concern for the European 
Parliament.194 
 
This low level of absorption can be partly explained by delay in setting up FIs in the 2007-
13 period. These delays can, among others be accredited to the complexities of the 
regulatory framework and crisis. When comparing the financial instruments for enterprises 
(Article 44 (1)(a)) and urban development (Article 44 (1)(b)), the latter initiative has 
performed less well than expected. In the context of the financial crisis, it was difficult for 
urban authorities to implement ambitious urban projects, and the appetite for risk also 
significantly decreased. There are cases in which urban development FIs have worked well 
(for example, the London Green Fund) but in countries such as Italy the financial crisis 
caused major difficulties. Moreover, the low absorption rates also raise some important 
questions about the ability of FIs to find appropriate projects and beneficiaries.  
 
However, there are other explanations for lower absorption rates. As mentioned, HFs can 
comprise a number of specific funds, which provides flexibility in spending. For example, the 
urban development HF for Lithuania has seven specific funds (Urban Development Funds). 
In some instances the HFs only contain a limited number of specific funds (sometimes only 
one), which raises questions about why a HF structure was adopted, as the benefit of having 
added flexibility disappears and fees have to be paid to both the HF and specific fund 
managers (for details, see Table 4 above).195 There are, however, explanations for adopting 
a HF structure. 
x Ensuring absorption ± in the 2007-13 period, there were considerable advantages 
in setting up a HF early so that N+2 rules could be bypassed, as transferring funds 
into a HF counted as expenditure. The Commission discouraged this practice and the 
2014-20 regulations contain measures to prevent it. 
x Providing certainty ± setting up a HF early provided the financial intermediaries 
(and the EIB) with the certainty196 that commitments were being kept. Once the 
funds were transferred into the HF, the intermediary could carry out further market 
analysis knowing that the funding was secured. 
                                          
192 Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
193  European Commission (2015d) op. cit. 
194  European Parliament (2015a) Opinion of the Committee of Regional development for the Committee of 
Budgetary Control on the European Investment Bank (EIB) ± Annual Report 2014, 13 November 2015. 
195  This may reflect unforeseen difficulties in setting up additional Urban Development Funds.  
196  AOWKRXJK WKLV µFHUWDLQW\¶ ZDV YLHZHG DV LPSRUWDQW LQ HQFRXUDJLQJ WKH SDUWLFLpation of private sector 
LQWHUPHGLDULHVLQSDUWLFXODUIXQGVFRXOGEHSRWHQWLDOO\VWLOOEHWUDQVIHUUHGEDFNWRWKH0$¶. 
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x Flexibility ± HFs allow fund managers to shift funds between FIs in case of 
underperformance and provide the opportunity to establish new instruments if 
necessary.   
Nevertheless, such an approach also has disadvantages. As the ex-ante analyses for FIs can 
be considered a pilot initiative, in some cases not enough market research was carried out 
prior to approval and as a consequence absorption was often overestimated. This must also 
be seen in the context of the financial crisis and the increased aversion to risk. Second, 
some interviewees argue that HFs can be too rigid. Once funds have been committed, there 
are no longer opportunities to shift funding between priority axes in OPs to enable quicker 
spending (although funds can be shifted between FIs). Renegotiating a HF agreement is 
theoretically feasible but very difficult, as a HF involves detailed contractual arrangements.  
The ability to attract private sector funding is one of the appeals of FIs. However, in general, 
the extent of private contributions to OP commitments appears to be rather 
modest (although reporting on this was limited during the 2007-13 period). The 
European Court of Auditors noted the poor capacity of Structural Funds programmes to 
leverage in private investment in comparison with other EU SME programmes. The leverage 
ratios achieved ranged from around 1 (no leverage of private funding) to 2.75. This poorer 
outcome was attributed to a lack of fit between the Structural Funds regulations and the 
specific features of FIs, as well as weaknesses in the gap analyses carried out.197 However, a 
direct comparison is difficult to make as EU-level mandates do not have regional restrictions, 
have different deadlines, target different markets and final recipients, do not require State 
aid notifications and by some considered less complex in terms of regulatory provisions. 
 
The effectiveness of FIs can also be measured in terms of the risk associated with the types 
of project that are supported. A European Parliament Study in 2012198 found that investing 
through FIs does not imply greater financial risk to the EU budget than grants. 
Instead, the main risks are foreseen to be in relation to inadequate returns below the 
opportunity costs of capital, and poor performance from the Cohesion Policy budget 
compared to grants. As FIs usually finance projects that generate a financial return, the 
stock of projects is inevitably more limited than those seeking grant funding.199 As a result, 
the implementation of FIs has taken longer than was initially anticipated, particularly in 
those cases where instruments were introduced after the start of the 2007-13 programme 
period and involved a high number of varied stakeholders. This has meant that FIs for 
enterprises (Article 44 (1)(a)) have been easier to implement than those relating to urban 
development (Article 44 (1)(b)).200  
 
Lastly, effectiveness can be measured in terms of the extent to which funding initiatives 
contribute to Cohesion Policy objectives. However, at present there is little information 
available as to the extent to which the results are achieved, partly because of the lack 
of data but also because results are only likely to become apparent in the long term.  
3.5.2 EIB performance and management  
Turning to the overall performance of the EIB, Table 11 provides a comparison of EIB and 
non-EIB managed holding funds and their progress with implementation, compiled from 
summary data provided to the Commission by Member States.201  
                                          
197  European Court of Auditors (2012) op. cit. 
198  European Parliament (2012) op. cit.  
199  This particularly applies to those cases where FIs target urban areas, for example JESSICA; see: Dabrowski 
(2015) op. cit.  
200  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006 op. cit. 
201  European Commission (2015d) op cit. 
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It should be noted that reporting in relation to FIs only became a requirement in 2011 and 
even then, the majority of the data available are the result of voluntary submissions from 
Member States (see Section 4.2). As such, there are inherent accuracy and 
comprehensiveness issues with the performance data for FIs during this period. The data are 
made available by Member States through their Annual Implementation Reports. The data 
are extensively checked (manually and automatically), and the Commission follows up 
Member State submissions where they expect inaccuracies. Nevertheless, missing 
information and inaccuracies remain a problem. The main limitations regarding this data are 
outlined in Section 4.2, but for interpretation purposes it is worth mentioning here that: 
 
x some holding funds appear to be reported as specific funds; and 
x in some cases, contributions to the specific fund exceed the commitment to the 
holding fund, or contributions to final recipients exceed the specific fund allocations 
(this is not necessarily a mistake, but on occasions it does appear to be the case). 
Despite these limitations and inaccuracies, it remains possible to make a comparison 
between the effectiveness of EIB and non-EIB HFs, as Table 11 demonstrates. The summary 
data report identifies 30 EIB/EIF HFs202 and 46 non-EIB HFs. For some FIs and HFs 
insufficient data was available to be included in the analysis; these have been excluded.  
 
In terms of the total OP contribution to the HF reaching the FIs, the summary data 
indicate differences between HFs managed by the EIB and those that are not. EIB 
HFs, on average, committed 63.83 percent of the OP contribution to the FIs, while non-EIB 
HFs committed slightly more with an average of 85.44 percent. It is interesting to note that, 
for the previous year of summary data, there was little difference between the two, 
respectively 65.77 and 68.19 percent. The difference is even greater when focusing on HFs 
for enterprises (Art. 44 (1)(a)), with EIF managed HFs passing on 48.64 percent and non-
EIB 85.42 percent. 
 
There is also a significant difference regarding the proportion of the total OP contribution 
that reached final recipients. In the case of non-EIB HFs, on average, 64.1 percent of the OP 
contribution reached the final recipient (up from 44.0 percent in the previous year). The EIB 
HFs only invested 46.3 percent (up from 26 percent in the previous year), indicating a 
substantial gap in performance between EIB and non-EIB HFs. It should be noted that 
internal monitoring data provided by the EIB demonstrate a much higher absorption than 
those suggested in the Commission summary report. It suggests that 100 percent 
absorption (in respect of disbursement to final recipients) was reached by a majority of HFs 
for urban development by the end of 2015.203 Such discrepancies in data should be 
examined in further detail before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
There are a number of potential explanations for these differences. First, the HFs managed 
by the EIB and EIF may have been established with delays. The EIB and EIF were also 
restricted in the sense that it required legal certainty and avoid regulatory risks. This 
meant it had to wait for clarifications before implementation. However, a comparison of the 
year of set-up of HFs suggests that EIB HFs were established on average one year before 
(2010) non-EIB HFs (2011). A more in-depth analysis goes beyond the scope of this study 
but should also take into account the year in which FIs were established. The involvement of 
the EIB in HF management in itself can be regarded as a lack of capacity or other difficulties 
at the domestic level to implement HFs therefore making implementation more challenging. 
In those cases where there was sufficient capacity domestically it would not have been 
                                          
202 Feedback from the EIB indicates that the summary report contains factual errors and there are in fact 31 EIB/EIF 
HFs (16 EIB and 15 EIF). 
203 EIB internal monitoring data. 
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necessary for the EIB and EIF to act as a HF manager. This demonstrates the added 
value that EIB and EIF mandate management in terms of capacity building. This is 
particularly important in the context of the financial crisis which affected those areas 
(southern Europe) in which the EIB and EIF holds a high number of mandates particularly 
hard.  
 
Table 11: Holding fund performance data 2007-2013 
 
HOLDING FUNDS 
% of Total OP Contribution to 
Holding Fund Reaching FIs 
% of Total OP Contribution to 
Holding Fund Reaching Final 
Recipients 
EIB Holding Funds 
  
All Holding Funds 63.83% (Sample: 28/30 HFs) 46.31% (Sample: 26/30 HFs) 
Art. 44 (1)(a) Enterprises  48.64% (Sample: 12/13 HFs) 49.47% (Sample: 12/13 HFs) 
Art. 44 (1)(b) Urban Development 75.25% (Sample: 16/17 HFs) 43.27% (Sample: 14/17 HFs) 
Non-EIB Holding Funds*  
 
All Holding Funds 85.44% (Sample: 43/46 HFs) 64.12% (Sample: 40/46 HFs) 
Art. 44 (1)(a) Enterprises 85.42% (Sample: 37/39 HFs) 70.22% (Sample: 35/39 HFs) 
* In those cases where funds reaching the FIs exceeded the total commitment to holding funds, this was calculated 
as 100% in order to not to skew the analysis. 
Source: Data compiled from European Commission (2015d) Summary of data on the progress made in financing 
and implementing financial engineering instruments (see Annex 4 for data details) 
3.5.3 Management costs 
For the 2007-13 period, Article 43(4) of the Implementing Regulation set out certain 
thresholds for management costs and fees, established as a percentage of the capital 
contributed from the OP which may not be exceeded, on a yearly average. Management 
costs refer to cost items reimbursed against evidence of expenditure, and management fees 
refer to an agreed price or compensation for services rendered.204 Some of the reporting 
issues may have originated from this distinction.  
 
It is currently difficult to assess the full scale of management costs under co-financed FIs. 
For most FIs, no fees are explicitly reported.205 The information provided by Member States 
in the summary report206 suggests that some of the data on costs are implausible, but it is 
not clear which figures are (un)reliable (see Section 4.2). In some Member States (for 
example Slovakia), fund management costs seem very high in comparison to amounts 
invested in final recipients. More generally, MAs have voiced a range of different opinions 
regarding management fees; some considered them reasonable, whereas others were of the 
opinion that as the EIB is a Community body it should not charge for its services.207 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the EIF and EIB work according different models in 
terms of their mandate management fees. Urban development HFs are essentially 
implemented on a non-profit, cost recovery basis. The EIF does operate on a profit-making 
basis. 
 
When comparing the percentage of OP contributions paid as management costs and fees of 
all HFs, there is little difference between EIB and non-EIB HFs (see Table 12). Based 
on the summary data the EIF does appear to be more expensive. EIB HFs, on 
average, took 5.21 percent while non-EIB HFs took less with 4.99 percent. This gap widens 
                                          
204 European Commission (2012b) Revised Guidance Note on Financial Engineering Instruments under Article 44 of  
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/cocof/2010/cocof_10_0014_05_en.pdf   
205 Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit.  
206 European Commission (2015d) op. cit. 
207 Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. p. 23. 
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when comparing HFs for enterprises (Article 44 (1)(a)).208 EIF-managed HFs for enterprises 
received on average 6.65 percent of the total OP contribution as management costs and 
fees, while non-EIB HFs for enterprises received 4.88 percent. This difference is more 
pronounced when comparing EIF-managed HFs for enterprises with EIB-managed HFs for 
urban development, which had an average management cost and fee rate of 4.15 percent.  
The difference between EIF managed HF and EIB-HF respectively non-EIF HF can 
be partly explained by the difference in fees for different products. The fees for 
equity instruments (9.2%) are higher than for loan or guarantee instruments (4.2% 
respectively 3.1%).209 Other fund and country specific factors may also play a role in 
determining the structure and size of the management fee. The EIF for example 
argues that it operates in Member States with low level of capacity and consequently has to 
charge higher fees to provide services. The EIF also notes that the expertise it can offer in 
terms of setting up the governance structure, FIs procurement, negotiations of 
Operational Agreements, treasury, monitoring, reporting and advising in state aid 
is of significant value. Additionally, fees are calculated on the basis of a range of factors 
(e.g. leverage, ability to mobilise private investors, number of transactions, uptake per 
instrument, redesign of investment strategy due to external factors, etc.) which differ across 
Member States. Lastly, according to the EIB and EIF and as mentioned in Section 3.3.2 the 
2007-13 regulatory framework presented considerable challenges for the EIB and EIF 
in implementing HFs as it could only implement HFs when it received legal certainty and 
therefore had to wait for clarifications of the regulation, leading to delays. 
 
Table 12: Management costs of EIB and non-EIB holding funds 
HOLDING FUNDS 
Management Costs as % of Total OP Contribution to 
Holding Fund 2013 
EIB Holding Funds  
All Holding Funds 5.21 % (Sample 26/30) 
Art. 44 (1)(a) (enterprises)  6.65% (Sample 11/13) 
Art. 44 (1)(b) (urban development)   4.15% (Sample 15/17) 
Non-EIB Holding Funds*  
All Holding Funds 4.99% (Sample 30/46) 
Art. 44 (1)(a) (enterprises) Holding Funds 4.88% (Sample 28/39) 
* Those cases where management fees were 0% have not been included in the analysis. 
Source: Data compiled from European Commission (2015d) Summary of data on the progress made in financing 
and implementing financial engineering instruments (see Annex 4 for data details) 
 
Looking ahead, for the 2014-20 programme period there are more detailed provisions, 
and stricter limits and the imposition of specific methodologies for establishing 
costs and fees suggest that there will be lower management fees overall.210 Interviewees 
noted that the new rules for fund management fees makes the direct rewards from fund 
management less attractive for financial intermediaries. Therefore, other incentives for 
taking on the role of fund managers have to be used, such as appealing to their social and 
corporate responsibility role or highlighting the potential access to a new client base through 
fund management. 
 
3.6 Effectiveness of the EIB¶V lending activities in Cohesion Policy 
 
The EIB has a significant effect on EU expenditure, an effect which has increased over the 
past two decades. EIB financial products make an important contribution to EU 
                                          
208 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1828/2006 op cit. 
209 European Commission (2014d) op. cit. 
210 Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit.  
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economic development expenditure.211 Yet most academic studies of policy sectors in 
which the EIB is active pay it little attention both in general212 and more specifically in the 
field of regional policy.213 One of the few academic studies to have been undertaken argues 
that the effectiveness of the EIB (particularly in the context of the economic crisis) is 
µXQGHUSLQQHGE\ LWV FORVH OLQNVDQG UHVSRQVLYHness to policy-making, its speed to increase 
lending and the ability of member countries rapidly to increase its subscribed capital, which 
IDFLOLWDWHG LQFUHDVHG OHQGLQJLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKUHWHQWLRQRI LWV$$$UDWLQJV¶214 This study 
does not aim to fill this gap, instead it, reviews evaluations and literature that have been 
produced, sets out some of the key issues and identifies areas for further research. 
 
There is a limited body of academic and policy literature on the effectiveness and added 
value of EIB financing activities in relation to Cohesion Policy. Robinson notes that many EIB 
projects work on the basis of partnership between the Structural Funds and EIB loans. 
However, the scale of EIB lending to projects that are also funded through Cohesion 
Policy is unknown. As a consequence, it could be the case that some leverage effects or 
added value presently ascribed to Structural Funds are actually the result of EIB and 
Cohesion Policy activity combined. It could also mean that the leverage effect/added value 
of EU activities as a whole has been underestimated.215  
3.6.1 Structural Programme Loans 
An ex post evaluation of the use of Framework Loans to finance investment in the EU over 
the 2000-11 period states that Framework Loans are a relevant and, especially in the 
SPL case, effective instrument. These loans allow the EIB to target areas of European 
development which were previously unsupported or in receipt of only limited support. It 
creates leverage through blending with national, regional or EU grant or loan funding. These 
loans also allow the Bank to reach out to smaller schemes, often at the sub-state level. SPLs 
were more frequently rated as a satisfactory instrument than other non-SPL framework 
loans. The programmes to which SPLs contribute were better prepared and their objectives 
better defined.216 As SPLs contribute to Cohesion Policy programmes, this demonstrates the 
high level of added value of EIB lending to these programmes. 
 
According to the ex-post evaluation thH(,%¶s contribution to SPLs is considered low. One 
reason is that the Bank has no influence on the content of the loans, as they are defined by 
the Operational Programmes. At most, certain measures or priorities within the OPs can be 
selected to form an EIB project. As a result, the projects do not always form an integrated 
programme that clearly addresses a single EIB priority. However, all schemes do fulfil one or 
more of the EIB´s eligibility criteria. Both EIB and Commission priorities stem from EU policy 
and therefore have significant overlap; in practice, the evaluation of SPLs indicates that OPs 
may have a fairly weak link to current EIB priorities217, which can lead to limitations in terms 
of EIB involvement. The implementation of SPLs faces a number of other challenges. First, 
the sheer number of sub-projects that are implemented per operation poses capacity and 
control challenges for the EIB. Second, sub-project allocation approvals are often more 
                                          
211 Robinson (2009) op. cit.  
212 Robinson (2009) op. cit. 
213  Bache I (1998) The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press; Hall R, Smith A and Tsoukalis L (eds) (2001) Competitiveness and Cohesion 
in EU Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Doria L, Fedeli V and Tedesco C (eds) (2006) Rethinking 
European Spatial Policy as a Hologram: Actions, Institutions, Discourses, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
214  Griffith-Jones S and Tyson J (2012) op cit., p. 8. 
215  European Parliament (2013b) The implications of EIB and EBRD co-financing for the EU budget: follow up, Study 
for the Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department D:Budgetary affairs, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/490670/IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)490670_EN.pdf  
216  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation  (2012) op. cit.  
217  Ibid, 
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based on eligibility and exclusion criteria and a certain perception of (regulatory and 
reputational) risk, rather than on their consistency and actual contributions to the realisation 
of the objectives of the investment programme.218,219  
 
Commentators have argued that improving the effectiveness SPLs (and framework loans 
more generally) requires a more programmatic approach to implementation (i.e. adopt 
a set of indicators and targets to provide proof of effectiveness, rather than collecting 
information on huge numbers of individual allocations without necessarily enquiring about 
their achievement for the wider programme). Also, it has been suggested that the EIB 
should accept a certain level of risk rather than creating the µillusion of control¶ by 
establishing an individual project-monitoring framework that it does not have the resources 
to control. This would imply earlier involvement of the EIB and a more pro-active role in the 
Cohesion Policy programming phase (either Partnership Agreements or OPs). It would allow 
the Bank to streamline the allocation process and enhance the level of control over the 
investment.220 To an extent, such an approach is already possible and has become more 
apparent in the 2014-2020 period, as the EIB are in certain cases consulted in the 
development of Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes and also attend 
Monitoring Committees as an observer on a selective basis. 
3.6.2 Co-Financing for FIs in Cohesion Policy  
In some cases the EIB co-finances FIs. To date, there is no accurate information 
available at the aggregate level regarding the EIB lending in relation to FIs.221 Box 4 
provides an example of some of the benefits and challenges of EIB lending in relation to 
&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\2QHRIWKHPDLQFKDOOHQJHV LVWKH(,%¶V LQVLVWHQFHRQWKHWUHDWPHQWRI LWV
loan as senior debt (i.e. a debt that takes priority over other unsecured or otherwise more 
junior debt), which prejudices potential private sector equity investment. 
  
                                          
218  An investment programme is made up of many schemes implemented by the same promoter or a group of 
separate projects with different promoters coordinated by a central body. Investment programmes in SPLs must 
fit within the Operational Programmes. 
219 European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (2012) op. cit. 
220  Ibid. 
221  Through the EIB project database a number of credit lines for enterprise FIs (JEREMIE) in the UK and urban 
development (JESSICA) in Lithuania and Spain can be identified. However, it is not possible to search the 
database systematically to identify all credit lines to FIs.  
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Box 4: EIB Co-financing for JEREMIE initiatives in the UK 
 
A mid-term review of the JEREMIE funds in England in 2007-13 noted that they use a mix of ERDF and 
other public sector grant matched with a loan from the EIB. The EIB loan is a substantial source of pre-
match funding for the JEREMIE projects. 
An important feature of the way the EIB has provided finance to the projects is that, as they generate 
returns, the EIB loan is repaid first. The mid-term evaluation notes that this condition of the EIB loan 
from the perspective of the FI is sensible in that it minimises the cost of the EIB loan to the funds. 
There were a number of potential disadvantages of the JEREMIE approach depending on the 
circumstances, including the complexity and cost of the fund of funds model, the costs and seniority of 
the EIB debt-financing (although EIB financing costs were highly competitive versus commercial 
banking options at the time). Moreover, it places the balance of risk associated with fund performance 
on public sector investors (ERDF in particular), although this is a reflection of the use of substantial 
debt-financing in the model. It significantly reduces the attractiveness of private equity investment into 
WKHIXQGDORQJVLGHWKH(,%DQG(5')DQGWKHSURMHFWGHYHORSHUV¶LQYHVWLJDWLRQVDWWKHWLPHFRQILUPHG
this (although this also reflects the perceived returns that the funds generate). The EI%¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQ
the treatment of its loan to the HF as senior debt also prejudices potential private sector equity 
investment. 
In addition, some of the funds co-financing FIs were required to introduce the entire EIB loan at the 
start, which increases the lifetime costs of the loan finance (compared to introducing the loan in 
tranches). A positive aspect is that it generated higher-than-forecast treasury income to offset the 
)XQG¶VFRVWVLQSDUWWKHUHVXOWRIWKLVLQLWLDOGUDZGRZQRIWKHIXOO(,%ORDQDQd the interest it earns on 
the large cash deposit it represents. 
Source: Regeneris (2013) Mid-Term Review of the English JEREMIE Funds, available at: http://british-business-
bank.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Northern-JEREMIEs-Review-Summary-Report-Final-07-11-13.pdf  
 
 
One measure of success mentioned by interviewees in terms of lending activities is that the 
EIB enjoys a high level of continuity in terms of the partners with which it does 
business. Often after a successful loan agreement, multiple further consecutive loan 
agreements are planned. In terms of its lending, the EIB is less bound by Cohesion Policy 
regulations, and its relationship is primarily based on a contractual arrangement that takes 
regulations into account but can also be flexible. This means that the EIB can exercise 
considerable flexibility in offering solutions.   
 
3.7 Effectiveness of other instruments 
3.7.1 COSME 
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of COSME FIs, as the programme is at an early 
stage. Currently, it appears more feasible to assess the efficiency of its predecessor ± the 
CIP. According to the CEPS study on FIs (2012), the Growth and Innovative SME Facility 
(GIF) and the SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG) have proved to be relatively successful, with 
high demand for the instruments, and both have reportedly had substantial leverage effects. 
Surveys demonstrated that two-thirds of the GIF beneficiaries considered that, without GIF, 
the business would not have achieved the same level of investment. For the SMEG, about 
half the SMEs considered their business could not have been set up without SMEG loan 
support.  
 
However, the evaluations also noted several problems. Proper coordination between the 
various DGs managing parts of the CIP was lacking, strategic steering and coordination with 
other EU initiatives for SMEs was needed. Moreover, complementarity was identified 
with some other SME assistance instruments under Cohesion Policy. With regard to 
WKHLQVWUXPHQWV¶(XURSHDQDGGHGYDOXHWKH*,)DVVLstance proved to be more valuable as it 
directly addressed one of the core weaknesses in Europe (lack of finance for innovative 
SMEs), introducing an important new financing scheme in Member States. At the same time, 
the results were more controversial for the SMEG: similar national schemes for assisting 
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SMEs existed in many Member States; and the programme was criticised for considerable 
deadweight loss. The value of the SMEG programme was therefore questionable in countries 
where similar instruments already existed, and the SMEG could thus replicate or compete 
ZLWK WKHP :HDNQHVVHV UHJDUGLQJ WKH LQVWUXPHQWV¶ PRQLWRULQJ DQG UHSRUWLQJ ZHUH DOVR
noted. For example, the impact of the programmes was not monitored using a standard set 
of indicators to record and report progress, and the Commission reportedly had difficulties 
tracing the use of funding offered to financial intermediaries.222  
 
COSME was intended to address some of the weaknesses associated with the CIP 
instruments, e.g. with regard to monitoring and reporting, coordination with other EU 
initiatives for SMEs, and avoidance of overlaps. Thus, linking GIF1 (see Section 2.6.1) for 
start-up SMEs with the RSI programme for Horizon 2020 has been seen as one of the ways 
to avoid overlaps. In general, COSME FIs work in conjunction with Horizon 2020, even 
though the programmes have different foci. COSME has replaced the Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship strand of the CIP, and the other activities have been merged into Horizon 
2020. While COSME focuses on support to create a favourable business environment, 
increased competitiveness and riskier SMEs, Horizon 2020 focuses on innovation-driven 
SMEs. At the same time, complementarities with the ESIF operations supporting SMEs under 
shared management may still exist. Furthermore, the (,)¶V VWUDWHJLF UROH DV IXQG
manager for COSME enables cross-fertilisation between Cohesion Policy and other 
sources of funding. 
3.7.2 Risk-sharing instrument and InnovFin SME Guarantee Scheme 
As with COSME it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the InnovFin SME Guarantee 
Facility due to its recent establishment. The available RSFF evaluations provide some 
information regarding the efficiency of its predecessor. Overall, from 2007-13, the 
RSFF financed 114 R&I projects with EUR 11.3 billion and provided loan guarantees worth 
over EUR 1.4 billion. This reportedly catalysed a further EUR 37.2 billion in private 
investment in European innovation.223 Evaluations of the RSFF in 2010 (one by the EIB and 
one by an EU-commissioned expert group) presented overall positive findings.224  
 
The EIB conducted a number of evaluations of the scheme. Although positive about the RSFF 
achievements overall, an evaluation of the RSFF undertaken by the EIB in April 2010, along 
with an evaluation by a group of independent experts the same year, highlighted its failure 
to adequately deliver a framework which reflected the needs of SMEs. The EIB evaluation 
pointed out that, while the RSFF successfully assisted large companies and Mid-caps, it did 
not µVHHPWREHWKHULJKWLQVWUXPHQWWRDGGUHVV60(V¶225 On the basis of this conclusion, it 
was recommended that the RSFF should improve its specific focus on SMEs, which 
stimulated the launch of the RSI.226 The instrument was introduced in collaboration with the 
(,)ZKLFKDVVXPHGWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQWDVNVWKXVHQVXULQJWKHFRQWLQXLW\RIWKH(,%¶VUROH
in this domain.  
 
                                          
222 Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012) op. cit. 
223  For more information, see: http://www.eib.org/products/helpingyouinnovate/index.htm?launchtool  
224  European Parliament (2011b) op. cit. 
225  European Parliament (2011b) The implications of EIB and EBRD co-financing for the EU budget. Study, 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, Brussels; European Investment 
Bank Operations Evaluation (2010) Evaluation of Activities Under the Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), 
Luxembourg: EIB. 
226  Núñez Ferrer J, Volkery A, Withana S, Medarova-Bergstrom K (2012) The Use of Innovative Financial 
Instruments for Financing EU Policies and Objectives ± Implications for EU and National Budgets. Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
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The EIB Second Evaluation of the RSFF227 (2013) similarly reached the conclusion that the 
56)) µIXOILOOHG LWV UROH LQ DQ DGHTXDWH PDQQHU FRQWULEXWLQJ WR the reduction of market 
IDLOXUHVLQDOORFDWLQJDGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVWR5',¶3DUWQHUVKLSEHWZHHQWKHCommission and 
the EIB was noted to be efficient, improving an initial incomplete design and providing for 
mutual learning.228 The relevance of the RSFF was considered to be clear due to the 
alignment with the Lisbon Strategy, FP7 and EIB Knowledge Economy objectives. In 
addition, it was noted that the likelihood of the RSFF maximising its potential impact had 
been hindered by the absence of clearer ex-ante objectives and targets. In terms of 
effectiveness, the facility was noted to have achieved (or to be on track to achieve) most of 
its performance indicators oQH\HDUEHIRUHWKHHQGRIWKH56))¶Vavailability period, as well 
as achieving a wide geographical distribution. However, its contribution to filling the long-
term debt-financing gap was estimated as very limited with regard to total R&D investment 
in Europe. The sustainability of the facility was also assessed as satisfactory, especially 
taking into account the potential of Horizon 2020 instruments to capitalise on its experience. 
Lastly, in terms of governance and cooperation, the success of partnership working between 
the Commission and EIB was noted, although some imbalances were identified, e.g. with 
regard to reporting procedures, the methodology used to measure and report administrative 
costs, and the definition of some key concepts.229 
 
Concerning the RSI in particular, the second interim evaluation of the RSFF, carried out by 
an Independent Expert Group the same year,230 noted that the strong interest and contracts 
signed by diverse financial intermediaries demonstrated the demand for the instrument. The 
RSI compartment reportedly had proven resilient even within the short timeframe, as it was 
DEOH WR µFDWHU IRUELJJHUGHPDQGSURYLGHDFFHVV WRSURPRWLRQDO OHQGLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ µRIIHU
guarantees with diverse counterparties (regional banks, promotional institutions, commercial 
banks, etc.)¶DQGµDFKLHYHDGLYHUVLILHGSRUWIROLR¶,QJHQHUDOWHUPVWKHUHSRUWDVVHVVHGWKH
overall take-up RIWKH56,DVµVXFFHVVIXO¶231 Nevertheless, weaknesses were noted, such as 
limited financial sustainability, a restricted budget and a tight timeframe due to its pilot 
status. The recommendations for an RSI successor related, for example, to maintaining the 
core structure of RSI so as to leverage systems and procedures, improving RSI eligibility 
criteria, expanding the RSI amount and scope, and better combining the guarantee scheme 
with EIB funding. Among other things, the recommendation on avoiding overlaps between 
new and existing initiatives (including the RSFF) has been to some extent addressed by 
merging SME support for start-ups in the CIP (currently COSME) with the RSI in Horizon 
2020.232 
3.7.3 Connecting Europe Facility 
The CEF FIs have aimed to build significantly on the assessments of the effectiveness of 
their instruments-predecessors and the associated recommendations. For instance, the LGTT 
Evaluation233 JHQHUDOO\GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKH/*77µSURYLGHGVLJQLILFDQWYDOXHLQDOO
GHDOVZKLFKXVHGLW¶+RZHYHUDVDUHVXOWRI(XURSH
VILQDQFLDOFULVLVµWKHSRWHQWLDOSLSHOLQH
RISURMHFWVZLWKWUDIILFEDVHGGHPDQGULVNIRUWKH/*77LQVWUXPHQW¶decreased significantly. 
In this context, it was seen as crucial to design the new CEF FIs in a flexible way so that 
they could be adapted to changing market needs. Also, the evaluation showed that, as an 
                                          
227  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation  (2013) op. cit. 
228  Ibid. 
229  Ibid. 
230  Independent Expert Group (2013) Second interim evaluation of the RSFF. Final Report, June 2013 
231  Ibid. 
232  Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012) op. cit. 
233  European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (2014) The Loan Guarantee Instrument for TEN-T Projects 
(LGTT). An Evaluation Focusing on the Role of the EIB in the Implementation of the Instrument, Synthesis 
Report, April 2014, available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/ev/ev_lgtt_en.pdf 
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instrument, the LGTT did not meet the objectives of increasing private sector participation 
and accelerating projects. In addition, it demonstrated that the Commission and the EIB can 
efficiently work in a joint way on complex FIs. It also noted that the EIB ZDV µWKH ULJKW
FKRLFH RI SDUWQHU¶ IRU WKH Commission, providing the expertise and resources to develop, 
market and manage LGTT growth. A number of lessons from the LGTT experience were 
taken on board when launching the PBI Pilot. 
 
The ad-hoc audit of the pilot phase of the PBI,234 concluded in June 2014, provides some 
insights into the performance of the PBI initial stage. The final report, apart from assessing 
the efficiency of the PBI Pilot, also formulated recommendations on the future full 
deployment of the PBI under the CEF in 2014-20. The report considers the progress of the 
PBI Pilot implementation as satisfactory overall while proposing some adjustments. The PBI 
was assessed as having served as a catalyst to generate liquidity in debt capital markets for 
targeted infrastructure projects, demonstrated by the interest from a large pool of investors. 
The PBCE was considered a unique FI in Europe, in terms of its supranational scope, open 
structure and long tenure; it was also seen as well-structured and well-executed in 
transactions. The PBI has been viewed positively overall by most stakeholders, having been 
able to match the supply of infrastructure projects with the expectations of the large group 
of institutional investors.  
 
The weaknesses of the initiative are partly reflected in the audit recommendations for the 
future. These relate to issues such as flexibility with regard to implementation, extension 
into other infrastructure sectors, scope to use CEF funds in a more optimised manner across 
the three targeted sectors, and a focus on supporting greenfield projects.   
 
According to the CEPS study on FIs (2012),235 the PBI might be considered of significant 
European added value as it is focused on the important trans-European infrastructure as a 
core element of the Single Market, also linked to the need to develop low-carbon 
infrastructure to reach the EU climate objectives. The PBI is designed to target areas where 
financing is lacking, which ensures additionality, and the initiative has to date managed to 
raise considerable funding.  
 
Overall, although this new instrument cannot yet be fully evaluated, it seems to solve some 
of the problems of the LGTT, particularly in terms of flexibility with the bond issuance and 
coverage of more areas of infrastructure.236 However, it is not known yet if there will be 
further demand for project bonds. 
 
3.8 Member State perspectives 
 
In order to provide some insights into the (,%¶V role and effectiveness in Cohesion Policy, 
Member States representatives were asked to provide their assessment of its contribution, 
subject to the caveats outlined in Section 1.2.3. One measure of success is the scale of the 
expansion of the EIB and EIF activities to promote the use of FIs. However, the extent to 
which FIs have actually lived up to general expectations remains unclear. Figure 7 shows the 
general level of satisfaction of Member States in relation to each of its roles. Respondents 
were asked to rate each role on a scale from 1-5 (1 being very negative and 5 being very 
positive).  
 
                                          
234  EY (2014) op. cit. 
235 Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012) op. cit. 
236 Ibid. 
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In general, the EIB and EIF perform its roles with good levels of satisfaction. 
Average scores for its advisory and capacity-building services were around four on the scale. 
EIB support and involvement in the establishment of FIs was generally perceived as positive. 
Interviewees from the Commission and the EIB noted that its advisory and capacity-building 
activities helped to stimulate the uptake of FIs. 7KH µRWKHU¶ FDWHJRU\ ZKLFK LQFOXGHV (,%
lending in infrastructure projects, cooperation with the EIF in the context of COSME, and 
country-specific initiatives (e.g. Baltic Investment Fund), as well as some misreported 
capacity-related activities (i.e. JASPERS), received a very positive assessment.   
 
Also as a fund manager the role of the EIB Group was judged positively albeit the scores 
were slightly lower than for the other activities. The scores for fund manager ranged 
between one and four, for lending and advisory services between two and five, and for 
capacity-building between three and five. It should be noted that these results are based on 
a limited number of responses from Member States and should therefore not be regarded as 
conclusive.237   
 
Figure 7: Assessment of EIB services in Cohesion Policy by Member States 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
 
Senior officials in Member States were also asked to provide their overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of the EIB¶V activities and products in relation to the four categories. Figure 8 
provides an overview of responses. In general terms, the activities involving the EIB are 
considered as effective (between 3.8 and 3.9), and only in a small number of individual 
Member States does the rating dip below three. 
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Figure 8: Effectiveness of EIB activities and products  
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
 
Respondents were DVNHGWRLGHQWLI\WKRVHDUHDVWKDWEHQHILWHGPRVWIURPWKH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHV
and products.238 Figure 9 provides the accumulated responses to each of the statements 
(e.g. 11 respondents identified access to finance a key benefit). Respondents were asked to 
SLFN WKUHH µEHQHILWV¶ LQ RUGHU WR LGHQWLI\ those that were considered most important. The 
options presented to respondents were based on the findings from the academic and policy 
literature (see also Section 3.2). Access to co-financing and the (,%¶V analytical 
support were the most commonly reported benefits of the its role in Cohesion Policy. 
Assistance in increasing private sector involvement and expertise and increasing the impact 
of EU programmes were the least-mentioned benefits.  
 
Figure 9: Benefits of EIB activities and products 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
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Respondents were also asked to identify the most important challenges of EIB involvement 
in Cohesion Policy (Figure 10). The question was formulated in the same manner as the 
identification of key benefits (Figure 9). The key issues for most Member States were the 
complex rules and regulations for ESIF FIs. ,TKHVHFKDOOHQJHVDUHQRWRIWKH(,%¶VRZQ
making, as they must adhere to the Cohesion Policy regulations. Additionally, the high 
management fees and high costs of implementation of EIB activities and products 
were considered an important challenge for the majority of Member States. Other issues that 
were mentioned include the limited accountability of EIB activities and the lack of capacity 
with regard to conducting analyses, which led to significant delays. 
 
Figure 10: Challenges of EIB activities and products 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
 
 
3.9 Assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the EIB in 
Cohesion Policy 
 
This chapter has provided a detailed review of the effectiveness and efficiency of EIB 
activities in implementing Cohesion Policy objectives. It demonstrates that the EIB is 
involved in Cohesion Policy implementation in many different capacities. Further, its 
contributions are mostly valued by Member States, but the effectiveness of each of its roles 
is unclear.  
 
The introduction of FIs has increased the profile and involvement of the EIB. 
However, FIs are a relatively recent innovation in the context of Cohesion Policy, and there 
is as yet limited information on their effectiveness; thus, their scope to achieve Cohesion 
Policy objectives is not yet well understood. The EIB and EIF make a major contribution 
to the development and implementation of FIs. The effectiveness of this contribution in 
terms of gap analyses in the context of the JEREMIE initiatives and evaluation studies for 
JESSICA initiatives are valued by Managing Authorities, especially since the TA was provided 
for free. However, a complete picture of what has resulted from these analytical and 
advisory contributions remains unclear. It is undoubtedly the case that the evaluations have 
raised the profile of FIs among Managing Authorities, and many would not have been willing 
to pay for them (the European Commission and EIB financed gap analysis and evaluation 
studies). However, in at least some cases where an evaluation was conducted, no further 
action was taken for implementing FIs, raising questions about the incurred costs. 
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EIB staff skills and technical expertise in terms of the implementation of FIs and 
regional development projects more generally are highly valued 7KH (,%¶V QRQ-
financial added value in relation to JASPERS, JASMINE and the contributions it makes to 
development of the FI framework in Cohesion Policy through its advisory role to the 
Commission are very important. 
 
An assessment of the mandate management role of the EIB and EIF is impaired by the 
limited availability of data and the relatively short experience of implementing these FIs. The 
EIB and EIF implement HFs for both urban development and enterprises initiatives. Based on 
the available data, LW DSSHDUV WKDW WKH (,%¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LQ WHUPV RI ILQDQFLDO
absorption of funds at the FI level and funds paid to final recipients is lower than 
that of non-EIB holding funds. However, this may be explained by several factors; the 
Member States in which the EIB operates have less capacity and effect of the financial 
crisis in these countries and particular challenges in the context of the regulatory 
framework. 
 
Data from the ComPLVVLRQ¶VVXPPDU\UHSRUWLQGLFDWHthat management fees for EIB and 
EIF holding funds are broadly equivalent to those managed by non-EIB 
institutions. However, a comparison of management fees for holding funds implemented by 
the EIF (enterprises) and those for the EIB (urban development) indicate that the latter are 
lower as a proportion of commitments. The reverse is true when comparing enterprise 
support holding funds of other institutions with those implemented by EIF. 
 
In financial terms the (,%¶V central role is its (b)lending activities in Cohesion 
Policy projects. Although its overall contribution to the EU Cohesion objectives is 
recognised, currently there is no comprehensive overview of the scale and make-up of these 
contributions in Cohesion Policy programmes and projects and it is not possible to make 
an accurate assessment of its effectiveness in relation to Cohesion Policy. In 
general terms the Bank¶V OHQGLQJ GHFLVLRQV DUH RIWHQ FRQVLGHUHG FRQVHUYDWLYHZKLFK FRXOG
mean that certain more innovative Cohesion Policy projects are not being offered loans. That 
said, particularly the Bank¶V6WUXFWXUDO3URJUDPPH/HQGLQJLVFRQVLGHUHGHIIHFWLYHEXWIURPD
Cohesion Policy perspective is not always well-understood by policy makers at the European 
level. 
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4 ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND VISIBILITY 
OF EIB ACTIVITIES IN COHESION POLICY 
KEY FINDINGS 
x Member States generally have positive views regarding the accountability of the EIB¶V
products and services. However, reporting and monitoring of the Bank¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ
to Cohesion Policy objectives are fragmented. The role and contribution of the 
(XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V REGI Committee in holding the EIB to account has, to date, 
been limited.   
x Over the past years, there have been sustained efforts by the EIB to improve 
transparency and participation principles applied by the EIB. Member State 
perceptions of the transparency of the EIB in Cohesion Policy are largely positive. 
However, the European Parliament would like to strengthen certain elements of the 
Bank¶VWUDQVSDUHQF\SROLF\, especially regarding the economic and social impact of the 
loans. 
x The transparency of FIs in 2007-13 was hampered by a lack of systematic reporting 
until 2011 which has affected the scope WRDVVHVVWKH(,%¶VSHUIRUPDQFH LQ),V. The 
2014-20 regulations have sought to strengthen the reporting requirements for FIs.  
x Member States have mixed views on WKHYLVLELOLW\RIWKH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHVDQGSURGXFWV
in Cohesion Policy. Lower levels of visibility of WKH(,%¶Vlending activities can partly be 
attributed to the fact that it often works through intermediaries at the national and 
regional levels. 
 
 
7KH(,%KDVDKLJKOHYHORIDXWRQRP\ZLWKLQWKH(8¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHP 7KH(,%¶V
management and control structures allow it to take lending decisions on the basis of a 
SURMHFW¶VPHULWVDQGto tailor borrowing in line with the best opportunities available on the 
financial markets in all Member States whilst at the same time aiming to ensure 
contributions to EU policy. Academic and policy research has on occasion raised concerns 
about the steadily growing role of International Financial Institutions (IFI) like the EIB, as 
they are not directly accountable to EU citizens or their representatives.239 Furthermore, 
some have criticised the EIB for its weak accountability standards.240, 241 However, others 
have pointed out the advance in accountability standards that have been made over recent 
years.242  
                                          
239 0DMRQH*  µ7KH FUHGLELOLW\ FULVLV RI &RPPXQLW\ UHJXODWLRQ¶ Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2): 
273±302. Mörth U (2007) Public and Private Partnerships as Dilemmas between Efficiency and Democratic 
Accountability: The Case of Galileo, Journal of European Integration, 29:5, 601-617, DOI: 
10.1080/07036330701694907; Tricarico A (2010)  Privatizing European Development Finance: The Role of the 
European Investment Bank, Social Watch, poverty eradication and gender justice, available at: 
http://www.socialwatch.org/node/12052 Tricarico A (2015) Reclaiming Public Banks, a Thought Proving 
Exercise, Eurodad and Counter Balance available at: http://eurodad.org/files/pdf/5566ea7348f8c.pdf  
240 The criticism often focusses on the lack of accountability concerning the social and environmental impact of the 
Bank¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQSDUWLFXODULQUHODWLRQWRLWVH[WHUQDOPDQGDWH 
241 Hachez N and Wouters J (2012) op. cit; Xavier S (2015) Towards a reinforced accountability architecture for the 
European Investment Bank, Counter Balance - Challenging public investment banks, available at: 
http://www.counter-balance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CB_Towards-
accountability_print_web_hyperlinks.pdf; Seman V (2011) The European Investment Bank, investment in 
development?, Prague Global Policy Institute- Glopolis, July 2011.  available at: 
http://glopolis.org/soubory/4e1c/study-european-investment-bank.pdf;  also see Bretton Woods Project in 
relation to its external lending activity, Stewart H (2008) The shadowy bank that has  
loaned £150bn of your cash, The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/mar/02/europeanbanks.worldbank  
242 Nanwani S (2014) Directions in Reshaping Accountability Mechanisms in Multilateral Development Banks and 
Other Organizations, Global Policy, 5:2, 242-252. 
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The increased role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy and the often highly technical 
nature of associated FIs also raise important questions about its accountability, 
transparency and visibility. This chapter examines the current arrangements under these 
three themes and critically appraises them. The chapter also considers Member States' and 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOYLHZVRIWKH(,%¶VUHFRUGRQDFFRXQWDELOLW\WUDQVSDUHQF\DQGYLVLELOLW\LQUHODWLRQ
to Cohesion Policy.  
 
4.1 Accountability 
 
The high degree of institutional and operational autonomy of the EIB does not mean that it 
is independent and exempt from Community law. The TFEU (Art. 309) is FOHDUWKDWµWKH%DQN
LV LQWHQGHG WR FRQWULEXWH WRZDUGV WKH DWWDLQPHQW RI WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V REMHFWLYHV DQG E\
virtue of the Treaty forms part of the framework of the CRPPXQLW\¶243 Nevertheless, the 
EIB statute protects its autonomy and limits the influence of other EU institutions, 
particularly in relation to the management of its financial operations. 
 
Accountability can be defined as a set of principles and procedures under which an actor 
accounts for the impact of its actions ± as a governing entity or more generally as a power 
wielder ± on the individuals, groups or interests that it governs or affects.244 This includes 
prospective (taking into account impacts prior to operations) and retrospective procedures 
(render account for failure to abide by applicable substantive norms). At a more operational 
level, this can be understood as the degree to which the EIB engages with other EU 
institutions and Member States in accounting for its activities and performance. 
 
A series of accountability mechanisms are in place with regards to the EIB activities. These 
include: 
 
x European Ombudsman; 
x Complaint Mechanism; 
x Evaluation Operations; 
x Internal Audit; and  
x External Audit (ECA); 
Despite the EIB¶V hybrid nature - being both a bank and an EU body - the EIB is explicitly 
bound by the EU Treaties and its principles. Its upward accountability framework ± towards 
EU institutions and Member States (see Section 2.1.3) ± dates back to the Treaty of Rome.  
Downward accountability ± i.e. towards citizens ± was, and continues to be provided through 
the European Ombudsman but in 2008 under pressure from civil society a Complaints 
Mechanism (CM)245 was established. However, according to some commentators, the current 
arrangements continue to have certain weaknesses:246 
 
x the CM¶V decisions are non-binding; 
x the CM has a marginalised position within the EIB; 
                                          
243  Case 85/86, Commission v. Board of Governors, [1988] ECR 1281, para 28. cited in Hachez and Wouters (2012) 
op. cit. 
244  Hanchez and Wouters (2012) op. cit. 
245 In the past the CM was also refered to as the Complaint Mechanism Office (CMO). 
246  Xavier S (2015) op. cit. ; Vervynckt M (2015) An assessment of transparency and accountability mechanisms at 
the European Investment Bank and the International Finance Corporation, EURODAD Briefing, September 2015, 
available on: http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546480-an-assessment-of-transparency-and-accountability-
mechanisms-at-the-european-investment-bank-and-the-international-finance-corporation.pdf   
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x the &0¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH LV questioned (i.e. There is no system of formal relations 
between the EIB Board of Directors in relation to individual cases dealt with by the 
CM); and 
x the CM lacks resources. 
 
Audit forms an integral part of any accountability framework. In October 2003, a Tripartite 
Agreement,247 mentioned in Article 287(3) of the TFEU, was signed and governs 
cooperation between the EIB, the Commission and the European Court of Auditors (ECA). 
The Agreement was initially concluded for four years but has since been renewed in 2007 
and again in 2011 each time for a further four years. The agreement covers both loan 
operations under the mandate conferred by the European Union on the Bank and the 
operations managed by the Bank which are entered in, and guaranteed by, the general 
budget of the European Union.  
 
The Agreement sets out procedures for documentary audits and on-the-spot checks. 
The documentary audits require a flow of information between the Bank, the Commission 
and the ECA on operations covered by the agreement. The ECA is responsible for selecting 
operations for auditing according to its own criteria. A procedure by which the relevant 
departments of the Court are provided with the necessary information is set out in the 
Agreement. On-the-VSRW DXGLWV ZLOO RFFXU RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH &RXUW¶V DQQXDO ZRUN
programme which is communicated to the Commission and Bank at regular intervals. There 
must be a firm conviction that there are grounds for on-the-spot checks. The checks will be 
VFKHGXOHGE\WKH%DQN¶V$XGLW&RPPLWWHHDQGWKH(&$LQFRRUGLQDWLRQ7KH$XGLW&RPPLWWHH
LVUHTXLUHGWRPDNHFRQWDFWZLWKWKH%DQN¶VUHOHYDQWGHSDUWPHQWVDQGWRHVWDEOLVKOLQNVZLWK
intermediary financial institutions and final recipients where necessary. The conclusions of 
WKHDXGLWPD\EHFRPPXQLFDWHGWRWKH%DQN¶VFOLHQWVRQO\E\WKH%DQNRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ 
The Commission can decide how it is represented at the information meetings, in 
preparatory discussions and on-site visits. The Commission and, through the Commission, 
the EIB may express their point of view in observations. A conciliation process can be 
requested by one of the parties, under the chairmanship of the Commission. 
 
Internal Audit is another component of the EIB accountability framework.248 It 
examines and evaluates the relevance and effectiveness of the internal control systems and 
the procedures involved in managing risk within the EIB. The general objective of Internal 
$XGLW LVWRSURYLGHWKH(,%¶VPanagement with a reasonable assurance that it is operating 
SURSHUO\DQGHIILFLHQWO\7RGRWKLVLWH[DPLQHVDQXPEHURIDUHDVRIWKH%DQN¶VRSHUDWLRQV
to determine if: 
x ULVN H[SRVXUH UHODWLQJ WR WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH %DQN¶V VWUDWHJLF REMHFWLYHV LV
accurately identified and reported;  
x the Bank's resources and assets are properly accounted for and safeguarded;  
x financial, operational, accounting and other data generated within the Bank and/or 
used for management purposes is accurate and reliable;  
x the integrity, reliability, confidentiality and continuous availability of Information 
systems is secured;  
x resources are employed in an effective and efficient manner; and 
x the application of risk management procedures and methodologies and the 
functioning of internal control are effective.  
                                          
247  An original Agreement dates back to March 1999. 
248  European Investment Bank (2013c) Charter for Internal Audit. Available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/internal_audit_charter_2013_en.pdf  
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Internal Audit sets and agrees Action Plans with the Bank's departments as a means for 
improving procedures and strengthening controls. In support of the Audit Committee's 
mandate on best banking practice, Internal Audit includes such assessments in all elements 
of its work. It therefore reviews and tests controls in critical banking, information technology 
and administrative areas on a rotational basis using a risk-based approach. 
 
Furthermore, accountability and insight in the results of EIB activities is provided by 
the EIB Operation Evaluation (EV) department.249 Established in 2005, this department 
carries out ex post evaluations and coordinates the self-evaluation process of the EIB. EV 
focuses on the quality and the results of WKH (,%¶V operations within the framework of 
relevant EU policies (the Treaty, directives, Council decisions, mandates, etc.) and the 
decisions of the EIB Board of Governors. It evaluates both public and private sector 
operations supported by all types of financial resources as well as related policies and 
strategies. The evaluations conducted by EV may identify aspects of EU policies which may 
need to be reviewed by the appropriate bodies to enable the EIB to implement its operations 
better. 
 
The EV falls under the responsibility of the Inspector General, which is independently 
performing its tasks and is accountable to the President and the Management Committee. 
7KH(9¶VEXGJHW LVDSSURYHGE\WKH%RDUGRI'LUHFWRUVXQGHUDVHSDUDWHEXGJHW OLQH± and 
not by the management ± WRXSKROGWKH(9¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH250 
 
7KHUH DUH RUJDQLVDWLRQV WKDW WDNH D PRUH FULWLFDO YLHZ RI WKH FXUUHQW (,%¶V DFFRXQWDELOLW\
framework, as well as calls for action to reinforce the (&$¶Vscrutiny of EIB activities and to 
revise the tripartite agreement. The role of the ECA is deemed by some as being too 
passive. Instead, it is argued that the ECA should actively carry out assessments on the 
performance of EIB lending activities when they are directly related to the use of the EU 
budget. This should certainly cover EFSI operations of the EIB under the specific EU 
guarantee.251 
 
In the 2007-13 period, the use of Cohesion Policy funding as part of EIB products also raised 
questions about a potential increased and more direct role of the ECA. According to 
interviewees, the EIB opposed this proposition. The current tripartite arrangement allows the 
ECA to conduct performance audits of which the results can go to Parliament. However, 
there is no systematic audit of WKH(,%¶V contribution to Cohesion Policy.  
 
The EIB is primarily accountable to its shareholders (e.g. Member States) but as an EU body, 
the EIB activities are also scrutinised to the European Parliament in relation to its lending 
activities. 5HSRUWLQJ DQG PRQLWRULQJ RI WKH %DQN¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\
objectives to European Parliament are fragmented. The main responsibility for scrutiny 
of EIB activities lies with the CONT/ECON committees, but other committees can contribute. 
However, there is no clear link between EIB activities and Cohesion Policy in its annual 
report, making it difficult for the REGI committee to engage, and within the CONT/ECON 
committee there is insufficient capacity/interest in the Cohesion Policy objectives. For 
example, interviewees noted that the extent of the Bank¶V 6WUXFWXUDO 3URJUDPPH /HQGLQJ
and (b)lending is not well understood in either the Parliament or the Commission. 
 
 
 
                                          
249 European Investment Bank Operations Evaluation (EV) (2009) Terms of Reference¶. Available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/ev_terms_of_reference_2009_en.pdf (as accessed 29/02/16) 
250 Vervynckt M (2015) op. cit. 
251 Xavier S (2015) op. cit.  
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In Section 5.1, the relationship between the EIB and European Parliament is discussed 
further, but in the context of accountability it is important to note that WKH %DQN¶V
responsibilities for the EU budget in Cohesion Policy are ambiguous. When the EIB 
acts as HF manager, it is responsible for monitoring of urban development funds¶ activities 
and as such assumes a certain level of responsibility over implementation of funds that are 
financed from the Community budget. However, in this context the EIB should be regarded 
as the beneficiary of such funds and the lines of accountability run through the MA ± with 
which it has a contractual agreement. As such, it is argued that it would be inappropriate for 
the Commission to have a direct relationship with the EIB and receive information regarding 
FIs directly from the EIB rather than through the MA. Instead, the MA monitors the activities 
through its regular reporting and monitoring practices and provides information to the 
Commission, which has the final responsibility for implementing the Community budget and 
is accountable to the European Parliament. In terms of implementing FIs (as opposed to its 
(b)lending activities), the EIB is therefore not directly accountable to the European 
Parliament. However, with the introduction of the EFSI, the EIB will adopt a greater macro-
economic role and will have increased responsibility for the implementation of the 
Community budget, albeit through guarantees.    
 
Figure 11 gives an indication of Member States perceptions of the extent to which the EIB is 
accountable for its activities and products, i.e. to what extent does the Bank engage with 
other EU institutions and Member States in accounting for its activities and performance? In 
general, 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶YLHZVRIWKH%DQN¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\DUHSRVLWLYH, with 12 out 
of 16 respondents rating the EIB as accountable. Particular positive experiences mentioned 
include: 
x close cooperation between the EIB and Member State institutions on initiatives such 
as JASPERS;  
x positive experiences of negotiating framework contracts between the EIB and 
Member State; and  
x the mostly on-time delivery of products and services provided by the EIB. 
However, there were also four cases in which the EIB was perceived as not very accountable 
or unaccountable. The main concerns included: 
x late guidance, meaning that rules were changed after FIs had already been 
implemented, causing major difficulties in some cases; 
x legal rules considered as too strict and rigid; and 
x insufficient respect of Member State comments.  
In relation to the first two points it should be noted that providing guidance and 
implementing/interpreting the Regulations are the responsibility of the Commission rather 
than the EIB.  
 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
94 
Figure 11: Member StateV¶ views on EIB accountability 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
 
4.2 Transparency 
 
7UDQVSDUHQF\LVRQHRIWKH(8¶VIXQGDPHQWDOJRYHUQDQFHSULQFLSOHVDQGFDQEHFRQVWUXHGDV
the access of the public to information concerning an institution, person or entity.252 In a 
more narrow sense, it can be defined as the way in which reporting and monitoring are 
formalised and implemented to provide systematic information and allow policymakers to 
track how the budget is spent and to evaluate the effectiveness of that spending. A lack of 
transparency hinders the activation of accountability channels, as stakeholders are not 
aware of the relevant facts and practices. Democratic accountability requires that governing 
elites adopt an active policy of openness towards their stakeholders through disclosure of 
information and documents.  
 
Academic commentators have noted WKDW µSURFHGXUDOO\ WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG
SDUWLFLSDWLRQSULQFLSOHVDSSOLHGE\WKH(,%DUHUDWKHUSURJUHVVLYH¶. However, they still 
display a number of shortcomings as regards the involvement of stakeholders in 
the appraisal of projects and in finance decisions. The dual nature of the EIB makes 
transparency a difficult issue; as a bank it must respect client confidentiality but as an EU 
body it is required to be accountable to the public. The TFEU recognises the (,%¶V VSHFLDO
transparency regime and the   as it states that the institution¶s general transparency system 
DQGWKHFLWL]HQV¶ ULJKWRIDFFHVV WRGRFXPHQWVRQO\DSSO\ WR WKH(,% µZKHQH[HUFLVLQJ>LWV@
administraWLYHWDVNV¶253  
 
In the past, the EIB has in principle refused to disclose financial contracts but has also been 
reluctant to disclose documents relating to financial contracts, such as appraisal or 
monitoring reports, on the JURXQGVWKDWWKH\FRQFHUQµSURIessional evaluation and opinions 
IRUPLQJSDUWRIWKH(,%¶VLQWHUQDOGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJSURFHVVHV¶254 On occasion, the European 
Parliament has called for more visibility of specific EIB programmes in some Member 
States. It has stated that there is room to improve the Bank¶V WUDQVSDUHQF\ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ
                                          
252  Hachez and Wouters (2012) op. cit. 
253  Art. 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 
0001 - 0390. 
254  See Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1807/2006/MHZ against the EIB, 17 Dec. 2007, 
available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/home.faces. Cited in Hachez and Wouters (2012) op. cit.  
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terms of assessing the economic and social impact of the loans and the effectiveness of the 
implementation of due diligence. There have also been calls for greater transparency in 
relation to its global loans and increased scrutiny of indirect lending. Most relevant 
in relation to Cohesion Policy are the calls for a thorough assessment and a report on the 
risks and control systems linked to blended finance with the Commission, 
considering the impact of blending activities not only in terms of oversight but also in terms 
of governance options.255 Currently, there is no overview of the scale of EIB (b)lending in 
Cohesion Policy projects. 
 
In recent years, the EIB has engaged in a process of reform to improve its transparency and 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ SUDFWLFHV 7KH (,% YLHZV WUDQVSDUHQF\ DV µDQ HQYLURQPHQW LQ ZKLFK WKH
objectives of policies, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and 
their rational, and terms of EIB accountability are provided to the public in a comprehensive, 
accessible and timely manner¶.256 ThH%DQN¶V 7UDQVSDUHQF\ Policy is designed to take into 
account and comply with the regulation concerning public access to institutions¶ documents 
(Regulation 1049/2001)257 and operates on the presumption of disclosure unless there are 
compelling reasons for non-disclosure.  
 
However, recent reforms have not been perceived as universally positive. The European 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V Intergroup258 on Integrity, Transparency and Organised Crime and other 
organisations noted significant concerns about the new policy:259 
x vagueness surrounding the publication of information on EIB projects; 
x presumption of confidentiality around irregularities, corruption and 
maladministration; and 
x non-requirement to disclose the list of final recipients of its loans. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, transparency of FIs in 2007-13 has been hampered by a lack 
of systematic reporting until 2011, before which reporting on FIs by MAs was not 
obligatory.260 sets out the reporting requirements for FIs in Cohesion Policy. The EIB and EIF 
provide data to managing authorities for which they have a HF mandate. The data are sent 
to the Commission by the managing authorities. The first summary report on FIs was 
published by the Commission in 2012; successive reports have progressively improved the 
quality and comprehensiveness of data supplied by managing authorities, but many gaps 
and inconsistencies remain. The 2015 summary report highlighted significant gaps in data 
accuracy and availability. One of the main challenges is that Member States have reported 
different circumstances in different ways or inaccurately:261 
 
                                          
255  European Parliament (2015b) op. cit.  
256  European Investment Bank (2015b) Transparency Policy, available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/eib_group_transparency_policy_en.pdf   
257  Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001, L 145/43. 
258  Individual Members may form Intergroups or other unofficial groupings of Members to hold informal exchanges 
of views on specific issues across different political groups, drawing on members of different parliamentary 
committees, and to promote contact between Members and civil society. Such groupings may not engage in any 
activities which might result in confusion with the official activities of Parliament or of its bodies. See: Rules of 
Procedures of the EP, Rule 34 Intergroups.  
259  Counter Balance (2015)  EIB set to weaken transparency standards, available at: http://www.counter-
balance.org/eib-set-to-weaken-transparency-standards/; CEE Bankwatch Network (2015a) EIB's new 
transparency policy allows for more secrecy, available at: http://bankwatch.org/news-media/for-
journalists/press-releases/eibs-new-transparency-policy-allows-more-secrecy; CEE Bankwatch Network (2015b)  
European Parliament intergroup ITCO condemns new transparency policy of the European Investment Bank; 
available at: http://bankwatch.org/news-media/blog/european-parliament-intergroup-itco-condemns-new-
transparency-policy-european-invest  
260  An amendment to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 obliged Member States to report on FIs in the Annual 
Implementation Report: (Regulation (EU) No. 1310/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006). 
261  European Commission (2015d) op. cit. 
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x some Member States provided incomplete and incoherent information, for some FIs, 
such as late submission of information for OPs, omission of specific funds under 
holding funds or holding funds reported incorrectly as specific funds (ES, FR and 
IT);262 
x in a few cases, compulsory data are missing, especially for: national private co-
financing; date of the FI set-up; legal status of funds; name of the fund manager and 
type of fund; 
x the names of the FIs are sometimes confused with the names of the fund managers; 
x the share of Structural Funds contribution to FIs is not always reported (IT and FR); 
x the amounts of OP contributions paid to the FIs are sometimes lower than the 
corresponding amounts disbursed by the FIs to final recipients;263 
x cases where managing authorities include payments of revolving amounts which are 
no longer OP resources (e.g. in HU, LT, PL);  
x cases where the own resources of fund managers are included in the reporting on 
payments to final recipients, despite being resources outside of the OP; 
x for some FIs, the reporting was made on the level of financial product and not broken 
down to the level of financial intermediary, which reduces the overall count 
of FEI and allows less transparency regarding the absorption of OP amounts (BG, EL, 
SK), although cumulated data remain unchanged; 
x some countries report lower than actual contributions to specific funds (BG, CY, FR, 
IT, HU, PL) (this does not affect the reported amount at the level of final recipients); 
x inconsistencies resulting from the incorrect use of exchange rates (BG and CZ); and 
x output indicators such as the number of final recipients supported or jobs created 
which are not plausible (BG, CZ, IT and FR). 
These factors make it impossible to estimate accurately the number of FIs without knowing 
the specific details in each case (requiring further on-the-ground research at MA level). Such 
estimation is likely to introduce as many new errors as it resolves.  
 
The data submitted undergo quality checks, and over the past three years Member States 
and the Commission have made significant efforts to improve the quality of the data, for 
example by providing more extensive guidance. However, inaccuracies and missing data 
remain an important challenge. These limitations mean that the effectiveness and efficiency 
of FIs cannot easily be determined and raise concerns about transparency.  
 
The quality of data does not reflect any shortcomings on part of the EIB who 
according to interviews provide all necessary information to the managing authorities for 
which it holds a HF mandate and who are responsible for reporting to the Commission. 
However, the quality does affect the ability of European Parliament (and other 
institutions) to scrutinise WKH (,%¶V performance in relation to its role as HF 
manager.     
  
                                          
262  According to the Commission, this happened to a much lesser degree than in the previous reporting period. 
263  This does not necessarily constitute a reporting error, because additional amounts may come from interest 
generated through treasury operations by the FI which are added to the OP amounts (e.g. PL) or financial 
intermediaries are reimbursed by HF or managing authorities only after disbursing the money to final recipients 
(e.g. DK and EL). 
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Box 5: Reporting requirements for FIs in Structural Funds 2007-13 
 
In the 2007-13 programme period reporting requirements were divided into two categories. First, 
compulsory information is required regarding the following elements: 
GHVFULSWLRQRIWKH),VDQGimplementing arrangements; 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHHQWLWLHVthat implement the FIs, including those acting through HFs; 
DPRXQWVRIDVVLVWDQFHIURPWKH6WUXFWXUDO)XQGVDQGQDWLRQDOFR-financing paid to the FIs; and 
DPRXQWs of assistance from Structural Funds and national co-financing paid by the FIs to the final 
recipients. 
Second, optional data are requested regarding the following categories: 
 6WUXFWXUDO )XQGV (5')(6) DQG WKH QDWLRQDO SXEOLF DQG SULYDWH FR-financing committed in the 
funding agreements establishing FIs; 
23FRQWULEXWLRQVSDLGWRWKHIXQGVLQPDQDJHPHQWFRVWVDQGIHHV 
DPRXQWVRIRWKHUDVVLVWDQFHSDLGWR),VRXWVLGHWKHOP; 
QXPEHURIILQDOUHFLSLHQWVVXSSRUWHG; 
QXPEHURIORDQJXDUDQWHHDQGRWKHUILQDQFLDOSURGXFWVRIIHUHd and number of equity/venture capital 
investments made to final recipients; and 
QXPEHURIMREVFUHDWHG. 
 
Source: Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, op. cit. Article 67(2)(i) 
 
The 2014-20 regulations aim to strengthen the reporting requirements for FIs. The 
new framework requires MAs to include a specific report on operations comprising FIs as an 
annex to the annual implementation report, which is then sent to the Commission. All 
categories will be obligatory. Based on the reports submitted, the Commission will provide 
summaries of data collected.264 The implementing regulation (No. 821/2014 of 28 July 2014) 
details the reporting procedures, with extensive information requirements for the following 
categories:265 
x identification of the programme and priority or measure from which support from the 
ESI Funds is provided (Article 46(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013); 
x description of the financial instrument and implementation arrangements (Article 
46(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013);  
x identification of the body implementing the financial instrument as referred to in 
Articles 38(1)(a), 38(4)(a), (b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013, and the 
financial intermediaries referred to in Article 38(5) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 
(Article 46(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013);  
x total amount of programme contributions, by priority or measure, paid to the 
financial instrument and management costs incurred or management fees paid 
(Article 46(2)(d) and (e) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013) and Operational 
Programme contributions paid to final recipients in guarantees; 
x total amount of support paid to final recipients, or to the benefit of final recipients, or 
committed in guarantee contracts by the financial instrument for investments in final 
recipients, by ESI Funds programme and priority or measure (Article 46(2)(e) of 
Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013); 
                                          
264  European Commission (2014d) Financial Instruments in Cohesion Policy 2014-20, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/2014/financial_instruments_en.pdf  
265  Commission implementing regulation (EU) No. 821/2014 of 28 July 2014 laying down rules for the application of 
Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed arrangements 
for the transfer and management of programme contributions, the reporting on financial instruments, technical 
characteristics of information and communication measures for operations and the system to record and store 
data. OJ L 223, 29.7.2014, pp. 7±18. 
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x the performance of the financial instrument, including progress in its set-up and in 
the selection of bodies implementing the financial instrument (including the body 
implementing a fund of funds) (Article 46(2)(f) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013); 
x interest and other gains generated by support from the ESI Funds to the financial 
instrument, programme resources paid back to the financial instrument from 
investments as referred to in Articles 43 and 44, and the value of equity investments 
with respect to previous years (Article 46(2)(g) and (i) of Regulation (EU) No. 
1303/2013);  
x progress in achieving the expected leverage effect of investments made by the 
financial instrument and value of investments and participations (Article 46(2)(h) of 
Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013); and  
x contribution of the financial instrument to the achievement of the indicators of the 
priority or measure concerned (Article 46(2)(j) of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013). 
The implementing regulation is accompanied by detailed descriptions of each measure in 
order to avoid some of the interpretation differences that occurred in 2007-13.266 The first 
reporting cycle will be in 2016. Although the reporting requirements have become far more 
detailed, it remains to be seen if some of the data-gathering challenges that MAs 
experienced in 2007-13 have been resolved.  
 
The EIB utilises the Cohesion Policy monitoring and reporting framework for its 
own reporting purposes on its lending activities. This prevents unnecessary duplication 
and also avoids compliance issues. However, where the Bank considers it necessary, it can 
insist on additional monitoring and reporting responsibilities. For example, when the 
implementation capacity of a certain beneficiary (financial intermediary) is considered weak, 
the EIB can assist by adding TA as a condition of the loan. The TA can either be provided by 
the EIB, outsourced to a consultancy, or comprise a combination of the two. 
 
Research evidence from this study indicates that the EIB has made increasing efforts to 
improve transparency in recent years. Interviewees noted that there has been a greater 
effort to make information publicly available and accessible. For example, the EIB has 
SURYLGHG µsub-UHSRUWV¶ RQ VSHFLILF WRSLFV (SMEs, external relations, etc.) which provide 
more information and greater opportunity for public scrutiny in European Parliament 
committees. These specific publications are regarded as positive, demonstrating a high level 
of coherence with the figures in the annual report. However, the quality of data is not always 
regarded as sufficiently in-depth. The reports, according to one interviewee, tend to provide 
µhigh-level numbers¶ but say very little about the actual results of EIB activities. It should be 
noted that results are often difficult to capture, as the impact of EIB projects is usually only 
recognisable over a longer period of time.  
 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKH(,%¶VEV department provides a considerable body of evidence with 
regards to the impact of EIB activities (see Section 4.1). Furthermore, over the past two 
years the EIB has implemented its 3 Pillar Assessment (3 PA) methodology. The 3 PA is used 
for operations inside the EU to guide the ex-ante assessment of expected results and to 
HQKDQFH WKH %DQN¶V DELOLW\ WR PRQLWRU WKH DFWXDO UHVXOWV DFKLHYHG E\ WUDFNLQJ LPSDFWV
throughout the project cycle. EIB projects are rated according to three pillars:267 
 
                                          
266  Commission implementing regulation (EU) No 821/2014, op. cit. 
267 European Investment Bank (2014) Report on 3 Pillar Assessment for EIB operations inside the EU, EIB: 
Luexembourg, available on: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/report_2014_on_3_pillar_assessment_en.pdf  
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x quality and contribution of the project to sustainable growth and employment; 
x consistency of the project with and contribution to, EU and EIB policy objectives; and 
x (,%¶Vcontribution to the project. 
The survey results also demonstrate that Member State perceptions of the 
transparency of the EIB in Cohesion Policy are largely positive (i.e. openness in 
providing reports, data and other information on its activities and performance). Out of 15 
responses, 12 regarded the EIB as transparent or very transparent; three had a more 
negative perception (see Figure 12). Positive assessments noted that:   
x regular reports and relevant information are provided to stakeholders and published 
online; and 
x the JASPERS outputs are considered helpful and transparent: 
o guidance notes are issued during an assignment to cover on-going findings 
and its recommendations; 
o  µ&RPSOHWLRQ 1RWHV¶ DUH SURYLGHG RQFH WKH assignment has been completed 
and summarise the findings and recommendations; and 
o feedback forms DUHPDGH DYDLODEOH IRU -$63(56¶ EHQHILFLDULHV SURYLGLQJ DQ
opportunity to assess the process. 
More negative experiences included: 
x difficulties in getting reliable information and implementation forecasts from HF 
managers; and 
x long delays in the provision of information. 
 
Figure 12: Member StateV¶ views on EIB Transparency 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
4.3 Visibility 
Visibility is a key aspect of transparency and accountability. Clients of the EIB have to be 
aware of the sources and the policy context behind the EIB activities. In practical terms, 
visibility can be defined as the extent to which the EIB activities and products are visible to 
its clients. This relates to different levels: 
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x Member States ± administrators and politicians;  
x beneficiaries and ± financial intermediaries and project promotors; 
x final recipient; and 
x public ± taxpayers and citizens affected by EIB projects. 
Visibility is achieved first of all through the provision of information and hence is closely 
related to transparency. However, it also involves an active engagement with 
stakeholders and potential stakeholders to highlight EIB activities. Visibility is also 
important to allow partners to identify those products and activities that add most value, 
and to achieve synergies. In order to strengthen the cooperation and cultivate relations at 
the Member State level, the EIB has regional offices in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and 
the United Kingdom.268 
 
The EIB has been a key actor together with the Commission in terms of animating 
interest in FIs among both MAs and final recipients. Some interviewees mentioned 
that the visibility of EIB activities is often quite low, and although the survey results in 
general suggest that EIB activities are visible, it also seem to suggest that at least in some 
Member States this is an area of concern (see Figure 13). This is partly due to the structure 
of the Bank¶VOHQGLQJ, which operates through intermediaries in a large number of 
cases. 
In terms of FIs, significant steps have been taken to improve the provision of more 
information that is accessible to a larger (non-specialist) audience in the 2014-20 period. 
Initiatives such as fi-compass (see Section 6.4) provide an extensive information resource, 
including:269 
 
x brochures on various aspects of FI implementation;  
x case studies to analyse a specific financial instrument or research thematic issues of 
interest across a number of financial instruments; 
x manuals regarding the implementation of FIs; 
x factsheets regarding the use of FIs in all Cohesion Policy funds are currently being 
ILQDOLVHGLQDOORIWKH(8¶VRIILFLDOODQJXDJHV and 
x events on specific aspects of FI implementation. 
Such activities are expected to improve the visibility of FIs more generally which will also 
impact the visibility of EIB activities.  
 
Member States expressed a range of views on WKHYLVLELOLW\RIWKH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHV
and products in Cohesion Policy (i.e. the levels of awareness and knowledge about its 
activities/products). There are four countries in which EIB activities are thought to be highly 
visible, and a further eight where they are regarded as visible; but in five they are thought 
to be not very visible or invisible (see Figure 13). This is particularly the case in those 
countries where the EIB plays a marginal role in relation to Cohesion Policy. Member States 
considered the use of roadshows at the regional level, conferences, seminars and working 
meetings as positive. They noted that the intermediary structure means there is a lack of 
awareness among final recipients that the support is provided by the EIB, and that visibility 
is particularly low in the case of SMEs. 
 
                                          
268 For more information, see: http://www.eib.europa.eu/infocentre/contact/offices/index.htm  
269 For more information, see: https://www.fi-compass.eu/resources/product/152  
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Figure 13: Member StateV¶ views on EIB visibility 
 
Source: EPRC Member State survey 
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5 INTER-INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
KEY FINDINGS 
European Investment Bank ± European Parliament relations 
x Political oversight of EIB activities in the European Parliament is fragmented. The 
CONT and ECON Committees are responsible for scrutinising EIB activities, but 
scrutiny of the EIB by the European Parliament in relation to Cohesion Policy activities 
is partial and ad hoc. 
x The increasing role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy and the adoption of the EFSI is 
leading to greater interest by the REGI Committee in EIB operations. 
x Currently, the main interlocutor for the REGI Committee regarding EIB activities in 
Cohesion Policy is the European Commission. There is limited REGI Committee 
scrutiny of the EIB directly, although this is not due to reticence on the part of the 
EIB. 
x At the level of officials, operational contact between the REGI Committee 
administrators and EIB officials is limited, and there is considerable scope for more 
active dialogue and knowledge exchange. 
European Investment Bank± European Commission relations 
x Relationships between the EIB and the European Commission have developed 
VLJQLILFDQWO\DQGDUHODUJHO\MXGJHGWREHµSRVLWLYH¶RQERWKVLGHV 
x In the past, there was a significant cultural gap between the EIB and Commission in 
terms of different working practices. This gap has narrowed in recent years, although 
there is still scope for better mutual knowledge exchange. 
x The different priorities of the institutions sometimes create difficulties. For the EIB, 
commercial objectives are an important part of its decision making whereas for the 
Commission the primary concern is the contribution of projects towards policy 
objectives.  
x At the start of the 2007-13 programme period, the relationship between the EIB and 
DG Regio regarding FIs was unbalanced, with the EIB having considerably greater 
experience in the practical application of FIs. On the other hand, the EIB had to 
improve its understanding in terms of the complexities of Cohesion Policy 
implementation. Throughout the 2007-13 programme period DG Regio and the EIB 
have been able to exchange technical and policy knowledge which has increased 
understanding and capacity. 
 
 
Inter-institutional relationships between the EIB, on the one hand, and the European 
Commission and European Parliament, on the other, involve a complex set of formal and 
informal relations. This chapter provides an overview of the practical arrangements between 
the institutions and an assessment of the experiences and evolution of relationships over the 
2007-13 period. The chapter first discusses the relations between the EIB and the European 
Parliament, followed by similar consideration of the relationship between the EIB and the 
European Commission. It concludes with a map of institutional relations for each of the EIB 
roles. 
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5.1 European Investment Bank ± European Parliament relations 
 
The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (ECON) are lead committees on EIB matters. CONT exercise the control of the 
financial activities of the European Investment Bank and ECON is responsible for the 
relevant financial activities of the European Investment Bank as part of European economic 
governance in the Eurozone.270 The Committees alternate annually in terms of assessing 
responsibilities concerning the EIB. The EIB Annual Report published by the EIB is the 
starting point for this process. The Committee Rapporteur is free to select the activities on 
which to focus; this usually includes all EIB activities. The process involves a number of 
stages: 
x presentation of the EIB Annual Report by the President of the EIB in the Committee;  
x initial exchange of views; 
x formalised questions presented to the EIB; 
x preparation of Committee draft report by the Rapporteur;  
x submission of opinions from other Committees (for example, see the opinion 
European Parliament REGI Committee, 13 November 2015);271  
x a vote in CONT/ECON on the final report; and 
x a vote in a Plenary Session of the European Parliament on a resolution, with a final 
opportunity for Members/Political Groups to table their amendments if they have not 
been taken into account during the Committee stage.  
 
Overall, the role of the REGI Committee is to scrutinise those elements of the EIB 
activities that are linked to Cohesion Policy. There are a number of ways in which the 
REGI Committee can engage with EIB activities: 
x submit an opinion on EIB operations (Annual Report); 
x invite EIB representatives to discuss specific issues;  
x draw up own-initiative reports272 that target or include reflections on the role of the 
EIB in Cohesion Policy; and 
x request external expertise (e.g. studies) on EIB activities. 
 
Turning to experience of the EIB-European Parliament relations in practice, a number of key 
issues can be identified. First, scrutiny of EIB activities is partial. The Annual Report 
provides a high-level overview of EIB activities and forms the basis for further scrutiny. The 
ECON/CONT Rapporteur seeks direct contact with the EIB in order to explore issues and ask 
further questions. To a large extent, the nature of these relations depends on the issues that 
are of more (political) interest to the Rapporteur, and there is considerable flexibility in 
terms of the activities on which they decide to focus. This has included topics such as the 
(,%¶VUROHLQVXSSRUWLQJ60(VRUGHYHORSLQJH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV, but not specifically Cohesion 
Policy or regional development activities. 
 
Second, there is fragmented political oversight of EIB activities in the European 
Parliament. Within the lead Committees (CONT/ECON), there is clearly established 
awareness and expertise on the EIB and its activities, but there has been less engagement 
by other committees, including REGI. Several European Parliament interviewees noted the 
                                          
270  Powers and responsibilities of standing committees are described in Annex VI of The Rules of Procedures of the 
European Parliament (CONT, ECON, REGI). The modalities governing responsibilities of these committees are 
expected to be changed, but it is not known at the time of writing in what way it will affect the role of 
CONT/ECON in this process. 
271  European Parliament (2015) op. cit.  
272  For more information see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-
EP+20150909+RULE-052+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES  
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increasing interest of REGI Committee Members in the activities of the EIB, associated with 
WKH(,%¶VJURZLQJUROH LQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\DQG the establishment of EFSI, and the scope for 
developing a better understanding of the EIB among Members.  
 
Third, relations between the EIB and the REGI Committee have been organised on a 
somewhat ad-hoc basis. According to some interviewees, the REGI Committee has, on 
only very few occasions, formally engaged with EIB activities despite its increased role in 
Cohesion Policy. For example, the REGI Committee has provided an opinion on WKH (,%¶V
Annual Report only on two occasions in 2009 and 2015.273 Interviewees noted that this 
process was unsatisfying for a number of reasons: 
x the report was considered to provide limited, easily accessible and aggregated 
information in terms of the EIB activities in Cohesion Policy; 
x the Committee lacked expertise to scrutinise it sufficiently; and  
x the opinion was drafted in general terms, potentially limiting its influence. 
European Parliament interviewees noted that the lack of scrutiny by the REGI 
Committee was not due to reticence or resistance on the part of the EIB. During the 
2007-13 period, EIB representatives were invited on a number of occasions to attend REGI 
Committee meetings to present a report or give other presentations. Interviewees reported 
that, on these occasions, EIB representatives had demonstrated a clear willingness to 
respond and make a positive contribution to the work of the REGI Committee. In the 2014-
20 period, in the context of EFSI discussions, EIB representatives have been invited to speak 
at the REGI Committee to discuss the take-up of projects under the Fund.274  
 
Fourth, at an administrative level, the operational contact between REGI Committee 
European Parliament administrators and EIB representatives is limited. The main 
interlocutor for REGI administrators is the Commission; when specific EIB information is 
sought, it is often obtained from secondary sources. The administrative level in the European 
Parliament in general ± and the REGI staff specifically ± currently do not possess the 
technical knowledge to engage knowledgably or effectively with EIB activities, particularly in 
relation to the implementation of FIs. One of the major challenges at the administrative level 
for European Parliament is that there are only limited staff and a high turnover due to the 
staff rotation policy.  
 
Interviewees from both the EIB and the European Parliament were keen for active dialogue 
between EIB representatives and REGI administrators to be stimulated. They noted that the 
relationship should not only be based on formal reporting structures; the quantitative data in 
the Bank¶V reports require interpretation and context. Therefore, ways should be sought to 
improve the day-to-day dialogue between the institutions with the aim of improving 
the understanding of possibilities and limitations of EIB operations in general and FIs in 
particular.  
 
As noted above, the fragmentation of scrutiny of EIB activities across the different 
committees is regarded as problematic. Some interviewees argued that better coordination 
between the Committees is necessary to effectively scrutinise the BanN¶V activities. It is also 
recognised that these challenges are much broader and relate to the European Parliament¶V
opinion process (the main issue being that opinions provided by non-lead committees are 
not obligatory and not binding). However, there is scope to improve coordination within the 
                                          
273  European Parliament (2009) opinion of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on 
Budgetary Control on the European Investment Bank (EIB) - Annual Report 2008 (2009/2166(INI)); European 
Parliament (2015a) op. cit. 
274  European Parliament (2015d) Press release - EFSI to support Cohesion Policy in the long term, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20150327IPR38715/20150327IPR38715_en.pdf  
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existing framework by, for example, establishing informal working groups focused on 
EIB-related issues. 
 
The establishment of EFSI is leading to more involvement and interest in EIB 
operations by committees other than CONT/ECON (see Section 6.7). The interest is 
mainly based on the increased responsibilities of the EIB in relation to the implementation of 
the Community budget, particularly the use of the EU Budget to leverage additional 
financing, which increases the case for more scrutiny. Within the context of EFSI, the 
European Parliament has called for the EIB and Parliament to set up a platform for dialogue 
between the EIB and the relevant Parliament Committees, which would lead to the EIB 
reporting to the Parliament and discussing EIB progress and activities on a quarterly basis. It 
would also provide for a regular structured dialogue between the Presidents of the EIB and 
the European Parliament, similar to the quarterly monetary dialogue between the ECB and 
the European Parliament HQVXUH LQFUHDVHG SDUOLDPHQWDU\ RYHUVLJKWRI WKH (,%¶V DFWLYLWLHV
and facilitate enhanced cooperation and coordination between the two institutions.275 EFSI 
and its links to Cohesion Policy could provide the impetus for further (XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V 
REGI Committee engagement in EIB operations.  
 
5.2 European Investment Bank ± European Commission relations 
 
At the highest level, relationships between the EIB and the European Commission are set 
out in the Bank¶VVWDWXWHV7KH European Commission nominates a member to the EIB Board 
of Directors; this is currently the Director-General of the Structural Reform Service, with the 
Director-General of DG REGIO as an alternate. The Commission is also a major shareholder 
of the EIF. Article 19276 of the EIB's Statute stipulates that the Commission is notified 
of EIB projects and lending activities.277 The main contact point for the EIB is DG ECFIN 
which shares the projects across the DGs, for example DG REGIO if the project relates to 
Cohesion Policy objectives. In some cases, several DGs can be involved.  
 
Project proposals are shared with desk officers of the responsible geographical unit. Checks 
are performed on whether projects receive Cohesion Policy funding, and the process is also 
used to identify possible synergies or contradictions. The Commission delivers an opinion 
within two months. If no reply is received within this period, the Bank may assume that 
WKHUHLVQRREMHFWLRQWRWKHLQYHVWPHQW7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRQWKH(IB Board 
of Directors can highlight such issues when projects come up for approval.  
 
It was noted in the interview research that, during the 2007-13 period, projects were 
rarely challenged by DG REGIO desk officers. On the one hand, this may indicate a high 
level of complementarity between EIB activities and Cohesion Policy funding, but it could 
also indicate insufficient attention being paid to potential issues regarding EIB lending. On 
the other hand, it was also noted that the projects presented are often at early stage of 
development and that there is too little information available on the financing of the 
projects. The ESI funding and the relation with the Cohesion Policy is often not mentioned in 
the consultation documents provided by EIB.  
 
In terms RI WKH (,%¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\, there is also an inter-institutional 
relationship with regard to monitoring and control. The EIB has to adhere to Cohesion 
Policy regulatory requirements and national monitoring systems to manage and 
control its (b)lending activities in Cohesion Policy. However, the Bank reserves the right 
                                          
275 European Parliament (2015b) op. cit. 
276 EIB (2013b) Statute and other Treaty Provisions, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg,  available at: 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/statute/eib_statute_2013_07_01_en.pdf  
277 The Member State concerned can also deliver an opinion. 
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to request additional information and perform on-the-spot visits in order to verify the 
SURMHFW¶VSK\VLFDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ 
 
During the 2007±13 period, relationships between the EIB and the Commission have 
GHYHORSHGVLJQLILFDQWO\DQGDUHQRZODUJHO\MXGJHGWREH µSRVLWLYH¶RQERWKVLGHV. 
The joint initiatives (JESSICA, JEREMIE, JASPERS and JASMINE) (see Section 3.4) 
have provided a basis to deepen and broaden the relationship between the EIB and 
the Commission. The relationship with regard to the joint initiatives was formalised in 2006 
in several memoranda of understandings (MoU) between the Commission and the EIB 
together with the EBRD (for the JASPERS initiative) and with the CEB (for the JESSICA 
initiative). The Memoranda set out the principles for a coordinated approach and cooperation 
between the Commission and the EIB, in close cooperation with the Member States, in the 
preparation, programming and implementation of the special instruments.278 In 2014, 
another MoU was signed between the EIB and the Commission (DG AGRI) for cooperation in 
agriculture and rural development in the 2014-20 period with the aim of strengthening FIs in 
the context of rural development.279  
 
A study on the implications of EIB co-financing for the EU budget noted that, in most cases, 
the EIB colleagues were regarded (by Commission and Parliament interviewees) as 
effective policy partners able to mobilise large-scale finance for projects.280 
Interviewees for this study also noted that institutional relationships with the EIB and the 
Commission were strong, and openness between the different institutions was improving.  
 
Among the joint initiatives, JASPERS can be considered the most straightforward initiative. 
The rationale for the initiative was clear from the start for both the Commission and the EIB. 
The EIB had a proven track record in terms of delivering technical assistance for large-scale 
(mainly infrastructure) projects, and this model could be transferred relatively easily to the 
JASPERS facility. Additionally, there was a strong buy-in from MAs who wanted and actively 
sought the advice.  
 
The urban development FIs presented more challenges. Offering financial instruments in the 
field of urban development and regeneration was relatively new for both the EIB and the 
Commission. Additionally, funding for urban development FIs (and enterprises) drew directly 
from the Cohesion Policy budget, which made implementation more difficult. The 
implementation process was therefore slower and more fraught with legal questions. The 
tensions were amplified by the different working practices in both institutions. For the 
Commission, seeking guidance on legal issues (especially on State aid and Competition 
Policy rules) was often an iterative and lengthy process and relied on internal consultations 
between DGs. The EIB was not accustomed to these processes and was surprised by the 
lengthy timescales for its own legal clarification requirements. It faced considerable 
challenges in terms of keeping the client base (financial intermediaries) interested. The EIB 
required legal clarifications and a full understanding of the details prior to implementation.  
 
 
                                          
278  EC and EIF (2006) Memorandum of Understanding in respect of a Coordinated Approach to improving Access to 
Finance for micro to medium enterprises in the regions supported by the European Regional Development Fund; 
EC, EIB, CEB (2006) Memorandum of understanding in respect of a Coordinated Approach to the Financing of 
Urban Renewal and Development for the Programming Period 2007-2013 of the Community Structural Funds; 
EC, EIB and EBRD (2006) Memorandum of Understanding in respect of Joint Assistance in supporting projects in 
European Regions (JASPERS). 
279  European Investment Bank (2014f) EC and EIB sign MoU for co-operation in Agriculture and Rural Development, 
available at: http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2014/2014-164-ec-and-eib-sign-mou-for-co-
operation-in-agriculture-and-rural-development.htm 
280  European Parliament (2013b) op. cit. 
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According to interviewees, the enterprise FIs presented the greatest challenge in 
terms of implementation. The nature of the enterprise FIs (i.e. SME support) meant that 
there were many uncertainties regarding State aid that had to be clarified. More 
fundamentally, there were considerable cultural differences between the institutions in this 
field. Many EIF staff had a banking background, were focused on business objectives, and 
were often frustrated by the slow speed of the process. On the other hand, the Commission 
wanted assurances that the enterprise FIs would contribute to policy objectives, notably the 
Lisbon Strategy. Their impression was that the EIF often regarded the provision of credit to 
SMEs as valuable in itself. 
 
The implementation of these initiatives highlighted some of the challenges of adopting FIs in 
the Cohesion Policy framework and the relations between the EIB and the Commission. First, 
and perhaps most fundamentally, there was a cultural gap between the EIB and the 
Commission. The administrative culture of the Commission was not always compatible with 
the more business-orientated culture of the EIB and in particular the EIF; practices, 
processes, expectations and timescales varied considerably. Both institutions underwent a 
process of learning in order to implement the joint initiatives effectively. Although the 
institutional cultures remain distinct, significant inroads into the culture gap have been made 
over the past 7-8 years.  
 
Second, at the start of the 2007-13 programme period, the relationship between the EIB 
and the Commission regarding FIs was unbalanced. The EIB has long-standing and 
deep expertise in the area of FIs, while the Commission had limited capacity both in terms of 
knowledge and personnel. The Commission's lack of expertise in this area meant that some 
fundamental mistakes were made: 
 
x no reporting or monitoring framework with regard to FI was established until 2011; 
x guidance was unclear and had to be updated on several occasions; and 
x the responsibilities between the EIB and the Commission for animating and providing 
guidance were unclear. 
Third, the innovative nature of the instruments meant that there was a certain level of 
experimentation. Inevitably, the implementation process required flexibility, something 
which the regulatory framework did not always allow and which led to a large number of 
complex legal questions in relation to State aid.  
 
Fourth, some interviewees noted that although the relationship between the EIB and the 
Commission is generally good, the different priorities of the institutions can 
sometimes lead to challenges. As the Commission is accountable for the Community 
budget, it considers FIs from a policy perspective and prioritises policy objectives at all 
times. The EIB tends to think more in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
instruments. In this context, it is important to note the difference between the EIB and the 
EIF. The EIB has a wider policy mandate and therefore is arguably more attuned to Cohesion 
Policy objectives. The EIF can, in the opinion of some interviewees, be regarded as more 
business/banking-oriented.  
 
It also has to be noted that implementation was affected by several contextual issues, 
which had an important impact on relationships between the EIB and the Commission. 
 
x At the time of the implementation of the joint initiatives, the Commission was under 
pressure from the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament's CONT 
Committee regarding the high error rate in Cohesion Policy expenditure. In seeking to 
reduce the error rate, the Commission took fewer risks in implementing FIs and 
wanted assurances that models were compliant with rules and regulations to avoid 
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future errors. The intensified focus on the detail of implementation led to 
hesitation and delays. 
 
x Despite a Memorandum of Understanding and intensive discussions in preparing the 
joint initiatives, several misunderstandings of the role of the EIB became 
apparent to DG REGIO staff. DG REGIO had anticipated that the implementation of 
the initiatives would largely be handled by the EIB. It expected the EIB to develop 
guidance and provide clarifications in relation to implementation. This did not turn out 
to be the case, and instead DG REGIO was faced with an increasing number of legal 
and implementation questions from the EIB. These issues also had a financial 
dimension; for example, there were misunderstandings regarding the Technical 
Assistance budget for evaluations and gap analyses as well as misinterpretations of 
the financing of the management costs of JASPERS support. These 
misunderstandings led to increasing frustration among DG REGIO desk officers with 
the lack of guidance and slow progress that was being made. 
 
x Managing authorities complained about the high management fees for EIB 
holding funds and that implementation practices of the EIB/EIF were too rigid in 
their conditions. This led to some countries ± which initially intended to have holding 
funds with the EIF ± VZLWFKLQJWRWKHLUµRZQ¶QDWLRQDOEDQNV 
 
x The use of national development banks or other financial intermediaries as holding 
fund managers was logical in Western Europe where there is a strong financial 
services infrastructure. However, in several Member States in Southern and Central 
and Eastern European, national development banks or other financial 
intermediaries are less developed and therefore the EIB expertise was 
considered beneficial. 
 
x Implementation took place in rapidly changing market conditions. The 
financial and economic crisis shifted the focus and put considerable strain on budgets.   
In response to some of these issues, in 2008 DG REGIO established a small team of 2-3 staff 
who had been involved in the preparation of the special initiatives. This FI unit was tasked 
with coordinating relationships with the EIB as well as with internal desk officers. However, 
the team was unable to cope with the heavy demands that were placed upon it, and it was 
restructured in 2010. The new team included two members of staff from the EIB and had 
more resources. This led to significant improvements in relations and better competence in 
DG REGIO. However, staffing pressures remained a frustrating issue from '* 5(*,2¶V
perspective. The EIB was able to put together a team that was larger than the FI unit in DG 
REGIO, but a lot of responsibilities and demands were placed on the smaller unit. At the 
time of writing (September 2015), the DG REGIO unit consists of 15 staff. The reliance on 
EIB expertise has decreased as DG REGIO has built up its own capacity and 
expertise.  
 
5.3 Mapping institutional relations 
 
The discussion in Section 3.1 demonstrated that the EIB has a number of different roles 
when it comes to implementing Cohesion Policy. The relationship between the different 
institutions and wider stakeholders varies depending on the EIB role in Cohesion Policy. This 
section maps out the institutional relationships for each of its roles. 
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The relationship for mandate management is illustrated in Figure 14. In this case, the 
relationship between the EIB and other EU institutions goes through MAs as part of the 
shared management responsibilities between the Commission and the local, regional and 
national bodies. The EIB is a beneficiary of Cohesion Policy funding, and its relationship is 
with the managing authority rather than with the Commission directly. The European 
Parliament is ultimately responsible for scrutinising the implementation of the Community 
budget for which the main interface is the Commission. There is no direct relationship 
between the European Parliament and the EIB. 
 
Figure 14: Institutional relationships ± mandate management 
 
Source: EPRC 
 
In terms of the Bank¶V DGYLVRU\ DQDO\WLFDO DQG FDSDFLW\-building role, the relationship 
between the EIB and the Commission is more direct (see Figure 15). The Commission sets 
the framework and provides funding for many of the services that the EIB provides. Advisory 
services are offered to a range of beneficiaries that includes the Commission (DG REGIO), 
MAs, financial intermediaries at the national level, and in some cases final recipients (for 
example JASPERS). Again, there is no direct relationship between the European Parliament 
and the EIB, and the Commission is the interlocutor with regard to the EIB activities.  
  
Figure 15: Institutional relationships ± EIB advisory, analytical and capacity-
building services 
 
Source: EPRC 
 
)RU WKH (,%¶V EOHQGLQJ GHFLVLRQV, the relationship between the different institutions is 
different yet again (see Figure 16). The Commission (together with Member States) as a 
Member of the Board of Directors is responsible for decisions on lending activities. The EIB 
has administrative responsibilities in terms of preparing lending decisions and also 
implementing and monitoring loans. The European Parliament has in this case a direct 
relationship with the EIB as part of its responsibility to scrutinise the EIB Annual Report. 
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Figure 16: Institutional relationships ± EIB (b)lending  
 
Source: EPRC 
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6 THE ROLE OF THE EIB IN THE 2014-20 PROGRAMME 
PERIOD 
KEY FINDINGS 
x The role of the EIB within Member States varies greatly across the EU, but insofar as 
information is available, there is likely to be an expansion of its activity both in terms 
of the number of countries where it is involved and the depth of its involvement. A 
more complete picture of the role of the EIB in FIs in 2014-20 will become available 
in the second half of 2016. 
x The SME Initiative, introduced in 2013, is a joint instrument that aims to utilise 
synergies between existing SME support programmes at national and EU levels. The 
EIB played an important role in the sourcing and structuring of the operations 
supported by the SME Initiative. By late 2015, the uptake of the initiative had been 
considerably lower than initially expected. 
x The provision of advisory/technical assistance on FIs has been implemented through 
the (,%¶V  fi-compass unit. The new fi-compass initiative consists of horizontal 
advisory services for all Member States and types of FIs. fi-compass provides 
advisory support on behalf of all shared management DGs in the Commission, and it 
contributes to capacity-building of financial intermediaries in Member States. 
x The ESIF Regulation provides MAs with several options for FI implementation. One 
option is for MAs to entrust the implementation of financial instruments set up at 
national, regional, transnational or cross-border levels (including those using 
VWDQGDUG WHUPV DQG FRQGLWLRQV µRII WKH VKHOI LQVWUXPHQWV¶ to IFIs, including the 
EIB.. 
x EFSI provides a guarantee for the EIB to extend LWVµVSHFLDODFWLYLWLHV¶SRUWIROLR and a 
potential basis for deeper and broader cooperation between the EIB and other 
European institutions. As contributor to the EFSI, the EIB will have representatives on 
the Steering Board. The significant involvement of the EIB in EFSI means that any 
EFSI-VXSSRUWHG SURMHFW ZLOO DOVR UHTXLUH DSSURYDO DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH (,%¶V UHJXODU
procedures. A European Investment Advisory Hub is being set up. The EFSI 
Regulation foresees extensive rules to ensure accountability of the EFSI to the 
European Parliament. 
x Strategic coherence, thematic concentration and result orientation in the 2014-20 
programmes present opportunities for the EIB in terms of greater emphasis on 
revolving funds and a better-defined framework for implementation, increased 
possibilities to identify additional complementarities at the strategic level, and more 
opportunities to provide co-financing. 
 
The role of the EIB is increasing following the reform of Cohesion Policy for the 2014-20 
programme period. The EIB is continuing its lending activities in relation to Cohesion Policy 
programmes and has centralised its advisory activities to provide a more coherent and 
coordinated service. In particular, FIs are playing an increasingly important role in the 
delivery of key policy objectives, notably Europe 2020. Operating under conditions of 
economic uncertainty, fiscal deficit and consequent budgetary pressures, and encouraged by 
the early performance and leverage effects of FIs, policymakers see considerable value in 
supporting the further development of innovative FIs and for their use in both existing and 
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new policy-related areas of activity.281 Moreover, EFSI affords an additional role to the EIB 
which is closely linked to Cohesion Policy objectives. 
 
6.1 Financial instruments 
 
The CPR regulation extends the possibility of using financial instruments in place of grants to 
all ESI Funds and all thematic objectives.282 Some of the most important changes for the 
2014-20 period are:283  
 
x the need for ex-ante assessment for FIs; 
x the possibility to implement FIs in all sectors (not just enterprises, urban 
development and energy efficiency);  
x the phasing of payments; 
x stricter rules and limits on management costs; 
x changes in State aid compliance rules; 
x two new structures to implement FIs (i.e. the possibility of contributing ESI Funds to 
EU-level instruments and the possibility of using pre-prepared FI models with 
standard terms and conditions (off-the-shelf instruments); and 
x technical assistance platforms. 
In terms of the role of the EIB/EIF, this means that it: 
 
x can be entrusted by the Member States to implement and manage EU-level 
instruments (e.g.. SME initiative);284continues to manage FIs; 
x can lever EIB loans into FIs; and 
x provides technical assistance through the fi-compass platform.285   
These measures aim to provide greater flexibility, provide a stable implementation 
framework, exploit synergies and ensure compatibility between different FIs. In 
late 2015, almost two years into the 2014-20 programme period, the stage of 
development of plans by MAs for the implementation of FIs varies widely. At time of 
writing (December 2015), most Member States are still in the first stages of the FI lifecycle. 
Although data have not yet been collected by the Commission on FIs in 2014-20 (the first 
Annual Implementation Reports for the period are not due to be submitted to the 
Commission until May 2016), the survey results for this study and wider EPRC research286 
provide some indication of the use of financial instruments in 2014-20. The EIB and EIF have 
conducted ex-ante assessments for the 2014-20 period in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
France (Rhône-Alpes and Lorraine, Languedoc-Roussillon) Malta and United Kingdom 
(England)).287  
 
While there are some early indications of Member State and MA plans for FI use in 2014-20, 
the rationale and motivation underlying changes in approach from the 2007-13 period are 
not always clear, but include such factors as: 
 
 
                                          
281 Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
282 Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit.  
283 Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
284 See: http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/guarantees/sme_initiative/index.htm 
285 For more information see: http://www.fi-compass.eu/  
286 On-going research carried out as part of the IQ-Net consortium (see http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/).  
287 EIB (2015d) Using Financial instruments for SMEs in England in the 2014-2020 programming period, European 
Investment Bank, Luxembourg, available at: http://www.llep.org.uk/content/uploads/2015/07/SME-ex-ante-
Block-One-SUMMARY-13-2-15.pdf   
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x reaction to positive or negative experience gained in 2007-13; 
x rationalising approaches to increase cost-effectiveness; 
x responding to changes in the market situation; and 
x negative reactions to the administrative burden and risk of co-financing FIs. 
 
The exact role of the EIB and EIF in FIs in the 2014-20 period is also not yet 
clear.288 Some Member States which already have a strong partnership with the EIB note 
that they expect this to continue in 2014-20, and in some cases it is expected to expand. For 
example, According to survey responses, Slovakia is expected to allocate more than EUR 
400 million from Cohesion Policy programmes to financial instruments and expects that 
(b)lending from the EIB/EIF at the project level will increase. Other Member States in which 
the EIB has so far not played a major role are considering a possible expansion of its 
activities (Sweden, Estonia, Finland as well as a number of French regions).  
 
7KHUHDUHDOVR0HPEHU6WDWHV LQZKLFKWKH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHH[SHFWHGWRUHPDLQOLPLWHG
Austria and Belgium (Flanders) note that there are currently no plans to engage with the EIB 
in relation to Cohesion Policy programmes and projects in the 2014-20 programme period. 
For Poland, the scope and nature of the support provided by the EIB has not changed 
significantly in comparison with 2007-13 period.  
  
6.2 Ex-ante assessments 
 
In the 2014-20 period, ex-ante assessments are required for each FI. According to 
Article 37(2) of the CPR, support through financial instruments needs to be based on an ex-
ante assessment that has established evidence of market failures or sub-optimal investment 
situations, as well as the estimated level and scope of public investment needs, including 
types of financial instruments to be supported. The managing authority is responsible for 
carrying out such assessments.  
 
The EIB commissioned a study, co-financed by DG REGIO, for the development of a 
general methodology covering all thematic objectives generically as well as four 
guidance documents for specific thematic objectives289 (TOs, Article 9 CPR) and 
guidance for FIs for urban and territorial development.290 The methodology is for a large 
extent based on earlier methodologies developed by the EIF.291 Article 37(2) of the CPR 
articulates the required content of an ex-ante assessment (See Table 13).   
 
                                          
288  It is worth noting that for the the EIB and EIF will not only implement new FIs but also continue to implement 
2007-+)V VRPH+)VZLOO EH WUDQVLWLRQLQJEDFN WR0HPEHU6WDWHVGHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKH(,%DQG(,)¶V UROH LQ
capacity building.   
289  TO 1 (strengthening research, technological development and innovation); TO 3 (Enhancing the competitiveness 
of SMEs, including agriculture, aquaculture and fisheries); and TO 4 (supporting the shift to low-carbon 
economy). 
290  fi-compass (2014) Ex-ante assessment for ESIF financial instruments, quick reference guide, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/thefunds/fin_inst/pdf/ex_ante_vol0.pdf  
291  EIF (2014a) Guidelines for SME ACCESS to Finance Market Assessments (SAFMA), working  
paper 2014/22, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, available at: 
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_22_gafma_april14_fv.pdf; Kraemer H and Lang F (2014) A 
Practical Approach to the Market Analysis Part of SME-Related Ex Ante Assessments, ESTiF 3.  
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Table 13: Ex-ante assessment requirements 
Article 37 (2)  Description 
a) Analysis of 
market failures, 
sub-optimal 
investment 
situations and 
investment needs 
- identification of the main reasons, type and size of market failure 
and sub-optimal investment situations with a good practice 
methodology to make sure the FI resources are used where they 
make a difference; and 
- FI needs to contribute to the strategy and to the expected results of 
the relevant programme(s) by bridging a viability gap or a financing 
gap. 
b) Value-added of 
the financial 
instruments 
- check the value-added of the FI; 
- consistency with other forms of public intervention addressing the 
same market failure to limit overlap and avoid conflicting targets; 
- possible State aid implications including the proportionality of the 
envisaged intervention to the identified market needs; and 
- measures to minimise market distortion resulting from the FI. 
c) Additional public 
and private 
resources 
- estimate of additional public and private resources to be potentially 
raised by the FI; 
- co̻financing down to the level of the final recipient; 
- expected leverage effect; and 
- if relevant, an assessment of the need for and level of preferential 
remuneration to attract counterpart resources from private investors. 
d) Lessons learnt 
- analysis of lessons learnt from similar or instruments considered 
relevant in the past; 
- analysis of ex-ante assessments carried out by the MS in the past; 
- application of these lessons to make sure that the FI builds on 
existing and acquired knowledge. 
e) Proposed 
investment 
strategy 
- thematic and geographical coverage of the FI; 
- ensure that, within the meaning of Article 38, the most appropriate 
implementation option is chosen with regard to the country/regional 
situation; 
- financial products to be offered to ensure an adequate response to 
market needs; 
- final recipients targeted; and 
- if relevant, envisaged combination with grant support to maximise 
efficiency and ensure minimum intensity of the support 
element/element of subsidy. 
f) Expected results 
- specification of the expected results and outputs of the FI within 
the priority of the programme(s); and 
- definition of reference and target values based on the specific 
contribution of the FI to the priority of the programme results and 
outputs indicators. 
g) Provisions 
allowing the ex-
ante assessment to 
be reviewed 
- rationale for the revision of the ex-ante assessment; 
- practical and methodological procedures to update the ex-ante 
assessment; and 
- steps to adapt the FI implementation. 
Source: Fi-compass (2014) Ex-ante assessment for ESIF financial instruments ± quick reference guide 
 
6.3 EU-level instruments in Cohesion Policy and SME Initiative 
 
Article 38(1) of the CPR introduces the option that managing authorities may provide a 
financial contribution to financial instruments set up at EU level, managed by the 
Commission with implementation tasks entrusted to the EIF.292 Decisions on 
contributions should be based on the ex-ante assessment which was carried out by the 
Commission DQG (6,) SURJUDPPHV¶ allocations should be ring-fenced and invested in the 
                                          
292 Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit. 
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programme area.293 According to CPR (Art. 39.2(b)), a single dedicated national programme 
shall be established. 
Perceived advantages of using FIs at the EU level rather than at other levels relate inter alia 
to: 294   
x multiplier effects; 
x capacity-building (national and local institutions benefiting from EU-level entrusted 
HQWLWLHV¶ NQRZ-how in relation to the design and implementation of financial 
schemes);  
x ability to address market fragmentation;  
x facilitate the development of common standards across the EU;  
x help avoiding duplication of efforts;  
x efficiency savings for the managing authority in the set-up phase (managing 
authorities are thus relieved of much of the administration related to design, 
tendering, reporting and compliance issues);295 
x promote cooperation between Member States, institutions and levels of power; and  
x minimise risks of failure in areas where it would be difficult for an individual Member  
Potential challenges may include: 
x overlaps of FIs at European and national levels, 
x regulatory requirements of ESIF remain applicable alongside all regulatory 
requirements applying to the EU-level instruments leading to a potential 
overregulation (in the case of SME Initiative this is to an extent avoided by having a 
separate provisions in the CPR); 
x lack of synergies among different kinds of expertise, and  
x insufficient understanding of EU Regulations amongst actors involved.296  
Moreover, managing authorities may have concerns over the lack of flexibility and control in 
the EU-level instruments. The added YDOXHRIDOORFDWLQJIXQGVµEDFNXS¶WRWKH8QLRQOHYHO
associated with the complexities of EU financial circuitry, might also be questioned.297 
 
Although the CPR contains provisions for different kinds of EU-level instruments, it 
particularly refers to one type. Article 39 of the CPR includes specific provisions for ERDF and 
EAFRD contribution to EU-level FIs in favour of SMEs (which relates to ESIF allocation to the 
SME Initiative). The SME Initiative may be considered an EU-level instrument in Cohesion 
Policy, as it combines resources from centrally managed EU programmes and ESIF.298 The 
SME Initiative is a joint instrument that aims at utilising synergies between existing SME 
support programmes at national and EU levels. It combines resources from centrally 
managed EU programmes COSME and Horizon 2020, ESIF, the EIB resources and possibly 
those of national institutions and private investors. The rationale for the launch of the 
initiative related to considerations that the blocked credit channel to SMEs has been among 
the key obstacles to growth recovery from the economic crisis, and that increased volume of 
lending to SMEs in the EU, achieved by pooling resources and providing capital relief to EU 
banks, would help stimulate economic growth. Making different resources available for SMEs 
was expected to achieve greater leverage effects and economies of scale.  
 
                                          
293  European Commission (2014e) op. cit. 
294  European CommissionC (2013b) op. cit. ; Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012) op. cit. 
295  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
296  European Parliament  (2013a) op. cit. 
297  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
298  Commission Implementing Regulation No. 964/2014 of 11 September 2014 laying down rules for the application 
of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards standard terms and 
conditions for financial instruments. OJ L 271, 12.9.2014. 
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The SME Initiative comprises two different options (not mutually exclusive). 
x Uncapped guarantee instrument. This provides uncapped portfolio guarantees and 
partial capital relief to banks building up new portfolios of loans, guarantees for loans 
and leasing to SMEs. Potential benefits include the ability to increase bank-lending 
FDSDFLW\WRZDUGV60(VSRVVLEO\DOVRWR µKLJKHU-ULVN¶60(V, and the simplicity of the 
structure. Potential challenges include: the limited complementarity and potential 
overlaps with existing EU or national guarantee schemes (e.g. the UK Enterprise 
Finance Guarantee scheme and the Funding for Lending Scheme; the Italian Fondo 
Centrale di Garanzia, the French OSEO guarantee scheme, a Belgium guarantee 
scheme); it requires on-going reporting and monitoring, and needs time to get credit 
approval; the fact that it is only for new loans could end up being restrictive.299 
 
x Joint securitisation for new and existing loans. This provides a joint 
securitisation instrument, by combining EU resources (COSME and/or Horizon 2020) 
with ESIF. A portfolio of SME loans must be built up by the banks who benefit from 
having their portfolios of already existing or new SME loans securitised with support 
from ESIF, COSME/H2020 and EIB Group resources. Potential benefits are: it allows 
more complementary solutions with third parties and is able to increase leverage and 
outreach by attracting private investors (who would be more likely to join in, as risk 
levels of tranches of existing portfolios can be assessed); and it has the advantage of 
potentially providing both funding and capital relief. Perceived drawbacks include 
potential difficulty in getting investors due to challenges in dealing with unfavourable 
regulatory environments and ineligibility of synthetic transaction in some jurisdictions, 
and more complex regulations and further reporting requirements for additional 
portfolios. 
Financial contributions to the initiative should be based on an ex-ante assessment, covering, 
among other things, the SME-financing conditions and needs at EU level. The contribution 
should be provided by each participating Member State as part of a single dedicated national 
programme per fund. A Member State can contribute up to seven percent of its total ERDF 
and EAFRD allocation to the initiative, with a global ceiling (EUR 8.5 billion) at EU level also 
established.300  
 
The EIB and EIF played an important role in the sourcing and structuring of the 
operations supported by the SME Initiative. In compliance with Article 39 CPR, the 
instrument is managed indirectly by the Commission with implementation tasks entrusted to 
the EIB. The participating Member States are required to conclude a funding agreement with 
the EIB. For the purposes of implementation of the instrument, the EIB enters into 
contractual arrangements with selected financial intermediaries. The Commission with inputs 
from the EIB and EIF carried out an ex ante assessment providing evidence for the 
weakness of the SME lending market. At the preparation stage, the EIB elaborated on 
different options for the initiative (jointly with the Commission) and prepared a report 
analysing the opportunities and challenges related to the SME Initiative.301 The SME 
Initiative builds on combined EIB and EIF expertise with regard to guarantee instruments 
and knowledge gained through the management of Structural Funds and EU-level 
instruments. 
 
 
                                          
299 European Commission (2013b) op. cit. (on the basis of feedback received from market participants). 
300 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 op. cit. Article 39.2. 
301 European Commission (2013b) op. cit.  
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More specifically, with regard to the two FI options: for uncapped guarantees, while the ESIF 
guarantees the junior tranche and the EU resources together with EIF own resources the 
middle and upper mezzanine tranches, the EIF guarantees the residual risk of the senior 
tranches; for securitisation, ESIF and EU resources together with EIF own-resources 
guarantee the junior and mezzanine tranches, the EIB guarantees the residual risk of the 
senior tranches;302 According to the ex-ante assessment of the SME Initiative, the role of the 
EIB and EIF involvement might also be in SURYLGLQJDVSHFLILF µTXDOLW\VWDPS¶ IRU
the transactions (e.g. with regard to the quality of information available, the reporting to 
be performed by the originator,303 modelling provided). It could also serve a catalyst in 
terms of standardisation, which would help create a broader and more liquid market across 
Europe.304  
 
In general terms, compared to other FIs that can be set up with ESIF funding, the SME 
Initiative might offer participating Member States advantages such as: 
 
x a potentially higher leverage effect on the ESIF contribution than might be achieved 
domestically due to a combination of various resources;  
x no requirement of co-financing from national or regional resources;  
x no need to conduct additional ex-ante assessment (as EU-level assessment replaces 
Member State/regional ex-ante assessment); and  
x an already existing template for the Funding Agreement.  
Potential advantages for financial intermediaries relate, for example, to capital relief 
enabling new debt finance for SMEs, additional funding in case of securitisation and the 
ability to extend the volume of loans without affecting risk exposure. Potential advantages 
for SMEs include more favourable terms on loans and guarantees, more liquidity for 
investments, and availability of financing for projects that might otherwise be turned down 
by banks. Overall, it can potentially contribute to capacity-building (drawing on the 
expertise of the Commission and the EIB in designing and implementing SME-
financing schemes)305 and to overcoming the limitations linked to national 
programmes (such as different and unequal structures, policies and availability), 
by pooling available resources in a complementary way. The potential of the initiative 
LVDOVRVHHQLQLWVDELOLW\WRµLQVSLUH¶0HPEHU6WDWHs by designing coherent toolkits of FIs for 
SMEs.  
 
                                          
302  $µWUDQFKH¶UHIHUVWRDSLHFHDSRUWLRQRUVOLFHZLWKLQDVWUXFWXUHG(,)E60(/RDQ6HFXULWLVDWLRQDW
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_2013_19.pdf). Gradation of tranches in the capital 
structure is as follows. An equity tranche is the lowest tranche in the capital structure. It is a tranche with the 
highest risk. It carries the risk of payment delays and defaults first, and reduces the risk of the other tranches. 
The next more senior tranche is called mezzanine tranche. Mezzanine tranche investors are protected by the 
equity tranche and will incur losses only if the equity tranche is exhausted. On the other hand, their claims are 
subordinated claims of the senior tranche, which in turn will only be affected if the equity and mezzanine 
tranches are exhausted. A senior tranche is the highest tranche that offers a lower yield, because a lot of 
defaults would be needed to trigger losses in this tranche. Mäntysaari P (2009) The Law of Corporate Finance: 
General Principles and EU Law. Volume II: Contracts in General. Springer Science & Business Media, 2009. 
303  $FFRUGLQJWR5HJXODWLRQ(81RµRULJLQDWRU¶PHDQVDQHQWLW\ZKLFKLLWVHOIRUWKURXJK$FFRUGLQJWR
5HJXODWLRQ(81RµRULJLQDWRU¶PHDQVDQHQWLW\ZKLFKLLWVHOIRUWKURXJKUHODWHGHQWLWLHVGLUHFWO\
or indirectly, was involved in the original agreement which created the obligations or potential obligations of the 
GHEWRU RU SRWHQWLDO GHEWRU JLYLQJ ULVH WR WKH H[SRVXUH EHLQJ VHFXULWLVHG RU LL SXUFKDVHV D WKLUG SDUW\¶V
exposures for its own account and then securitises them. In WKHFRQWH[WRI60(/RDQ6HFXULWLVDWLRQµRULJLQDWRU¶
LVGHILQHGDVDQµHQWLW\DVVLJQLQJUHFHLYDEOHVLQDVHFXULWLVDWLRQWUDQVDFWLRQIXQGHGWUDQVDFWLRQRUVHHNLQJFUHGLW
ULVNSURWHFWLRQRQ WKHDVVHWV XQIXQGHG WUDQVDFWLRQ¶ (,) Eop. cit.  µ6HFXULWLVDWLRQ¶DVVXFK UHIHUV WR
transactions that enable a lender or other originator of assets ± typically a credit institution ± to refinance a set 
of loans or assets (e.g. mortgages, leases, consumer loans) by converting them into securities (see EC (2015c) 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common rules on 
securitisation etc., at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0472&from=EN 
304  European Commission (2013b) op. cit.  
305  Ibid.  
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The uptake of the initiative has hitherto been considerably lower than initially 
expected, and six Member States (Bulgaria, Finland Italy Malta, Romania and Spain) have 
signed up to it. According to European Parliament internal documents, the initial target for 
the SME Initiative was EUR 8 - 10 billion306 of ESIF which was considered necessary to 
assume sufficient critical mass and achieve impact. However, based on the most current 
information it seems it will reach only around EUR 1.2 billion of ESIF resources307 which 
represents about 15 percent of the global ceiling of EUR 8.5 billion as set out in the CPR. 
Part of the explanation of the lower uptake of the instruments relates to contextual changes. 
The scheme was introduced to address the hampered credit channel from banks to SMEs 
due to liquidity problems of the former, but according to one interviewee these have been 
less severe than expected. The banking legislation (i.e. recapitalisation) has had a lesser 
impact on liquidity than expected. Furthermore, the European Central Bank has started a 
programme of quantitative easing which has improved liquidity.308 Another important issue 
is that participation in the SME Initiative requires Member States to design a separate 
Operational Programmes which is a major undertaking. Lastly, the Initiative was introduced 
late in the regulatory process, meaning that many Member States had already begun the 
design and negotiation of Operational Programmes nationally which made introducing a new 
OP and re-allocating funding politically challenging.  
  
One of the challenges is the continued concern among Member States about losing control 
over their allocated ESIF funding by channelling funds back up to the EU level. They 
have also been uncertain about the added value of such channelling and on whether the 
funds that they allocate would actually be spent in their Member State/region and 
what would happen to the unspent funding. An additional difficulty for Member States 
in joining the initiative is they have a limited time remaining to opt-in (commitments 
have to be made before the end of 2016). Moreover, the scheme was introduced quite late 
in the regulatory process (autumn 2013), when many Member States were already in an 
advanced state of programming. The potential integration of the initiative into national 
programmes might be a challenge, as programming has already been largely completed and 
introducing changes may present difficulties (upon negotiation of the funding agreement, 
Member States would have to submit a request for amendment of the single dedicated 
national programme and reallocate the contribution to other programmes and priorities). 
Specific challenges related to each of the two instruments (referred to above) are also 
among potential drawbacks. 
 
Participation in the initiative is often a political decision taken at the state level rather than 
the MA. Considering the group of Member States that have signed up or that are potentially 
interested, a number of reasons for their participation could be hypothesised. First, some of 
the Member States have had challenges in terms of the absorption of funds through financial 
instruments in 2007-13, and the SME Initiative may be seen as a way to improve this. 
Related to this are capacity challenges in Member States such as Romania, Bulgaria and 
Malta. For smaller Member States like Malta, the initiative can also be seen as a way to 
achieve the necessary critical mass for the successful implementation of financial 
                                          
306  Internal European Parliament documentation. 
307  European Parliament (2015) 2014 Discharge to the Commission, Written Questions to Commission Cretu, 
hearing 7 December 2015, available at: https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/fc47d113-
8987-4ef8-ad2a-236a748f1783/EP%20Questionnaire%20Cretu.pdf. 
308  In March 2015, the ECB announced an expanded asset purchase programme. Asset purchases provide monetary 
stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They are further 
expected to ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper. Combined monthly 
SXUFKDVHVZLOODPRXQWWR¼ELOOLon. They are intended to continue until at least September 2016. The ECB will 
also buy bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and European institutions in the secondary 
market against central bank money, which the institutions that sold the securities can use to buy other assets 
and extend credit to the real economy. For more information, see the ECB website: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html. 
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instruments. On the other hand, these countries have also built up considerable capacity by 
implementing FIs for enterprises in the 2007-13 period. Finally, some of these Member 
States historically have a strong relationship with the EIB, which may also favour their 
participation (for example, Spain receives the highest proportion of EIB group loans). 
However, further research is needed to determine the exact motivations for participation and 
non-participation. 
 
6.4 FI-compass 
 
A new technical assistance platform ± fi-compass ± was introduced for the 2014-20 period. 
The platform will apply to all ESI Funds and is intended to provide common and 
fund-specific products related to FIs, covering the whole implementation cycle.309 
Funding for TA activities carried out by the EIB is provided by the Commission. 
There are two main strands to fi-compass in relation to its assistance to Member States and 
other stakeholders (e.g. financial intermediaries) (see Figure 17).  
 
The first is a horizontal strand, focusing on advisory services for all Member States 
and types of FIs (e.g. exchange of best practice, networking, training, guidance on 
common themes such as ex-ante assessments, public procurement and State aid). This is 
carried out by the EIB, and activities under this strand are initiated through the definition of 
a horizontal work programme (top-down approach). Such activities include the exchange of 
good practice and networking across Member States, as well as training sessions or 
methodological guidance on common themes such as ex-ante assessments, regulatory 
aspects concerning ESIF Policies, etc. It will also develop knowledge to support the 
development of FIs in sectors with high potential but limited experience in the ESIF policies 
framework, such as energy efficiency and renewable energies, research and innovation, 
social infrastructure and services.310 In other words, fi-compass is designed to support ESIF 
managing authorities, EaSI microfinance providers and other interested parties, by providing 
practical know-KRZDQGOHDUQLQJWRROVRQILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV7KHVHZLOO LQFOXGH³KRZ-WR´
manuals, factsheets for quick reference, e-learning modules, face-to-face training seminars 
and networking events. All products and services provided by fi-compass are publicly 
available at www.fi-compass.eu. 
 
The second strand covers multi-region assistance responding to stakeholder 
proposals. The projects that may receive an EU grant must benefit at least two managing 
authorities in at least two Member States. They must aim at assessing a possible use of FIs 
targeting development objectives or market failures that are shared by a number of regions. 
Another possibility for the managing authorities to receive technical assistance is bilateral 
assistance including ex-ante assessment for FIs. Bilateral assistance supports individual 
Member States and managing authorities intending to set up and implement FIs in their 
territory. However, Member States must use their own TA budgets for tasks such as the ex-
ante assessment or hiring a specialised body to assist the setting-up of a FI in their 
programme area.311 
 
                                          
309 For more information, see: https://www.fi-compass.eu/  
310 Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit.  
311 Ibid. 
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Figure 17:  Horizontal and multi-region assistance under fi-compass as compared 
to bilateral technical assistance 
 
Source: European Commission 
6.5 Off-the-shelf instruments 
 
Off-the-Shelf instruments are one of the innovations for the 2014-20 period. For FIs set up 
at national, regional, transnational or cross-border levels, managed by or under the 
responsibility of the managing authority, the CPR allows Member States to provide a 
ILQDQFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQWR), µFRPSO\LQJZLWKWKHVWDQGDUGWHUPVand conditions laid down by 
WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶ $UWLFOH D312 These terms and conditions provide a standard 
template for the implementation of FIs and make them ready to use ± the so-called 
µRII-the-VKHOI¶LQVWUXPHQWV. Such instruments have been developed to facilitate the design 
and management of the most commonly used types of FI supported by ESIF, in particular 
for specific sectors where FIs are expected to play an important role contributing to the 
Europe 2020 objectives,313 and enable their wider use in a more standardised way,314 
helping managing authorities to deliver faster and safer funds to the final recipients. 
 
Off-the-shelf instruments have been expected to extend the certainty and clarity of rules, 
WKXVUHGXFLQJFRPSOH[LW\DQGSURYLGLQJD µTXLFN-VWDUW¶PRGHO315 They are designed to deal 
with a range of compliance issues,316 including ensuring State aid compliance: their terms 
                                          
312  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013  op. cit. 
313  European Commission (2013a) Draft Standard terms and conditions for financial instruments pursuant to Article 
33(3)(a) of the CPR (2013). 
314  Ibid.  
315  Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
316  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
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and conditions are structured in such a way that either do not involve State aid at all, or do 
not require State aid notification and subsequent clearance from the European 
Commission317 (compatibility with State Aid rules). Complementarity of off-the-shelf 
instruments with some other FIs may also be noted.318 
 
An implementing act of September 2014319 (2014/964/EU) lays down rules concerning the 
standard terms and conditions for three types of off-the-shelf instruments: risk-sharing loan 
(RS Loan)320, a capped portfolio guarantee,321 and a loan for energy efficiency and 
renewable energies in the residential building sector (Renovation loan).322 Two more off-the-
shelf FIs ± for equity investments for SMEs and urban development ± are in preparation at 
time of writing (September 2015). It is envisaged that, depending on the different 
programmes and results of ex-ante assessments, additional off-the-shelf instruments may 
be developed by the Commission.323 
 
The EIB or EIF have no unique role in terms of implementing off-the-shelf 
instruments. However, the SME off-the-shelf products are based on EIF products 
used in the 2007-13 period. The CPR provides an option for a managing authority to entrust 
implementation tasks to the EIB (or other financial institutions) (Art.38 (4)(b)). However, 
the implementing act does not state any direct role for the EIB.  
 
The EIB¶s website refers to the off-the-shelf option, stipulated in the CPR, noting that the 
(,%¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKPDQDJLQJIXQGVIRUXUEDQGHYHORSPHQWDQG60(ILQDQFLQJOHDYHVLW
µSHUIHFWO\ SRVLWLRQHG WR DVVXPH WKH UROH RI )XQG0DQDJHU¶324 In its Corporate Operational 
Plan 2014-2016,325 the EIF mentions among its medium-term objectives one relating to 
maintaining cooperation with the Commission0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGUHJLRQVDQGZRUNLQJµRQ
the effective deployment of financial instruments, including off-the-shelf and tailor-made 
SURGXFWVRUOHYHUDJHGKROGLQJIXQGVLQWKHFRQWH[WRI(85HJLRQDO3ROLF\¶326 
 
Early indications are that the uptake of the off-the-shelf instruments has been 
lower than initially expected. Many MAs in the 2007-13 period have already gained 
considerable experience with the implementation of FIs and have established the structures 
needed to operate them. Now they have the necessary mechanisms in place, which provide 
a workable model. Therefore, the off-the-shelf instruments appear not as valuable as they 
would have been in 2007-13.327 Moreover, certain concerns remain over the ability of the 
off-the-shelf instruments to resolve procurement and State aid issues. For example, 
                                          
317  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
318  For example, uncapped guarantees and securitisation instruments to support SMEs, not foreseen by off-the-shelf 
instruments, are envisaged under the SME Initiative. Also, the SME Initiative and the off-the-shelf instruments 
may be seen complementary as the latter address the SMEV¶QHHGVDWDJLYHQUHJLRQDOOHYHO 
319  Commission Implementing Regulation No. 964/2014 op. cit. 
320  Provides new loans to SMEs at preferential conditions (interest rate/collateral reduction) by providing financial 
intermediaries with funding contributions and credit risk-sharing. The RS loan is seen as a potentially effective 
way of supporting SMEs in a context of limited availability of funding or relatively little risk-appetite of the 
financial intermediaries for certain sectors or type of SMEs. 
321  Aims to µSURYLGHDQ LQFHQWLYHWR ILQDQFLDO LQWHUPHGLDULHV WR LQFUHDVH OHQGLQJWR60(VFRYHUHGE\8QLRQ IXQGHG
JXDUDQWHHV¶,WVHHNVWRDGGUHVVWKHH[LVWLQJJDSLQWKHGHEWPDUNHWIRU60(VVXSSRUWLQJQHZORDQVE\SURYLGLQJ
credit risk coverage up to a certain limiWDOORZLQJWKHILQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDU\WRIDFLOLWDWH60(V¶DFFHVVWRILQDQFH 
322  Aims to incentivise the energy-saving potential arising from the renovation of residential buildings. It offer loans 
at preferential conditions to natural and legal persons or independent professionals owning premises in order to 
invest in renewable or energy-HIILFLHQWDVVHWVLQXQGHUWDNLQJEXLOGLQJUHQRYDWLRQSURMHFWV/LWKXDQLD¶VODUJH-scale 
programme to improve home energy efficiency based on a combination of grants, technical assistance and loans 
VHUYHGDVDQLQVSLUDWLRQIRUWKHµ5HQRYDWLRQ/RDQ¶. 
323  Commission Implementing Regulation No. 964/2014 op. cit. 
324  For more information, see: http://www.eib.org/products/blending/esif/eib-role-in-2014-2020/index.htm  
325  EIF (2013a) EIF Corporate Operational Plan 2014-2016, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg. 
326  Ibid.  
327  Wishlade and Michie (2015) op. cit. 
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anecdotally, it would seem that many MAs had anticipated that off-the-shelf instruments 
would provide more creative solutions to State aid compliance than use of the de minimis 
Regulation. Some regard de minimis as administratively cumbersome and it is perhaps 
surprising that off-the-shelf instruments did not make use of the General Block Exemption 
Regulation. ,QDGGLWLRQWKHUHODWLYHIOH[LELOLW\SURYLGHGE\WKHµRII-the-VKHOI¶PRGHOVPD\EH
insufficient, and it is possible that, given regional particularities, they are not likely to be 
applicable in all scenarios328 and may conflict with local needs, preferences and regulations 
of Member States.329 Hence ex-ante assessments remain an obligation in order to determine 
the suitability, appropriate design and financial parameters of FIs.  
 
6.6 European Fund for Strategic Investments 
 
In November 2014, a new Investment Plan for Europe was announced. The plan consists of 
three mutually reinforcing strands:330 
 
x EUR 315 billion in additional investment over the next three years; 
x targeted initiatives to make sure that this extra investment meets the needs of the 
real economy; and 
x greater regulatory predictability and removal of barriers to investment. 
The first two strands of the Investment Plan are a joint undertaking between the 
Commission and the EIB. The Commission has made EUR 16 billion available, and the EIB 
has provided an additional ¼5 billion. The funds will in principle be used to allow the EIB to 
invest in higher-risk projects (special activities). The EIB is a risk-averse lender and highly 
protective of its AAA status. This AAA rating allows the Bank to facilitate lower financing 
costs to its borrowers. However, some commentators331 and interviewees for this study 
consider that the EIB should be encouraged to finance projects that have potentially higher 
rewards but also an increased risk profile. The EIB, on the other hand is concerned that a 
project portfolio with higher-risk projects could jeopardise this status. The EFSI provides a 
JXDUDQWHH IRU WKH(,% WRH[WHQG LWV µVSHFLDODFWLYLWLHV¶SRUWIROLR7KH IXQGV that provide the 
guarantees are derived from re-allocated resources (CEF and Horizon 2020). The 
Commission expects that EUR 21 billion will leverage funding from other investors and 
reaching a ratio of 1:15 which, it argues, based on past experience, is a conservative 
estimate.   
 
In order to mobilise EUR 315 billion at the EU level, a new European Fund for Strategic 
Investment332 is to provide risk support for long-term investments. Among other goals, the 
plan aims to improve the effective use of ESI Funds and calls on Member States to increase 
the use of FIs in key investment areas such as SME support, energy efficiency, ICT, 
transport and R&D support. In practical terms, the Plan proposes a doubling of the use of 
ESI Funds under FIs thus reaching an overall amount of ¼ELOOLRQFRPPLWWHGWR),s, which 
LVHVWLPDWHGWRKDYHDGLUHFWOHYHUDJHHIIHFWRIDURXQG¼-70 billion. 
 
                                          
328 Núñez Ferrer et al. (2012) op. cit. 
329 Michie and Wishlade (2011) op. cit. 
330 European Communion (2014i) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and 
the European Investment Bank, An Investment Plan for Europe, available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0903&from=EN   
331 European Parliament  (2013b) op. cit. 
332 Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European 
Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project 
Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No. 1291/2013 and (EU) No. 1316/2013 ² the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments. 
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The EFSI is LQWHQGHGWRSURYLGHIOH[LELOLW\WRDOORZIRU0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVGLUHFWO\
or via their National Promotional Banks. They can contribute either at the level of projects, 
financial instruments or investment platforms and increase the risk-bearing capacity 
(complementing the contributions by the EU budget and the EIB) of investment and provide 
increased access to finance for particularly SMEs and mid-cap companies. 
 
Investment platforms,333 which aim to bring together co-investors, public authorities, 
experts, education, training and research institutions, the relevant social partners and 
representatives of the civil society and other relevant actors at Union, national and regional 
levels, are introduced at different levels: 
 
x national or sub-national platforms that group together several investment projects on 
the territory of a given Member State; 
x multi-country or regional platforms that group together partners from several 
Member States or third countries interested in projects in a given geographic area; 
x thematic platforms that group together investment projects in a given sector. 
Furthermore, a European Investment Project Portal (EIPP) has been set up to improve 
LQYHVWRUV¶ NQRZOHGJH RI H[LVWLQJ DQG SRWHQWLDO IXWXUH SURMHFWV 7KH ODFN RI FUHGLEOH DQG
transparent information about projects is currently a major barrier to investment. However, 
the project pipeline does not guarantee that these projects will be financed by EFSI. The 
pipeline will be regularly updated so that investors have reliable and current information to 
take investment decisions. A joint Commission-EIB Investment Task Force has already 
identified some 2,000 potential projects worth EUR 1.3 trillion.334 The Task Force focused on 
projects in key growth-enhancing areas: knowledge, innovation and the digital economy; 
energy union; transport infrastructure; social infrastructure; and natural resources and the 
environment. Any project identified by the Task Force will have to be assessed thoroughly 
before being considered for finance. There are no automatic financing commitments by the 
European Commission or the EIB for projects identified by the Task Force, and these 
projects are not entitled to preferred access to national or European resources. The 
identification of projects by the Task Force is considered a first step towards creating a 
forward-looking and transparent pipeline of investable projects. This is regarded as an 
essential measure to restore confidence and encourage investors to invest and build 
expertise in Europe.335 
 
The EIB is playing an important role in delivering EFSI336 and is responsible for 
implementing the instrument. The infrastructure and innovation window is managed by 
the EIB and the SME window by the EIF.337  
 
 
 
                                          
333 µ,QYHVWPHQW SODWIRUPV¶ DUH VSHFLDO-purpose vehicles, managed accounts, contract-based co-financing or risk-
sharing arrangements or arrangements established by any other means by which entities channel a financial 
contribution in order to finance a number of investment projects (Art. 2, 2015/1017). 
334 European Commission (2015e) 'HOLYHU\RI¼ELOOLRQ,QYHVWPHQW3ODQRQWUDFN&RPPLVVLRQSUHVHQWVODZ for 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
3222_en.htm. 
335 European Commission (2014g) Investment Offensive for Europe: EU Task Force identifies 2,000 potential 
SURMHFWVZRUWK¼WULOOLRQ, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2480_en.htm. 
336 European Commission (2015f) The European Fund for Strategic Investment Fact Sheet, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-3223_en.htm. 
337 Siouliou M, Field B, Kazamaki-Ottersten and Debande O (forthcoming) Preliminary Observations on the regional 
dimension of the Investment Plan for Europe, European Structural and Investment Funds Journal, paper also 
presented at Annual Conference on ESI Funds: Implementation, Management & Control of ESI Funds 2014-
2020, 19±20 November 2015, Brussels. 
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With respect to governance, as a contributor to the EFSI, the EIB has a representative on 
the Steering Board. As long as the only contributors to the EFSI are the Union and the 
EIB, all decisions in the Steering Board will be taken by consensus. When other contributors 
join the Fund, the number and votes will remain proportionate to the contributions and 
decisions will be taken by simple majority, if no consensus can be found. No decision can be 
adopted if the Commission or the EIB votes against it. An Investment Committee is 
accountable to the Steering Board with responsibility to vet specific projects and decide 
which will receive EFSI support, without any geographic or sectoral quotas. The Committee 
consists of eight independent market experts and a Managing Director338 and a deputy 
Managing Director in charge of the day-to-day management of the EFSI and chair of the 
Investment Committee. Since the EFSI is operating with the involvement of the EIB, any 
pURMHFW VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH ()6, ZLOO DOVR UHTXLUH DSSURYDO DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH (,%¶V UHJXODU
procedures.  
 
Furthermore, a European Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH) is being set up. This Hub 
provides services partly on the PIU/TA model in SPLs as well as the JASPERS model in 
relation to large projects. The EIAH provides support to lenders that are facing 
implementation challenges and aims to assist them with the implementation of EFSI loans. 
At the moment, the EIAH has EUR 20 million funding annually, but there are questions 
regarding whether this is sufficient given the higher risk levels involved in EFSI projects. 
Table 14 sets out the key differences between the EFSI and the ESIF which, despite the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWDU\QDWXUHRIWKHWZRLQVWUuments, some authors 
have highlighted some fundamental issues:339 
 
x the objective of EFSI is efficiency rather than equity, the main concern is to fund the 
most suitable projects without primary concern for regional disparities (there are no 
territorial pre-allocations); 
x concerns that ESIF funding will be crowded out by EFSI; and 
x potential for conflict between applicable rules due to different legal frameworks.340 
  
                                          
338 A former vice president of the EIB and member of the Management Committee, Wilhelm Molterer, has been 
appointed as the Managing Director. 
339 Mendez C and Bachtler J (2015) Permanent revolution in Cohesion Policy: restarting the reform debate, 
European Policy Research Paper No.93, ,European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
340 European Court of Auditors (2015) Opinion No. 11/2015 (pursuant to Article 287(4) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the European Fund for Strategic Investments and amending Regulations (EU) No. 1291/2013 and 
(EU) No. 1316/2013, Luxembourg. 
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Table 14: Similarities and differences between the EFSI and the ESIF 
 EFSI ESIF 
Objectives 
x To resolve difficulties in 
financing and implementing 
strategic, transformative and 
productive investments with 
high economic, environmental 
and societal added value 
contributing to achieving EU 
objectives. 
x Strengthening economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, particularly 
reducing disparities and 
backwardness of less-developed 
regions. 
x Contributing to Europe 2020 
objectives. 
Funding 
x EUR 16 billion (and EUR 5 
billion from the EIB) guarantee 
from the EU budget) with an 
expected leverage of 15 times 
(EUR 315 billion of total 
investments). 
x EUR 351.8 billion (dedicated EU 
budget heading). 
Geographical 
targeting 
x No geographical targeting / 
pre-allocations. 
x Concentration on less-developed 
countries/regions through pre-
allocated envelopes. 
Thematic 
targeting 
x No thematic pre-
allocations/ring-fencing, 
although EUR 5 billion (out of 
EUR 21 billion) reserved for 
SMEs. 
x Strategic infrastructure 
(including digital, transport 
and energy, education, 
research, development and 
innovation, renewable energy 
and resource efficiency) and 
support for smaller businesses 
and midcap companies. 
x Ring-fencing of allocations to 
thematic objectives and investment 
priorities. 
x 11 thematic objectives (RTDI, ICT, 
SMEs, low-carbon economy, 
climate change, environment and 
energy, transport, social inclusion, 
education, training, employment, 
public administration efficiency).  
Financial 
instruments 
x Loans, guarantees, equity and 
venture capital. 
x Non-reimbursable grants mainly 
(>75 percent).  
x Financial instruments (guarantees, 
loans, equity and venture capital) 
to represent EUR 23 billion of 
funding in 2014-20.341 
Forms of 
assistance 
x Projects (of high-risk nature), 
financial instruments and/or 
investment platforms 
x National and regional programmes. 
x Major projects (> EUR 50m, funded 
by ERDF/CF and subject to 
Commission decision). 
Management 
x Centralised management by 
EIB with Steering Board 
including EIB and Commission 
representation. 
x Project selection by EU-level 
Investment Committee of 
experts. 
x Shared management between 
Commission, Member States and 
regions. 
x Programme management and 
project selection by national and 
regional managing authorities and 
implementing bodies. 
Timeframe 
x 3 years (2015-18) with option 
for extension. 
x 7 years (2014-20). 
Source: adapted from Mendez C and Bachtler J (2015) Permanent revolution in Cohesion Policy: restarting the 
reform debate, European Policy Research Paper No.93, ,European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow 
                                          
341 European Commission (2014h) Effectiveness and Added Value of Cohesion Policy, Non-paper assessing the 
implementation of the reform in the programming for cohesion policy 2014-2020, available on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/regi/dv/implementationeffectivenescp_/imple
mentationeffectivenescp_en.pdf. 
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The role of the EIB in EFSI means that it has an increased role in the implementation of the 
Community budget (although the Community budget consists only of a guarantee). This 
underlines the importance of stronger accountability, including towards the European 
Parliament. This has been recognised by MEPs, who have advocated measures for 
accountability transparency and visibility of the EFSI. As part of the legislative process, MEPs 
called for a high-quality governance and selection process as well as a 
democratically accountable monitoring and evaluation framework, which should be 
as transparent as possible in setting out the criteria to be used to determine the projects 
deemed suitable for inclusion in the pipeline.342 
 
The Regulation343 foresees extensive rules that aim to ensure accountability of the EFSI to 
the European Parliament. Monitoring is structured around two key principles: 
 
x Reporting: The EIB will report (i) semi-annually to the Commission and (ii) annually 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the EIB financing and investment 
operations under the Regulation. The report shall be made public. The Commission 
will also report to the European Parliament on the application of the Regulation. The 
reporting should include a description of the projects where the support of the 
European Structural and Investment Funds is combined with the support of the 
EFSI.344 
x Accountability: The European Parliament will have the right to organise, at any 
time, hearings with the Managing Director of the EFSI on the performance of the 
latter. The Managing Director will also have a legal obligation to reply swiftly ± orally 
or in writing ± to questions addressed by the European Parliament. The European 
Parliament can also request reporting by the Commission. 
 
The Court of Auditors will apply its usual rules and procedures for auditing the EU guarantee 
and the payments and recoveries that are attributable to the general Budget of the Union. 
Its existing role as regards the auditing of the activity of the EIB (detailed in a tripartite 
agreement between the EIB, the Court and the Commission) remains unchanged (see 
Section 4.1).  
 
There are several issues concerning the objectives of EFSI that have prompted debate. First, 
considering that the EU budgetary commitment to EFSI derives from reallocated resources 
(CEF and Horizon 2020), there are questions about how much additional investment is 
achieved through EFSI. On the other hand, EFSI has been allowed to frontload the delivery 
of some of multi-annual programmes (see SME window in EFSI). Second, there are concerns 
based on the 2007-13 experiences with FIs in Structural Funds programmes that a 1:15 
leverage effect seems unrealistic, particularly since the ECA found that FIs in Cohesion Policy 
had achieved a leverage of 2.75 at best (see Section 3.5.1). However, such interpretations 
may point to a misunderstanding; national and regional mandates such as the ones 
supported by Cohesion Policy are lower than central mandates and therefore difficult to 
compare. Lastly, from an economic theory perspective, there are questions whether a 1:15 
leverage represents an appropriate and additional use of public funding. Such a large 
leverage effect seems to suggest that the investment would probably have happened 
without EU funding commitments.  
 
 
                                          
342 European Parliament (2015a) op. cit. 
343 Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 op cit. 
344 Ibid., Article 16.2(f). 
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The results from the survey conducted for this study provide an initial picture of the 
expected impact in Member States. The expected results of EFSI vary considerably. In some 
Member States, the current expectation is that it will not have a major impact (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and Sweden). Others report that it is too early to make 
predictions (Belgium, Netherlands, Latvia and Poland). However, there are a number of 
Member States that expect significant benefits; officials in these countries cited the 
following.  
 
x Increase of private sector investment (France, Finland and Poland); 
x attract EFSI financing to leverage the EU Cohesion Policy funds (Lithuania);  
x additional infrastructure and energy efficiency investments (Slovenia); 
x opportunity to develop large scale and more ambitious projects either directly or 
indirectly affecting ESIF programmes (UK, Poland and Portugal) but also potential 
difficulties in terms of losing control over project (UK); and 
x use of EFSI to mitigate the risk absorption of financial instruments to be created 
under the 2014-20 Operational Programme (Lithuania). 
 
6.7 Strategic coherence, thematic concentration and result 
orientation 
 
The 2014-20 Cohesion Policy framework is characterised by several key principles. Elements 
such as strategic coherence, result orientation and thematic concentration aim to increase 
the results of Cohesion Policy funding in the 2014-20 period. These changes have affected 
all Cohesion Policy stakeholders including the EIB. Table 15 provides a summary of the ways 
in which strategic coherence, result orientation and thematic concentration have a potential 
impact on EIB activities in Cohesion Policy. 
 
Strategic coherence is a central element of the 2013 reform of Cohesion Policy for the 
2014-20 period. The aim is to ensure a more coordinated, coherent and integrated approach 
to programming and implementation of the ESI Funds through a stronger alignment with EU 
objectives and governance processes, harmonisation of approaches across policy areas with 
binding provisions in the CPR for all the ESI Funds, and a Common Strategic Framework 
(CSF) with greater scope for synergies across the Funds and with other EU financing 
instruments.345 
 
Partnership Agreements are a main feature of strategic coherence. By contrast, the National 
Strategic Reference Framework in the 2007-13 period placed less emphasis on multi-Fund 
coordination. Article 27(5)(b) of the General Regulation specified only that Member States 
ZHUH UHTXLUHG WR SURYLGH ZKHUH UHOHYDQW µLQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH PHFKDQLVPV IRU HQVXULQJ
coordination between operational programmes... and the EAFRD, the EFF and the 
interventions of the EIB DQGRIRWKHUH[LVWLQJILQDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV¶. The EIB can also be part 
of the partnership in the drafting of OPs. The EIB may also be part of the partnership by 
being consulted on the OPs. Article 31 of the CPR provides the provisions for EIB, at the 
request of the Member State to participate in the preparation of Partnership Agreement as 
well as in activities relating to the preparation of operations, in particular major projects, 
financial instruments and Private Public Partnerships (PPP). The Commission may also 
consult the EIB prior to the adoption of Partnership Agreements or Operational Programmes. 
The extent to which the EIB participated in Partnership Agreement discussions and drafting 
of OPs is not yet known. 
                                          
345 European Parliament (2015c) Strategic coherence of Cohesion Policy: comparison of the 2007-13 and 2014-20 
programming periods, study for European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development. 
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The result-orientation is set to reverse the input-driven programming logic to focus on 
desired change and how best to achieve it.346 Appraisal and selection procedures are a main 
feature of this approach. The CPR states WKDW µas regards the selection of operations, the 
managing authority shall draw up and, once approved, apply appropriate selection 
procedures and criteria that ensure the contribution of operations to the achievement of the 
specific objectives and results of the relevant priority¶.347 This is particularly important for 
LPSURYLQJ µHYDOXDELOLW\¶RIDFWLYLWLHVVRPHRIZKLFKKDYHEHHQHQFRXQWHUHG LQFKDSWHURI
this study. 
 
Increasing the use of FIs is an integral part of this approach. For example, Commissioner 
Corina &UHĠX UHJDUGV),VDVµDSURPLVLQJWRROIRUWKHIXWXUHRIUHJLRQDOSROLF\¶DQGstrongly 
encourage[s] Member States to double their use of financial instruments during the 2014-
2020 budgetary period¶.348 As stated in Section 3.2.1, the European Parliament also 
µUecognises the leverage effect of new financial instruments and their potential to mobilise 
investment, supports increased financing from credit in general¶, and has called for µthe use 
of revolving financial instruments to be extended to those areas eligible for funding which 
prove to be appropriate¶349 In a recent Opinion on the EIB Annual Report 2014, the REGI 
&RPPLWWHH FDOOHG µRQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ DQG WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WR PDNH IXOO XVH RI WKH
possibilities afforded by Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 to increase the use of the financial 
instruments, where appropriate, for the period up to 2020 and calls on the EIB to further 
SURPRWH LWV LQVWUXPHQWV DQG WKH EHQHILFLDULHV¶ JRRG SUDFWLFHV LQ RUGHU WR HQKDQFH WKHLU
DWWUDFWLYHQHVV¶350  
 
However, the results-orientation and the associated performance framework also imply a 
different way of measuring results. The specific ex-ante assessment requirement for FIs 
contained in the CPR Regulation is a clear indication of the relevance given to performance 
assessment in 2014-20. Furthermore, the OP ex-ante evaluation has to include a rationale 
for the form of support proposed, and MAs can decide to carry out FI-specific evaluations.  
 
MAs have to report on the operations comprising FIs (as an annex to the annual 
implementation report), and for each FI on its achievement of the indicators of the priority 
or measure concerned. As a consequence, the EIB has to adapt its performance 
measurement framework for FIs, particularly those concerned with assessing additionality 
and wider programme and portfolio benefits.351 The EIB intends to dovetail the 
measurement effort into the wider OP evaluations but has also developed its own 
methodologies for assessing performance of FIs. 
 
                                          
346  Mendez C, Kah S and Bachtler J (2012) The Promise and Perils of the Performance Turn in EU Cohesion Policy, 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper No. 31(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/downloads/IQNet_Reports%28Public%29/Thematic%20Paper_31%282%29.
pdf 
347  Regulations (EU) No. 1303/2013 op. cit., Art. 125, 3(a)(i). 
348  &UH ?X&EFinancial instruments are a promising tool for the future of Regional Policy, Blog post European 
Commission, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/cretu/blog/financial-instruments-are-
promising-tool-future-regional-policy_en  
349  European Parliament (2011a) op cit. 
350  European Parliament (2015a) Opinion of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on 
Budgetary Control on the European Investment Bank (EIB) ± Annual Report 2014 (2015/2127(INI)), European 
Parliament, Brussels. 
351  European Commission and EIB (2013) Methodologies for Assessing Social and Economic Performance in 
JESSICA, available at: http://www.eib.org/attachments/documents/jessica_assessing_socio_economic_ 
performance_en.pdf  
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Part of the rationale is to present urban development investments (i.e. JESSICA type 
operations) as µimpact investments¶352 aiming to deliver acceptable financial returns but also 
a range of measurable non-financial impacts. These benefits may include:353 
x increasing co-investment opportunities ± presenting urban development 
operations as impact investments with measurable socio-economic outcomes may 
attract other investors (private and public) with the same interest in bringing about 
durable impacts on sustainable urban development, such as investors with strong 
attachment to particular places or with ethical considerations; and 
x improving performance measurement practices ± MAs and UDF managers in 
urban development FIs can learn from best practices in the µimpact investment 
industry¶ ± and vice-versa. 
The Cohesion Policy framework could therefore be beneficial within the context of the 
development of a urban development socio-economic measurement framework.  
 
Another defining characteristic of Cohesion Policy in the 2014-20 period is greater thematic 
concentration on Europe 2020 objectives, building on the realignment of Cohesion Policy 
with the Lisbon agenda in the 2007-13 period. There is a significant increase in 
ERDF/Cohesion Fund allocations to Thematic Objectives 1-4 (RTDI, ICT, SME 
Competitiveness and Low-Carbon Economy), while infrastructure investment is less 
prominent compared to 2007-13.354  
 
In 2014-20 period, FIs can be used for all thematic objectives. At the same time, thematic 
concentration means that the focus of Operational Programmes is narrower with potentially 
a more limited range of projects eligible for funding. For FIs, this means that there are 
potentially fewer final recipients. 
 
Table 15:  Key horizontal features of the 2014-20 Cohesion Policy framework and 
their impact for the EIB 
 Role of the EIB  
Effectiveness of EIB 
activities 
Accountability, 
transparency and 
visibility of EIB 
activities 
Strategic 
coherence 
- Increased role 
for the EIB in 
Partnership 
Agreement 
process355 
- Possibility to identify 
complementarities and 
synergies at an early 
stage 
- Increased involvement in 
coordination mechanism at 
national level which 
LPSURYHVWKH%DQN¶V
visibility 
Result 
orientation 
- Greater use of 
FIs 
- FIs subject to 
ex-ante 
assessments  
- clearer rules enable 
better combination of FIs 
with other forms of 
support  
- Increase co-investment 
opportunities 
- Improve measurement 
practices to improve 
reporting of results 
 
Thematic 
concentration 
- FIs can be used 
for all thematic 
objectives 
- Potentially Less 
flexibility which projects 
can be funded due to 
more focussed 
programmes 
 
Source: EPRC Research 
 
                                          
352  Impact investments refers to investment made into activities with the intention to generate a measurable, 
beneficial social or environmental impact alongside a financial return. 
353  European Commission and EIB (2013) op. cit. 
354 European Parliament (2015c) op. cit. 
355 See Common Provisions Regulations, article 31 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis and assessment of how 
the EIB contributes to the achievement of Cohesion Policy objectives. While the review 
HQFRPSDVVHVDOORIWKH(,%¶VPDLQUROHVWKHIRFXVLVSDUWLFXODUO\RQFIs which have become 
increasingly important for the implementation of Cohesion Policy. The analysis has focused 
on five key elements: the role of EIB in the implementation of Cohesion Policy; the 
effectiveness and efficiency of EIB activities in Cohesion Policy; accountability, transparency 
and visibility of EIB activities; relationships between EU institutions and the EIB; and future 
expectations. This final section draws together the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
7.1.1 Role of the EIB  
The role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy expanded rapidly during the 2007-13 
programme period. It now undertakes activities and delivers products and services that 
are intended to provide both financial and non-financial added value in support of EU policy 
objectives. In some cases, these roles were anticipated, whereas in others they evolved in 
response to new policy priorities and demands.  
 
The original remit of the EIB in relation to Cohesion Policy was to provide finance for 
economic development projects. It continues to fulfil this role by providing direct loans, 
framework loans, intermediated loans and global loans. 7KH(,%¶VOHQGLQJWRVXSSRUWsocial 
and economic cohesion objectives of the EU amounted to EUR 147 billion in 2007-13. 
Furthermore, through its Structural Programme Loans (SPLs) facility, the EIB makes 
available investment programmes made up of projects from one or more OPs. 
 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ mandate management means that it has taken an 
important step in terms of assuming indirect responsibility over the implementation of 
Cohesion Policy budget. However, under the shared management model final responsibility 
for implementation of Cohesion Policy lies with the Member State and the Commission. 
 
Over time, WKH(,%¶VUROH has expanded to include a wide range of analytical and advisory 
services as well as capacity-building activities. Of particular importance in the 2007-13 
period was the (,% DQG (,)¶V roles LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW DQG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI µSpecial 
6XSSRUW,QVWUXPHQWV¶JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City 
Areas) ± a TA initiative to help managing authorities set up investment funds supporting 
sustainable urban development. The JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to 
Medium Enterprises) initiative offered EU Member States TA assistance, through their 
national or regional managing authorities, the opportunity to explore possibilities of using 
part of their EU Structural Funds to finance small and medium-sized enterprises by means of 
equity, loans or guarantees. The EIB and EIF were involved by: 
 
x advising and assisting national, regional and local authorities in implementing 
JESSICA and JEREMIE initiatives; and 
x promoting the use of FIs and best practice across Europe. 
JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions) was a joint initiative by 
the Commission (DG REGIO), EIB and EBRD356 to assist beneficiary countries (principally the 
new Member States and acceding countries of the EU) to absorb EU Structural and Cohesion 
                                          
356 Between July 2008 and December 2013, KfW Bankengruppe was also a partner of JASPERS. 
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Funds over the 2007-13 period. JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions) 
was an EU initiative managed by EIF in the 2007-13 period to help non-bank microfinance 
institutions to scale up their operations and maximise the impact of microfinance products 
RQPLFURHQWHUSULVHV¶GHYHORSPHQWDQGXQHPSOR\PHQWUHGXFWLRQZLWKLQWKH(XURSHDQ Union. 
In both the JASPERS and JASMINE initiatives, the EIB and EIF provided advisory and 
analytical services. Furthermore, the EIB and EIF could act as holding fund manager of 
financial instruments for enterprises and urban development when requested by Member 
States or managing authorities. This role meant that the EIB and EIF have increased their 
responsibilities in terms of implementing Cohesion Policy funds. 
 
Additionally, outside the formal Cohesion Policy framework, the EIB provides a wider range 
of services and products to achieve Europe 2020 goals (COSME, INNOVFIN and Connecting 
Europe Facility). These instruments are complementary and contribute to Cohesion Policy 
objectives.  
7.1.2 Effectiveness and efficiency 
The EIB activities are generally regarded as making a significant contribution to 
Cohesion Policy objectives and have a high level of added value and 
complementarity. Member States generally consider the activities of the EIB to be 
effective in terms of absorption, generating relevant projects and results. Member States 
identified access to finance, analytical support and technical know-how as key areas in which 
the EIB contributed to Cohesion Policy implementation. Complex rules and regulations, high 
management fees and high costs of HF management were considered to be the main 
challenges when engaging with the EIB. 
 
$V WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ LQFUHDVHV WKHUH LV D QHHG IRU PRUH LQVLJKW LQWR Whe 
effectiveness of its different activities. Evaluations of JEREMIE and JESSICA provide evidence 
of the positive contribution of EIB and EIF advisory and analytical services and their 
related operations to build capacity for implementing Cohesion Policy, but the 
services have been fragmented across the EIB and EIF. The introduction of a more 
centralised advisory service in the form of fi-compass is therefore welcomed. The 
(,%¶V EOHQGLQJ DFWLYLWLHV DUH RIWHQ DVVHVVHG DQG UHSRUWHG DV SDUW RI LWV RYHUDOO OHnding 
portfolio. However, its specific contribution to - and relation with - Cohesion Policy 
programmes and projects are unclear. Its role in mandate management means that 
the EIB has indirect responsibility (through managing authorities) for the 
implementation of Cohesion Policy instruments, but this is still a relatively new role for 
the EIB and the currently available data only provide only limited insights into the 
comparative performance of HFs managed by the EIB relative to those managed by other 
institutions.  
 
The increased role of the EIB also presents considerable challenges in terms of the 
monitoring and control of its operations. As the EIB workload increases, questions have been 
raised on whether it should adopt a more programme-based approach rather than a 
project-based approach in terms of monitoring its lending activities. To an extent, 
such a shift has already taken place, and the EIB has adapted to the new circumstances. For 
example, its Structural Programme Lending provides framework loans that can cover a 
whole programme period. A further integration of this programme approach for other 
activities would bring EIB investments more into line with the implementation of Cohesion 
Policy. 
 
&RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ KDV EHFRPH WKH (8¶VPDLQ LQYHVWPHQW SROLFy, increasingly focused on the 
(8¶V RYHUDOO economic objectives. The EIB is a natural partner in supporting these 
goals. However, the EIB can be characterised as a risk-averse organisation. Its AAA rating 
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is the foundation of its investment strategy. There have been concerns that the EIB is too 
risk-averse and that necessary investments to improve the sluggish European economic 
growth rate are not being supported. The EFSI and the EUR 8 billion guarantee provided by 
the Community budget are an attempt to increase investment in higher-risk projects. 
7.1.3 Accountability, transparency and visibility 
The dual role of the EIB (public institution and investment bank) can lead to ambiguity in 
terms of its accountability, transparency and visibility. However, over the past five years 
major efforts have been made to improve its accountability framework and 
transparency policy, particularly by providing more information. Innovations such as 
dedicated sub-reports on themes such as SMEs or external affairs are regarded as an 
important improvement LQ WHUPV RI (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR VFUXWLQLVH WKH (,%¶V
activities.  
The overall conclusion from the research for this study is that most Member States regard 
EIB activities as accountable, transparent and visible. However, in a few Member 
States, EIB involvement was not rated positively. Many of the issues noted by respondents 
related to gaps or uncertainties in the legal framework for implementing FIs and the lack of 
guidance ± which are not solely due to the EIB.  
 
In 2007-13, there were major drawbacks in reporting and monitoring the performance of 
FIs. As the EIB has a major role in terms of providing advisory/analytical and 
mandate management services for FIs, it has a significant role to play in terms of 
improving the situation. The CPR lays down new and more detailed requirements for 
monitoring FIs. However, the first reporting round will not occur until 2016. Although the 
framework for reporting has been strengthened, it remains to be seen whether the quality of 
data that is returned will improve and whether issues around data availability and reliability 
are resolved. 
 
7KH (,%¶V UROH KDV LQFUHDVHG PRVW LQ WKH DUHD RI ),V DQG DVVRFLDWHG DGYLVRU\
services. However, in financial terms this still only represents a small proportion of its 
activities when compared with its overall (b)lending activities in Cohesion Policy. Curiously, 
despite this being the longest-standing involvement of the EIB in Cohesion Policy, it is 
probably least well understood in terms of its overall contribution to the Policy with 
relatively little information available. Some information is included in annual reports but is 
limited to WKH %DQN¶V FRQWULEXWLRQV to its economic convergence objectives. It does not 
SURYLGHDFOHDUSLFWXUHRIWKH(,%¶VGLfferent instruments where they are used or the extent 
to which they contribute and are complementary to Cohesion Policy funding. 
The dual role of the EIB in providing advisory and also mandate management services can 
be perceived as a conflict of interest. The Bank carries out the ex-ante assessment or 
evaluation whilst at the same time it is a prospected HF manager. The Bank has taken a 
number of steps to mitigate this risk, most significantly by centralising all advisory services 
in one unit, fi-compass. Nevertheless, there are still questions about a potential conflict 
of interests. 
7.1.4 Inter-institutional relationships 
Over the 2007-13 programme period, a process of learning has taken place at the 
institutional level. The introduction of FIs and the associated increased role of the 
EIB represent a paradigm shift in the implementation of Cohesion Policy. Although 
FIs still represent a relatively small part of the overall Cohesion Policy budget, there is 
strong support for increasing their use. The 2007-13 period represented a steep learning 
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curve on the part of the EIB and the Commission. The two institutions have different 
cultures which sometimes complement each other but have also been the cause of 
friction. Particularly through the introduction of FIs, EIB activities have become more 
dependent on Cohesion Policy regulation, which in 2007-13 were regarded as a significant 
constraint. Understanding the policy and legal context and reallocating resources to its 
advisory and mandate management services required considerable effort on the part of the 
EIB. 
For the Commission (DG REGIO), the shift from an implementation culture based on grants 
to financial instruments has also been challenging. Understandably, there has been a 
reliance on the technical expertise and know-how of the EIB. However, this has 
meant that the implications of decisions and the possibilities of implementation have not 
always been fully understood. The Commission has had to adjust to this context at a time of 
considerable budget and resource constraints.  
The increased role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy has implications for the role of the 
European Parliament and, in particular, the REGI Committee in terms of 
VFUXWLQLVLQJWKH%DQN¶VDFWLYLWLHV. There is widespread recognition that the EIB makes a 
VLJQLILFDQW FRQWULEXWLRQ WR (XURSH¶V *URZWK $JHQGD LQ JHQHUDO DQG &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\
specifically, but the full implications of increased EIB involvement are not understood in 
detail. Partly, this is because the European Parliament Committees (other than BUDG/CONT) 
have a relatively limited understanding of EIB activities and in particular financial 
instruments. This means that there is an understanding of the general importance and 
impact of EIB activities, but further expertise, knowledge and routine in dealing with and 
processing EIB information needs to be built up in the political groups, policy committees 
and the administration.   
7.1.5 The EIB in 2014-20 and beyond 
The role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy is set to increase in the 2014-20 programme 
period. Many lessons have been learned, and the CPR provides a more robust framework 
for financial instruments in which the EIB and EIF are playing a major role. Furthermore, 
given the continued budgetary constraints that many Member States face, the EIB financial 
products and services will be important in achieving Cohesion Policy objectives.  
Post 2020 the engagement of the EIB is critically dependent on two factors. The first 
is Member State experience with FIs and particularly the degree to which they are 
implemented on time in the 2014-20 period and whether they can demonstrate the claimed 
efficiency and effectiveness benefits relative to grant instruments (such as legacy funding). 
Second, the introduction of the EFSI, although not directly linked to the Cohesion 
Policy budget, has important implications for Cohesion Policy and the involvement 
of the EIB, given the responsibilities of the EIB in the delivery of EFSI. Ensuring a sufficient 
pipeline of projects that is complementary and synergistic with ESIF programmes and that 
optimise the potential leverage of programmes is realised, is crucial. Both will determine the 
degree to which the upward trajectory of spending in FIs can be maintained. EFSI and 
Cohesion Policy have complementarities, but there are also considerable tensions 
with the aims and objectives of Cohesion Policy. Looking forward, if the EFSI is 
deemed to be a success in the 2017 review of the fund, it might be institutionalised as a 
permanent policy and compete with the ESIF for resources in future budget negotiations.357   
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7.2 Recommendations 
 
7KH(,%¶VLQFUHDVHGUROHLQ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\SDUWLFXODUO\WKURXJKWKHJUHDWHUSURILOHDQGXVH
of financial instruments, has significant implications for the performance and results of 
&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\7KH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHVKDYHILQDQFLDODQGQRQ-financial added value, as detailed 
in this study. EIB lending is a contributor to economic development expenditure in the 
Member States and a key component in the viability of many projects. The EIB has played a 
critical role in supporting the design, launch and operation of FIs, with funds management, 
advisory and capacity-building services to MAs and the Commission. The Bank provided 
similar support services for the JESSICA, JEREMIE, JASPERS and JASMINE initiatives. The 
EIB continues providing extended services for financial instruments under fi-compass 
(replacing JESSICA, JEREMIE and JASMINE) and for major projects under Jaspers. Ex-ante 
assessments have become a requirement for FIs which can be carried out by the EIB or EIF. 
The problem in assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of these activities ± from a 
Cohesion Policy perspective ± is that the evidence base is so weak. There has been little 
HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH UROH DQG FRQWULEXWLRQ RI WKH (,%¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\, 
and in the regional development policies and strategies of Member States more broadly. For 
example, the scale of EIB lending to projects that are also funded through Cohesion Policy is 
unknown. There is also limited academic research on the role of the EIB compared to other 
EU institutions, notably the Commission and the Parliament, in Cohesion Policy. Of particular 
concern is that the effectiveness of financial instruments relies heavily on their potential 
rather than measurable results.  
The research for this study indicates a high level of satisfaction with the EIB among Member 
States. The overall assessment is that the Bank is effective across most areas of 
activity, and it appears to be doing well in supporting the objectives of Cohesion Policy. 
However, there are clearly some specific areas of concern. Also, the (at times) difficult 
relationship between the EIB and the Commission is indicative of some fundamental 
differences in culture and ± importantly ± differences in the priority accorded to commercial 
versus public policy objectives, although both institutions have made efforts to bridge the 
gap. 
 
The challenge is to ensure that the largely positive assessment can be substantiated by 
systematic evaluation ± and monitored on an on-going basis to ensure that where problems 
exist they arHEHLQJDGGUHVVHG7KLVZRXOGPHHWVRPH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRQFHUQVDERXWWKH
WUDQVSDUHQF\DQGYLVLELOLW\RIWKH(,%¶VDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHQHHGIRUDPRUHRSHQV\VWHPIRU
holding the EIB to account. This should not necessarily be problematic: the EIB has taken 
important steps to develop a more robust accountability framework in recent years and has 
been responsive to scrutiny by the European Parliament. 
 
The main recommendation of this report, therefore, is that the European Parliament 
needs to support the development of more accountability on the role of the EIB in 
Cohesion Policy. This echoes European Parliament REGI committee opinion 2015/2127, 
ZKLFK µFDOOV IRUPRUH LQIRUPDWLRQZLWKLQ WKHFRQWH[WRI(,%DQQXDO UHSRUWLQJRQ WKHUHVXOWV
and contribution of EIB aFWLYLWLHV WR &RKHVLRQ 3ROLF\ REMHFWLYHV¶358 This study proposes a 
number of steps at different levels.  
 
First, the REGI Committee needs to undertake more active and systematic scrutiny 
RI WKH (,%¶V DFWLYLWLHV. This would involve providing an opinion on the Bank¶V DQQXDO
report. In order for the REGI Committee to become effectively engaged in this process, it 
should explore the possibility of D FKDSWHU RU $QQH[ LQ WKH (,%¶V Dnnual report which 
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specifically reports on those elements that contribute to the delivery of Cohesion Policy 
objectives. This would include:  
 
x WKH(,%¶V involvement in FIs (either as advisors or as mandate management);  
x its role as a financial provider (i.e. (b)lending), which would include FI co-financing, 
Structural Programme Lending, financing of projects that include Cohesion Policy co-
financing; and  
x its wider role as advisor and provider of analytical services and capacity-building 
activities. 
Such a contribution to WKH(,%¶VDQQXDOUHSRUWZRXOGVLJQLILFDQWO\LPSURYHWKHYLVLELOLW\RI(,%
activities in Cohesion Policy at the European Parliament level. 
Second, in addition to more systematic reporting, there needs to be ongoing dialogue 
between the European Parliament and EIB. In order to increase understanding of the 
(,%¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\DQGSURPRWHOHDUQLQJEHWZHHQLQVWLWXWLRQV, there has to 
be more frequent communication. 7KLV VXSSRUWV WKH 5(*, &RPPLWWHH RSLQLRQ µIRU
strengthened dialogue and constant exchange of information between the EIB and the 
Parliament, via regular meetings with regard to EIB activities which have an impact on 
HFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGWHUULWRULDOFRKHVLRQLQWKH(8¶359  
Based on the interview research for this study, there are several ways in which the 
relationships between the EIB and the European Parliament (as well as the Commission) can 
be strengthened by: 
1. at the political level, visits by the REGI Committee to the EIB similar to those 
to the European Central Bank (ECB);  
2. regular invitations to the EIB to present the results of their activities in the 
context of Cohesion Policy to the REGI Committee; 
3. organisation of seminars and workshops at the administrative level to 
promote knowledge exchange, improve the visibility of EIB activities and ensure 
active institutional engagement;  
4. more detailed studies focussing on specific themes or issues  
5. recruitment of personnel from other EU institutions/bodies that possess 
relevant know-how; and 
6. draw up own-initiative reports that target or include reflections on the role of 
the EIB in Cohesion Policy. 
The different roles the EIB assumes in Cohesion Policy should be clarified and documented. 
Potential conflict of interest between the EIB mandate management responsibility and its 
advisory services should be highlighted and mitigating actions and safeguards stipulated.  
The role of the EIB as (b)lender should become more visible (i.e. its lending to Cohesion-
Policy-funded projects, Structural Programme Lending, and co-financing of financial 
instruments). This would identify shared strategic interests and provide a potential basis 
for more complementarities. It would require a reporting mechanism that allows the EIB to 
record finance activities that also involve Cohesion Policy funding.    
                                          
359 Ibid. 
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Lastly, there is a need for further research and debate over the remainder of the 
2014-20 programme period to improve accountability, visibility and transparency 
of the EIB and its activities. While this study has provided a comprehensive assessment 
of the role of the EIB in Cohesion Policy, it is limited by its broad remit and the information 
available or accessible. Specifically, there are several areas where further investigation and 
debate are required to enhance the understanding of the contriEXWLRQ RI WKH (,%¶V UROH LQ
Cohesion Policy. One of these are the knowledge gaps concerns the role of the EIB in 
relation to each stage of the Cohesion Policy Programme implementation cycle: 
programming; project generation, appraisal and selection; monitoring and evaluation. 
Another is the limited understanding of the contribution of the EIB (b)lending 
activities to Cohesion Policy. Future work could usefully analyse in detail the co-financing 
provided by the EIB for projects that are also funded by Cohesion Policy funds from the 
Community budget. These include: framework loans (e.g. Structural Programme Lending), 
global loans, direct loans, intermediate loans and also co-financing provided by the EIB for 
financial instruments. Finally, EFSI can be expected to represent a step change in 
terms of the role that the EIB assumes in relation to Cohesion Policy. It has 
increased responsibilities in terms of the implementation of the Community budget. On the 
one hand, there are considerable complementarities between EFSI and ESIF; on the other 
hand, there is potential for competition. Further research can identify how synergies can be 
exploited and competition avoided.  
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Role of EIB in implementation 
 How have the different roles (i.e. advisory, lending, management or capacity-
building) that the EIB Group has in terms of implementing Cohesion Policy 
evolved? 
 What has been the level of co-financing provided by the EIB Group to 
Structural Funds programmes in Member States? 
 What is the role of Structural Programme Lending in Cohesion Policy? 
 What are the advantages of EIB Group involvement in Cohesion Policy? 
 What are the challenges of EIB Group involvement in Cohesion Policy? 
2. Effectiveness  
 How does the EIB Group contribute to cohesion and regional development in 
Europe? 
 To what extent do EIB Group activities contribute to the objectives of Cohesion 
Policy? 
 How can the effectiveness of EIB Group activities in Cohesion Policy best be 
measured? 
 What gaps in evidence of the effectiveness of EIB Group activities in Cohesion 
Policy exist? What can be done to address these gaps? 
 Do you consider FIs effective instruments to implement Cohesion Policy 
objectives? In what sense? 
 To what extent are decisions for funding by the EIB Group based on 
profitability and/or Structural Fund programme objectives? Is there a trade-off 
between the two?  
 Have FIs in the Cohesion Policy 2007-13 period lived up to the expectations? 
 How can effectiveness of FIs be improved? What are the main barriers? 
 
3. Accountability, transparency and visibility 
 How is reporting and decision-making on instruments involving EIB Group 
organised? What monitoring, reporting and auditing systems are in place? 
 How can the processes of a financial institution be aligned with those of 
Cohesion Policy, which is governed by specific regulations? Are monitoring, 
evaluation, reporting and auditing activities different and in what way from 
such activities that apply to grants under Cohesion Policy? 
 How are horizontal principles (sustainable development, equal opportunity, 
etc.) of Cohesion Policy considered in EIB Group activities? 
 What information is provided to beneficiaries with regard to explaining the 
expectations of EIB Group activities (particularly FIs) in Cohesion Policy? 
 How can the transparency of the process be best ensured? 
 
 4. Relationships between EU institutions 
 What are the current institutional, budgetary and procedural arrangements of 
EIB Group involvement in Cohesion Policy? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of current inter-institutional 
interactions between EIB, EC and EP? 
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 What lessons can be learned in relation to information exchange in the 2007-
13 period? 
 What are the communication/interaction gaps, and are there requirements for 
additional communication/reporting interfaces? 
 What are the options for deepening and strengthening institutional 
relationships? 
 How can processes involving financial instruments be best aligned with 
Cohesion Policy objectives? 
 What are the monitoring and reporting requirements in each institution?  
 What are the gaps in information provision in the monitoring process of the EIB 
*URXS¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\" 
 
5. Future expectations  
 What are the implications of the changes in the legislative framework for 2014-
20 for EIB Group role(s) in Cohesion Policy? 
 What is the likely uptake of measures involving the EIB Group in 2014-20? 
 What are the implications of result orientation, performance framework, 
thematic concentration and strategic coherence for EIB Group activities and 
specifically FIs in the 2014-20 period? 
 What synergies are there with other policy initiatives involving the EIB, for 
example Investment Plan for Europe and EFSI? 
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ANNEX 2: SURVEY QUESTIONS  
Review of the role of the European Investment Bank Group in European Cohesion 
Policy    
 
The following survey is being conducted by the European Policies Research Centre 
(University of Strathclyde, Glasgow) as part of a study for the Committee on Regional 
Development of the European Parliament.     
 
The role of the European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group) ± comprising the EIB and EIF 
± in Cohesion Policy has increased dramatically in recent years. This reflects the increased 
emphasis on financial instruments (FI) and also the wider EIB Group involvement in policy 
delivery, notably the European Fund for Strategic Investment. The EIB Group is involved in 
the implementation of Cohesion Policy in four main roles:         
x advisory ± involvement at early stage feasibility study or gap analysis;   
x lending ± investing EIB Group loans in an FI that also includes Cohesion Policy 
funding;    
x management ± managing a Holding Fund or Specific Fund (e.g. JESSICA and 
JEREMIE); and    
x capacity-building ± organising technical assistance platforms that provide a forum for 
managing authorities to engage in knowledge-exchange activities (for example 
through JASPERS).    
 
The aim of the study is to provide the European Parliament with a comprehensive analysis 
and assessment of how the EIB contributes to the achievement of Cohesion Policy 
objectives. The focus of the study is broken down into four themes:      
x the effectiveness of EIB Group activities in Cohesion Policy;    
x the accountability, transparency and visibility of EIB Group activities in Cohesion 
Policy;    
x the governance of EIB Group activities in Cohesion Policy; and    
x the future role of EIB Group activities in Cohesion Policy.      
 
Your views on these issues would be invaluable and we would be grateful if you could 
complete this short survey. No individuals or organisations will be identified; results will only 
refer to differences between Member States.    
 
*All research undertaken by the European Policies Research Centre complies with 
the University of 6WUDWKFO\GH¶V &RGH RI 3UDFWLFH RQ ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV RQ +XPDQ Beings. This 
Code is designed to ensure that all research undertaken by University staff and students is 
carried out in an ethical manner. For further details please see: 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/Documents/PDF_files/Ethics_Information_for_interviewee
s.pdf 
 
Which Member State do you represent? 
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The following questions relate to the role of EIB/EIF in Cohesion Policy 
programmes in your Member State. 
 
What role did the EIB/EIF have in the 2007-2013 Cohesion Policy programme(s) 
implementation in your Member State in the period? (Please provide a short description of 
the EIB/EIFs role for each of the relevant categories) 
 
 EIB/EIF provided analytical and/or advisory services (e.g. gap analysis, evaluation, on-
going advice) (1) ____________________ 
 EIF provided co-financing for a financial instrument(s) for enterprises (Art. 44a) (2) 
____________________ 
 EIB provided co-financing for a financial instrument(s) for urban development (Art. 44b) 
(3) ____________________ 
 EIB provided co-financing for a financial instrument(s) for renewable energy (Art. 44c) 
(4) ____________________ 
 EIF was holding fund manager for an enterprise fund (Art. 44a) (5) 
____________________ 
 EIB was holding fund manager for an urban development fund (Art. 44b) (6) 
____________________ 
 EIB was holding fund manager for an renewable energy fund (Art. 44c) (7) 
____________________ 
 EIB/EIF provided co-financing for an individual project(s) (please specify theme - e.g. 
transport, infrastructure, energy, etc.) (8) ____________________ 
 EIB/EIF provided capacity-building activities (JASPERS or other activities) (9) 
____________________ 
 Other (please specify) (10) ____________________ 
 The EIB/EIF has had no role in the implementation of Cohesion Policy programmes (11) 
____________________ 
 Don't know (12) 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being very negative and 5 being very positive), what is your 
overall assessment of each the roles that the EIB/EIF had in Cohesion Policy programmes in 
your Member State in 2007-2013? 
______ As an advisor (1) 
______ As a lender (2) 
______ As a fund manager (3) 
______ As a provider of capacity-building support (4) 
______ Other (5) 
 
Does the EIB/EIF play any other role in regional development outside the European Cohesion 
Policy framework in your Member State? (If yes, please briefly specify the nature of this 
role) 
 Yes (1) ____________________ 
 No (2) 
 Don't know (3) 
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The following questions relate to the accountability, transparency and visibility of 
EIB Group activities in Cohesion Policy 
 
How transparent are the products/activities of the EIB/EIF? (i.e. openness in providing 
reports, data and other information on their activities and performance) 
 
 Very transparent - The EIB/EIF is completely open about the performance of their 
activities/products (please explain) (1) ____________________ 
 Transparent - In most instances the EIB/EIF is open about the performance of their 
activities/products (please explain) (2) ____________________ 
 Not very transparent - Only in some instances is the EIB/EIF open about the 
performance of their activities/products (please explain) (3) ____________________ 
 Not at all transparent - The EIB/EIF is not open about the performance of their 
activities/products (please explain) (4) ____________________ 
 
How accountable are EIB/EIF in terms of delivering their activities and products (i.e. to what 
extent do EIB/EIF engage with other EU institutions and Member States in accounting for 
their activities and performance)? 
 
 Very accountable - EIB/EIF always engage with other EU institutions and Member States 
in accounting for their activities and products (please explain) (1) 
____________________ 
 Accountable - In most instances the EIB/EIF engage with other EU institutions and 
Member States in accounting for their activities and products (please explain) (2) 
____________________ 
 Not very accountable - Only in some instances does the EIB/EIF engage with other EU 
institutions and Member States in accounting for their activities and products (please 
explain) (3) ____________________ 
 Not at all accountable - The EIB/EIF does not engage with other EU institutions and 
Member States in accounting for their activities and products (please explain) (4) 
____________________ 
 
How visible are the activities and products of the EIB/EIF (i.e. the levels of awareness and 
knowledge about EIB/EIF activities/products)? 
 
 Very visible - There is a high level of awareness and knowledge about EIB/EIF activities 
and products (please explain) (1) ____________________ 
 Visible - There is a reasonable level of awareness and knowledge about EIB/EIF activities 
and products (please explain) (2) ____________________ 
 Not very visible - There is a low level of awareness and knowledge about EIB/EIF 
activities and products (please explain) (3) ____________________ 
 Not at all visible - There is no awareness and knowledge about EIB/EIF activities and 
products (please explain) (4) ____________________ 
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The following questions focus on the effectiveness of EIB/EIF activities and 
products in Cohesion Policy programmes in your Member State in the 2007-13 
programme period 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, how effective do you rate EIB/EIF activities and products in your 
Member State (1 being not effective, 5 being very effective)? 
______ Financial absorption (1) 
______ Generating relevant projects (2) 
______ Achieving results (3) 
 
What are the top three benefits of EIB/EIF involvement in Cohesion Policy programmes in 
your Member State? (please mark 1, 2 and 3 in boxes) 
______ Provide access to co-financing (1) 
______ Increase the impact of EU programmes (2) 
______ Provide management expertise (3) 
______ Analytical support (evaluations, gap analysis) (4) 
______ Increase the quality of projects (5) 
______ Improve access to a wider spectrum of financial tools (6) 
______ Help to increase private sector involvement and expertise (7) 
______ Provide technical know-how (8) 
______ Other (9) 
______ Other (10) 
______ Other (11) 
 
What are the three most important challenges in terms of EIB/EIF involvement in Cohesion 
Policy programmes in your Member State? 
______ Limited understanding of Programme(s) objectives (1) 
______ High management fees (2) 
______ Insufficient understanding of conditions/challenges in your Member State (3) 
______ Limited control over funding decisions (4) 
______ High costs of implementation (5) 
______ Complex rules and regulations (6) 
______ Other (7) 
______ Other (8) 
______ Other (9) 
 
How can effectiveness of EIB/EIF activities/products in Cohesion Policy in your Member State 
be improved? What are the main barriers to improving effectiveness? 
 
 
  
Review of the Role of the EIB Group in European Cohesion Policy 
 
 
155 
 
The following questions involve the expected role of the EIB/EIF in Cohesion Policy 
in the 2014-20 programme period. 
 
How do you think the role of the EIB/EIF in Cohesion Policy programmes will evolve in your 
Member State over 2014-20 period? 
 Much greater (please explain) (1) ____________________ 
 Somewhat greater (please explain) (2) ____________________ 
 About the same (please explain) (3) ____________________ 
 Somewhat less (please explain) (4) ____________________ 
 Much less (please explain) (5) ____________________ 
 
What impact will the European Fund for Strategic Investment (Juncker Plan) have on ESIF 
Programme(s) in your Member State? 
 
Thank you for completing the survey. The results of the survey will be reported following 
strict rules of anonymity. If you are happy to be contacted by the research team about the 
study or would like to receive the final report, please leave your name, position and email 
address below. 
 
Do you have any further comments? 
 
Name 
 
Position 
 
Email address 
 
May the EPRC contact you for any additional information? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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ANNEX 3: JEREMIE GAP ANALYSES AND JESSICA EVALUATION STUDIES 
JEREMIE Gap Analyses 
Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Member State BG 2007 
These 
recommendations 
relate to the use of 
JEREMIE in Bulgaria 
in 2014-20, not in 
2007-13 (unlike 
most of the other 
reports) 
EIF believes that there are 
substantial benefits for 
Bulgaria in the 
implementation of the 
JEREMIE Programme, which 
could be defined as financial 
contribution of around EUR 
250 m from the Operational 
Programme Competitiveness 
for the next planning period' 
(p.38) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
(jHF) Bulgaria 2010 
Yes - EIF is the Holding 
Fund manager. See: 
http://jeremie.bg/about
-jeremie-bulgaria-2/ 
Funded from the 
OP 
Competitiveness
; Priority Axis 3 
µFinancial 
Resources for 
Developing 
Enterprises¶ 
Member State CY 2007 - 
...an initial portfolio of 
specialised instruments 
amounting to a range of EUR 
45±63 m is recommended to 
be set up through the means 
of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF)' 
(p.1) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Cyprus trust 2009 
Yes - organised through 
the European 
Investment Fund (EIF) 
acting through the 
JEREMIE Trust (JT) 
- 
Member State CZ 2007 - 
...revolving instruments are 
proposed to be set up in the 
context of EU Structural 
Funds 2007-2013 via a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
structure' (p.3) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region DE (Brandenburg) 2007 
The report notes 
that 'EIF can 
support 
Brandenburg in 
closing these gaps 
with its expertise in 
the field of 
innovative SME 
financing' (p.3) 
EIF proposes for the 
programming period 2007-
2013 (2015) a JEREMIE 
Holding Fund of EUR 93 m for 
Brandenburg, consisting of 
revolving SME debt and 
equity financial instruments 
to enhance access to finance' 
(p.5) 
Yes No - - - - 
Member State DK 
2006 
(appr
oved 
2008) 
- 
As a result of this initial 
analysis, the European 
Investment Fund is of the 
belief that there is substantial 
benefit to be gained by 
Denmark from the 
implementation of a JEREMIE 
programme' (p.38) 
Yes No - - - - 
Member State EE 2007 - - Yes No - - - - 
Member State EL 2007 - 
A portfolio of financial 
instruments is proposed in 
the framework of the 
JEREMIE programme: micro 
financing, guarantees, 
securitisation programme, 
seed fund, business angels, 
Yes Yes 
entrepreneurship fund 
(TEPIX) (Athens); 
JEREMIE Holding Fund, 
Greece 
2010 and 
2007 
respectively 
Yes - EIF is the Holding 
Fund manager of the 
JER001 HF. However 
the National 
Entrepreneurship and 
Development Fund 
manages the 
The JER001 HF 
has 12 specific 
funds under it. 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
intellectual property fund ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
FUND. 
Member State ES 
no 
date 
Specific regional 
recommendations 
are provided in the 
individual regional 
reports (see below) 
It is therefore recommended 
to create a nationwide 
Holding Fund with an initial 
amount of EUR 300 m, which 
could be progressively 
increased to expand on-going 
initiatives, in case they are 
well absorbed by the market 
and to allow for pan-regional 
initiatives' (p.4) 
Yes No 
There are JEREMIE funds 
in: Andalucía, Barcelona, 
Canarias, Extremadura, 
IDEA. 
Various, see 
below Various, see below - 
Region ES (Andalucia) no date - 
...EIF recommends the 
creation of a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund for the progressive 
implementation of financial 
instruments...' (p.5) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Andalucia (Holding Fund) 2009 
Not as manager. IDEA 
is the Holding Fund 
manager. 
Includes 
JEREMIE-IDEA 
(specific fund) 
amongst others. 
Region ES (Asturias) 2007 - 
...Based on the situation 
outlined above and on the 
analysis of supply and 
demand for SME funding, EIF 
would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 20 m for the 
2007±2013 programming 
period' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region ES (Canarias) 2007 - 
...EIF would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 40-50 m...' (p.5) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Canarias (specific fund) 2012 
Not as manager. The 
fund manager is 
SODECAN. 
- 
Region ES (Cantabria) 2007 - 
Based on the situation 
outlined above and on the 
analysis of supply and 
demand for SME funding, EIF 
would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 20 to 30 m for 
the 2007±2013 programming 
period' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region ES (Castilla y 
Leon) 
2007 - 
Based on the situation 
outlined above and on the 
analysis of supply and 
demand for SME funding, EIF 
would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 45 to 60 m...' 
(p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Region ES (Cataluña) 2007 
A recommendation 
was not explicitly 
articulated, because 
the Generalitat de 
Catalunya had 
already decided to 
allocate EUR 50m to 
a HF for JEREMIE. 
Instead, the report 
formulated 
implementation 
recommendations. 
NB: the 2007-13 
ERDF OP code for 
Catalonia is 
2007ES162PO006 
 
n/a Yes JEREMIE Barcelona 
(specific fund) 
2008 
Not as manager. The 
fund manager is: 
Instruments Financers 
per a Empreses 
Innovadores, IFEM, 
SLU. Barcelona. 
 
Region ES 
(Extremadura) 
2007 - 
... in order to shift towards a 
more market driven approach 
and to provide SMEs with an 
integrated finance chain, EIF 
would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 20-30 m for the 
2007± 2013 programming 
period' (p.4) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Extremadura 2013 Yes - EIF is the Holding 
Fund manager 
- 
Region ES (Galicia) 2007 - 
EIF would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 70 to 90 m that 
could be set up with a 
minimum size of EUR 30 to 
40 m' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region ES (Valencia) 2007 - 
EIF would recommend to 
establish a JEREMIE Holding 
Fund of EUR 20-30 m...' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR (Auvergne) 2007 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.4) 
Yes Yes FCPR JEREMIE Auvergne 2009 
Not as manager. 
SOFIMAC Partners is 
the Holding Fund 
manager. 
This HF has 16 
specific funds 
under it. 
Region 
FR (Basse-
Normandie) 2007 
Exec. Summary 
'Summary' section 
notes 'The EIF has 
begun to engage an 
active dialogue with 
all the stakeholders, 
in order to ensure 
that the JEREMIE 
program will 
provide an 
important added 
value to Basse-
1RUPDQGLH¶V
regional economy' 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Region FR (Centre) 2008 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant directions for 
the JEREMIE program taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region 
FR 
(Champagne-
Ardenne) 
2008 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant directions for 
the JEREMIE program taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR (Corse) 2007 - 
The EIF has begun to engage 
an active dialogue with all the 
stakeholders, in order to 
ensure that the JEREMIE 
program will provide an 
important added value to 
&RUVLFD¶VUHJLRQDOHFRQRP\

(p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR 
(Guadeloupe) 
2007 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.2) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR (Guyane) 2007 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR (Ile-de-France) 2008 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered... The 
recommended size of the 
JEREMIE Holding Fund in Ile-
de-France should range 
between EUR 22m to 41.5m.' 
(p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region FR (Languedoc-Roussillon) 2007 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE holding fund taking 
into account the available 
supply of finance and the 
existing and potential 
demand to be covered' (p.4) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Languedoc-Roussillon/France 2008 
Yes - EIF is the HF 
manager. It is also the 
manager of the specific 
fund. 
- 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Region FR (Lorraine) 2007 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE program taking into 
account the available supply 
of finance and the existing 
and potential demand to be 
covered' (p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region 
FR (Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur) 
2008 - 
The report... identifies the 
most relevant focus for the 
JEREMIE program taking into 
account the available supply 
of finance and the existing 
and potential demand to be 
covered' (p.4) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE PACA 2012 
Yes - EIF is the specific 
fund manager. - 
Member State HU 2007 - 
Based on these findings 
JEREMIE recommends to 
concentrate public support to 
SMEs in a form of holding 
fund with the total allocation 
up to EUR 720m' (p.4) 
Yes Yes venture finance Hungary 
plc 
2007 
Not as manager. 
Venture Finance 
Hungary Plc is the HF 
manager. 
Hungary has 
some 174 
specific funds in 
total. 
Member State IT 2007 
The proposal for a 
JEREMIE 
intervention focuses 
in the co-
investment in 
regional guarantees 
funds 
...the potentially positive role 
of JEREMIE is envisaged to 
address the market 
insufficiencies impacting on 
the risk capital market, 
microfinance and guarantees' 
(p.4) 
Yes 
no (all 
regional) 
JEREMIE Sicilia fse, 
JEREMIE FSE, Istituito 
Presso Finlombarda 
s.p.a.; 
Funded Risk Sharing 
financial instrument per la 
regione Calabria (HF); 
JEREMIE Campania 
(HF); 
Fondo Regionale di 
Capitale di Rischio a 
compartecipazione 
pubblico/privata 
denominato ingenium ii; 
ASSE i - Fondo di 
Partecipazione if 
Sviluppo Lazio SPA. 
JEREMIE - Milano (HF); 
Fondo Unico Anticrisi, 
Campobasso; 
Partecipazioni Minoritarie 
e Temporanee al Capitale 
di Rischio di Imprese 
Innovative ; 
Sistema delle Garanzie 
per Investimenti 
QHOO¶,nnovazione e per 
O¶LPSUHQGLWRULDOLWj 
Various 
Yes. EIF is the HF 
manager for JER - 050 
JEREMIE SICILIA FSE 
LUXEMBOURG and 
JEREMIE Campania. 
All HFs are 
regional. 
JEREMIE 
Campania has 
two specific 
funds under its 
Holding Fund, 
both managed 
by the EIF. 
JEREMIE FESR - 
MILANO has one 
specific fund 
(not managed 
by the EIF). 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Region IT (Marche) 2007 
Report is subject to 
a 'positive decision 
by the Marche 
Regional Authorities 
on the 
implementation of 
the JEREMIE 
initiative in 
cooperation with 
the EIF' (p.3) 
The recommendations are 
based on the possibility of 
creating a Holding Fund for 
Regione Marche by means of 
Structural Funds, mainly 
ERDF' (p.3) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region IT (Piemonte) 2007 - 
The recommendations are 
based on the possibility of 
creating a Holding Fund for 
Regione Piemonte by means 
of Structural Funds, mainly 
ERDF' (p.3) 
Yes No - - - - 
Member State LT 2007 
This report 
proposed a series of 
FIs whilst not 
explicitly identifying 
them as JEREMIE 
instruments, though 
their delivery 
through JEREMIE is 
strongly inferred. 
The present Report has 
identified the following 
financial instruments that 
could be implemented in the 
period 2007-2013: guarantee 
scheme for micro and start-
up companies', etc. 
Yes Yes 
Enterpreneurship 
promotions fund, Vilnius; 
invega fund, Vilnius; 
JEREMIE Holding Fund, 
Lithuania 
2008 
Yes. EIF is the HF 
manager. 
There are 5 
specific funds 
under this 
Holding Fund. 
None are 
managed by the 
EIF/EIB. 
Member State LV 2007 
Report refers to the 
awaited delivery of 
a 'positive decision 
by the government 
on the 
implementation of 
the JEREMIE 
initiative in 
cooperation with 
the EIF' (p.40) 
... proposals are made for 
generic financial engineering 
instruments that comply with 
the JEREMIE philosophy' 
(p.18) including: guarantee 
scheme for micro and start-
up companies; social micro 
finance pilot scheme, etc.; 
social micro finance pilot 
scheme; securitisation pilot 
programme', etc. (p.3) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Holding Fund Latvia 2008 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is the 
Latvian Guarantee 
Agency Ltd. 
There are 8 
specific funds 
under this 
Holding Fund. 
None are 
managed by the 
EIF/EIB. 
Member State MT 
Updat
ed 
2008 
- 
... there is a latent demand 
for further guarantees in 
order to allow the firms 
access to higher levels of 
credit. This constitutes the 
cornerstone upon which, in 
the present report, the 
proposal for a JEREMIE 
intervention in Malta has 
been envisaged' (p.27) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
Malta 2010 
Yes. The EIF is the HF 
manager. 
There is 1 
specific fund 
under this HF. 
However, it is 
managed by 
Bank of Valletta 
PLC, Malta. 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Member State PL 2006 - 
...JEREMIE recommends to 
concentrate public support to 
SMEs in a form of holding 
fund with the total allocation 
up to EUR 1,160m' (p.3) 
Yes 
Yes - one 
or more of 
the HFs are 
national 
'ROQRĞOąVNL)XQGXV]
powierniczy; 
Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (bgk), 
warszawa; 
Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego, Warszawa; 
Fundusz Powierniczy 
JEREMIE Województwa 
Pomorskiego, Warsaw; 
Kujawsko-Pomorski 
Fundusz PRĪ\F]NRZ\63
Z O.O.; 
7RUXĔ1DWLRQDO&DSLWDO
Fund, Warsaw. 
also see Lódzkie, 
Wielkopolska and 
Zachodniopomorskie 
below for details 
2012, 2009, 
2012, 2009, 
2010, 2009, 
2009 
Not as manager. The 
manager of the 
'ROQRĞOąVNL)XQGXV]
powierniczy HF is Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego, Warszawa. 
Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego, 
Warszawa is 
under the 
national 
Operational 
Programme: 
Human Capital. 
Region 
PL (Eastern 
Regions) 2008 - 
...the implementation of a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
support scheme is 
recommended in order both 
to boost the competitiveness 
of the SME sector and to 
support and modernise the 
EPR financial sector' (p.6) 
Yes No - - - - 
Region 3/àyG]NLH 2008 - 
...implementation of a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
support scheme is 
recommended in order to 
foster the competitiveness of 
the SME sector' (p.5) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Holding Fund for 
Lodzkie region, LyGĨ 2009 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego based in 
Warsaw, Poland. 
- 
Region PL (Pomorskie) 2008 - 
...implementation of a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
support scheme is 
recommended in order to 
foster the competitiveness of 
the SME sector' (p.5) 
Yes Yes - - 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego based in 
Warsaw, Poland. 
- 
Region 
PL 
(Wielkopolska) 2008 - 
...implementation of a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
support scheme is 
recommended in order to 
foster the competitiveness of 
the SME sector' (p.5) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Holding Fund for 
Wielkopolska region 2009 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego, Polska, 
Warszawa. 
- 
Region 
PL 
(Zachodniopom
orskie) 
2008 - 
...implementation of a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
support scheme is 
recommended in order to 
foster the competitiveness of 
the SME sector' (p.5) 
Yes Yes 
Zachodniopomorski 
Fundusz Powierniczy 
JEREMIE (holding fund) 
2009 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is Bank 
Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (BGK). 
- 
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Member 
State/Region 
Member State 
or region 
Year Notes Recommendation In 
favour? 
Yes/No 
Has a 
JEREMIE 
FI been 
implemen
ted? 
If yes, which? If yes, 
when? 
EIF involvement Notes 
Member State PT 2007 - 
...proposals are made for 
generic financial engineering 
instruments that comply with 
the JEREMIE philosophy' 
(p.23) 
Yes No - - - - 
Member State RO 2007 - 
We believe that [a] portfolio 
of financial instruments for 
supporting SME access to 
finance could be successfully 
deployed in Romania through 
the JEREMIE mechanism...' 
(p.4) 
Yes Yes JEREMIE Romania Holding Fund (unknown) 
Yes - EIF is the HF 
manager. 
There are 3 
specific funds 
under this 
Holding Fund. 
None are 
managed by the 
EIF/EIB. 
Member State SE 2007 - 
The analysis indicates that 
disparate market 
imperfections or failures can 
be addressed by utilising the 
new JEREMIE framework...' 
(p.4) 
Yes No - - - - 
Member State SI 2008 - 
...revolving instruments are 
proposed to be set up in the 
context of EU Structural 
Funds 2007-2013 via a 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
structure' (p.3) 
Yes Yes 
Programme of financial 
engineering instruments 
(PIFI) within Slovene 
Enterprise Fund (SEF), 
Maribor 
2009 
Not as manager. The 
HF manager is the 
Slovene Enterprise 
Fund, Ulica Kneza 
Koclja 22, 2000 
Maribor, Slovenia. 
Decided to go 
with an 
alternative - 
Slovene Ent. 
Fund. 
Member State SK 2007 - 
...the following revolving 
instruments are proposed to 
be set up in 2007-2013 in the 
JEREMIE framework: Micro 
Loan Guarantee Scheme; 
Social Micro Loan Scheme', 
etc. (p.3) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Holding Fund 
Slovakia through 
sSovensky Zarucny a 
Rozvojovy Fond, S.R.O., 
Bratislava 
2009 
Yes - EIF is the HF 
manager. 
There are 3 
specific funds 
under this 
Holding Fund. 
None are 
managed by the 
EIF/EIB. 
Region UK (England) 2007 - 
The analysis indicates that 
disparate market 
imperfections or failures can 
be partly addressed by 
utilising the new JEREMIE 
framework and the 
construction of a portfolio of 
financial instrument 
interventions combined to 
create a revolving structure' 
(p.3) 
Yes Yes 
Finance Yorkshire (HF); 
North East Finance 
(HF); 
The North West Fund (HF) 
(unknown) 
No. The HF managers 
are Finance Yorkshire 
Limited, North East 
Finance and North West 
Business Finance 
Limited respectively. 
- 
Region UK (Wales) 2007 - 
The analysis indicates that 
disparate market 
imperfections or failures can 
be partly addressed by 
utilising the new JEREMIE 
framework and the 
construction of a portfolio of 
financial instrument 
interventions combined to 
create a revolving 
structure...' (p.4) 
Yes Yes 
JEREMIE Cardiff (specific 
fund, for the east Wales 
ERDF RCE programme); 
JEREMIE Cardiff 
(specific fund, for the 
west Wales and the 
valleys ERDF RCE 
programme) 
(unknown) 
Not as manager. The 
manager of the 2 
specific funds, and also 
the HF above them, is 
Finance Wales 
Investments Ltd. 
- 
 
Source: EPRC research 
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Jessica Evaluations 
Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region BE (Flanders) 2009 - Several investment 
opportunities 
identified, most re. 
urban renewal 
policies. 
- Yes No - - - 
Region BE (Wallonia) 2009 There is therefore in 
Wallonia a 
potentially fertile 
ground for 
implementing an 
integrated urban 
policy 
which could be 
supported by an 
instrument like 
JESSICA.' 
A lot of actors could 
be involved and 
invest in large scale 
of projects which 
could be supported 
by UDF. 
Modest capacity 
of institutions to 
invest themselves 
in a UDF because 
lack of necessary 
cash flow. 
Yes No - - - 
Region BE (Brussels) 2010  A clear need for a 
holistic tool that 
can take an 
initiative on 
physical realisation. 
Already some 
projects are mature 
enough to be 
implemented. 
 Yes No - - - 
Member State BG 2009 The summary 
findings of our 
work... suggest that 
there is a role for 
the JESSICA 
instrument to play in 
%XOJDULD¶VHFRQRPLF
development 
financing.' 
- - Yes Yes 'Fund for Sustainable 
Urban Development of 
Sofia' EAD, Sofia; Regional 
Urban Development Fund 
AD, Sofia. 
2010+ Yes. The EIB is 
the Fund manager 
for the JESSICA 
HF (umbrella HF 
for these two 
instruments). 
Member State CY 2009 - Cyprus can benefit 
from JESSICA 
support in 
addressing various 
issues faced today 
such as 
regeneration of 
deprived areas and 
enhancement of 
public 
infrastructure.' 
- Yes No - - - 
Region CZ (Moravia-Silesia) 2009 There is a HF but 
there are no specific 
funds detailed under 
it, which is strange. 
As of 2013, no 
investments had 
been made by this 
HF. 
Recommendation 
was that 'Urban 
development funds 
should be 
established at the 
beginning of 2011.' 
- Yes Yes JESSICA Holding Fund 
Moravia-Silesia, 
Luxembourg'. 
2010 Yes -  the EIB is 
the Fund 
Manager. 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
166 
Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region CZ (South-East 
Cohesion Region) 
2010 - The Study 
concludes that 
there is sufficient 
demand for project 
funding through the 
JESSICA 
instrument.' 
Further work is 
required to 
advance project 
preparation and 
to include 
µJessicable¶ 
projects... 
Especially the 
µVWDUW-XS¶SHULRG
can take some 
time. 
Yes No - - - 
Region CZ (North-East 
Cohesion Region) 
2010 The decision on 
JESSICA 
implementation 
should be made as 
soon as possible...' 
The following areas 
of support were 
identified as 
potentially suitable 
for the utilisation of 
the JESSICA 
instrument in the 
context of the 
NUTS 2 ROP NE: 
Development of 
Regional Centres, 
Development of 
Cities, 
Development of 
Basic Infrastructure 
and Supporting 
Activities in the 
Field of Tourism 
and Support for 
Development of 
Entrepreneurial 
Infrastructure. 
- Yes No - - - 
Region CZ (Central Moravia 
Cohesion Region) 
2011 - The above 
indicators justify 
the implementation 
of the JESSICA 
mechanism in the 
region...' 
- Yes No - - - 
Region FI (Western Finland) 2009 Since the 
evaluation, no 
JESSICA instrument 
has been introduced 
in Finland but an 
Art. 44a equity-
based fund 
(Finnvera plc, 
Helsinki) has been 
set up. 
Need for new types 
of financing for 
urban development 
and several 
projects which 
could potentially 
benefit from 
JESSICA funding. 
Most of these 
projects are aimed 
at developing new 
business facilities. 
- Yes No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region DE (Hamburg) 2009 Since the 
evaluation, no 
JESSICA instrument 
has been introduced 
in Hamburg but an 
Art. 44a fund 
(Innovationsstarter 
Fonds Hamburg) 
was set up in 2011. 
It has become clear 
that the use of 
JESSICA 
instruments for 
sustainable urban 
development 
in Hamburg is 
sensible' (p.10) 
Legal 
uncertainties... 
relate... to... 
calculation and 
settlement of the 
management 
costs, the 
consequences of 
the investment of 
ERDF funds from 
several priority 
axes in the urban 
development 
fund and the 
structural 
separation of 
financing streams 
for eligible and 
non-eligible 
costs. 
Yes No - - - 
Region DE (Berlin) 2010 As well as the 
Art.44b FI in 
Potsdam there are 
multiple Art. 44a 
instruments in 
Berlin. 
By setting up an 
urban development 
fund, the Land of 
Berlin expects to be 
better able to meet 
the major urban 
development 
challenges' (p.7) 
- Yes Yes SEF 
Stadtentwicklungsfonds, 
Potsdam. 
2009 Not specified. The 
Fund Manager is 
Investitionsbank 
des Landes. 
Region DE (NRW) 2010 Since the 
evaluation, no 
JESSICA instrument 
has been introduced 
in NRW. There are 
three Art. 44a funds 
in Dusseldorf, one of 
which was set up in 
2012 (i.e. after the 
EIB evaluation). 
...the long-term 
establishment of an 
NRW urban 
development fund 
therefore offers the 
opportunity to 
compensate for 
declining budget 
appropriations in 
the forthcoming 
programming 
period.' 
Setting up a fund 
becomes more 
expensive and 
more complicated 
specifically in the 
JESSICA 
context... 
because all the 
political decision-
makers, 
administrative 
authorities, and... 
financial 
institutions do 
not yet have any 
experience. 
Yes No - - - 
Region DE (Saarland) 2010 - it makes sense to 
set up a CDF for 
the Saarland to 
promote an 
integrated 
community 
development' 
(p.11) 
- Yes No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Member State EL 2008 Greece set up a 
JESSICA HF in 2010 
and has 5 separate 
UDFs. 
The outcome of the 
study has identified 
the existence of 
significant 
opportunities in this 
specific area' 
- Yes Yes UDF Crete; 
UDF Attica, Western  
Greece Ionian Islands; 
UDF Central  Macedonia 
& Thessaly; 
UDF Eastern Macedonia 
& Thrace, North 
Aegean, Western 
Macedonia & Epirus; 
UDF Peloponnese & 
mainland Greece. 
2012 (USF 
Peloponnese 
and mainland 
Greece only), 
2011 ± Attica, 
W. Greece 
Ionian Islands, 
OPESD Crete. 
Y. 
Yes -  the EIB is 
the Fund 
Manager. 
Member State HU 2011 Hungary has many 
Art.44a FIs and a 
few Art.44c FIs but 
no Art.44b FIs. 
Introducing 
JESSICA financial 
engineering 
instruments in 
Hungary presents 
an opportunity to 
add to the range of 
funds available for 
sustainable urban 
development' (p.9) 
Experience with 
FIs in Hungary is 
limited and 
especially 
municipalities are 
more familiar 
with grant 
funding 
requirements. 
Yes No - - - 
Member State IE 2013 - The implementation 
of a financial 
instrument in 
Ireland could 
provide significant 
advantages and a 
valuable source of 
finance to take 
forward projects 
related to 
strategically 
important themes..' 
(p.37) 
It is clear that the 
Project Types 
assessed for 
Ireland, appear 
to need some 
order of 
assistance in 
order to be 
realised (i.e. 
private sector 
market will need 
encouragement 
to invest)...' 
p.37) 
Yes No - - - 
Region IT (Campania) 2010 - The analysis 
performed during 
this study 
highlighted a high 
compatibility for 
the application of 
JESSICA 
instruments to 
revenue generating 
projects. 
- Yes Yes JESSICA Campania and, 
under this two UDFs. 
2011 Yes -  the EIB is 
the Fund 
Manager. 
Region IT (Marche, Emilia-
Romagna, Lazio, 
Veneto) 
2014 - Veneto: The FI 
could finance 
medium/large 
urban development 
projects, 
overcoming some 
critical issues. 
Emilia-Romagna: 
The limited 
amount of 
resources that 
will be available 
for the 2014-
2020 ERDF ROP 
ER, likely to be 
less than 400.00 
Meuro, might be 
a constraint for 
the 
implementation 
of FI. 
Mixed -different 
assessments for 
each of the four 
regions 
No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region IT (Puglia) 2010 - The preparatory 
study carried out 
has shown that 
JESSICA-type 
financial 
instruments could 
be widely applied in 
the context of 
Apulia. 
- Yes No - - - 
Region IT (Sicily) 2010 Sicily already had a 
JESSICA FI by the 
time this study was 
done, so this eval. 
was not an ex-ante. 
- - n/a Yes JESSICA Sicily with two 
UDFs under this.  
2009 Yes -  the EIB is 
the Fund 
Manager. 
Region IT (Sardinia) 2011 Following the 
evaluation, 
Sardinia's JESSICA 
HF was set up in 
2011 and its 2 
JESSICA specific 
funds in 2012. 
Based on the 
information 
analysed, JESSICA 
instruments were 
considered 
applicable in the 
context of the 
Sardinia Region. 
- Yes Yes JESSICA HF Sardegna 
2007- 2013 Cagliari and 
under this, two JESSICA 
specific funds. 
2011 (HF only) 
and 2012 
(specific funds. 
Yes ± the EIB is 
the HF manager.  
Region IT (Liguria) 2009 - Encourages pooling 
of resources of 
local action - 
makes possible to 
take advantage of 
financial resources 
which otherwise 
would have been 
difficult to find. 
- Yes No - - - 
Member State LT 2009 Seven different 
Art.44b FIs were set 
up in Lithuania 
between 2010 and 
2013. 
There is a 
significant market 
gap in providing 
financing for urban 
development 
projects - large 
potential for 
JESSICA. 
- Yes Yes JESSICA Kontroliuojantysis 
Fondas (JESSICA HF 
Lithuania) + seven specific 
Art.44b funds under it. 
HF established 
2009. 
Yes - the EIB is 
the Fund Manager 
of the HF. 
However the 
specific funds are 
managed by 
various banks. 
Member State LV 2012 - - ...one of the key 
risks is in respect 
of the repayment 
capability of 
individual 
residents in the 
buildings' (p.99) 
Yes No - - - 
Member State LU 2010 - There is a clear role 
for JESSICA in 
Luxembourg for a 
part of a country-
wide development 
fund. JESSICA 
would stimulate 
PPP regeneration 
investments across 
the country. 
- Yes No - - - 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
170 
Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Member State NL 2010 Since the 
evaluation, NL set 
up a HF (in 2012). 
This HF covers one 
Art.44a FI and also 
one Art.44b 
JESSICA specific 
fund. 
Is JESSICA of 
added value to the 
Netherlands? The 
answer is yes' (p.7) 
- Yes Yes JESSICA Fonds Ruimte en 
Economie Den Haag 
(FRED). 
HF established 
2012. Date of 
JESSICA FI 
establishment 
not specified. 
No reference to 
the EIB is made. 
The JESSICA 
Fund Manager is 
Stichting 
Stimuleringsfonds 
Volkshuisvesting 
Nederlandse 
Gemeenten 
Rechtsvorm: 
Stichting 
Vestigingsplaats: 
Hoevelaken. 
Region PL (Mazovia) 2011 - Projects having 
demand for 
JESSICA funds 
were revitalisation, 
energy efficiency 
and renewable 
energy as well as 
cluster initiatives. 
- Yes Yes JESSICA HF Mazovia - Yes  the EIB is 
the HF Manager.  
Region PL (Pomerania) 2010 - Tthe value of the 
potential demand 
for JESSICA 
considerably 
exceeds the value 
of resources 
allocated to be 
used in the form of 
JESSICA...' (p.7) 
- Yes Yes JESSICA HF Pomerania - Yes ± the EIB is 
the HF Manager. 
Region PL (Silesia) (undated
) 
The report 
recommends that 
'Entrusting the HF 
establishment to the 
EIB is the best 
solution' (p.173) 
- High debt and 
debt service 
ratios of local 
government 
entities. 
Yes Yes JESSICA HF Silesia - Yes ± the EIB is 
the HF Manager.  
Region PL (South Poland) 2009  It is recommended 
that one Urban 
Development Fund 
should be 
established in the 
initial period of 
JESSICA operation 
in Poland. 
In the long-term 
perspective, the 
establishment of 
a holding fund 
may lead to 
reducing the 
competitiveness 
of JESSICA 
products because 
of the need to 
bear additional 
costs of 
managing this 
fund. 
Yes No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region PL (West Poland) 2009 NB: the only Art.44b 
FIs in Poland are in 
Wroclaw (West 
Poland) and 
Warsaw. The EIB is 
the HF Manager for 
the latter. However 
there are many 
Art.44a FIs across 
Poland. 
It is recommended 
that one Urban 
Development Fund 
should be 
established in the 
initial period of 
JESSICA operation 
in Poland. 
In the long-term 
perspective, the 
establishment of 
a holding fund 
may lead to 
reducing the 
competitiveness 
of JESSICA 
products because 
of the need to 
bear additional 
costs of 
managing this 
fund. 
Yes Yes Fundusz Powierniczy  
JESSICA (HF); 
Bank Zachodni WBK SA, 
:URFáDZVSHFLILF
fund). 
HF established 
2009. Specific 
fund 
established 
2011. 
Yes - EIB is the 
HF Manager. 
However, Bank 
Zachodni WBK 
6$:URFáDZLV
the Fund Manager 
for the Art.44b 
specific fund. 
Member State PT 2009  JESSICA will... be 
suitable for 
Structural Funds 
deployment' (p.4) 
The Portuguese 
legal framework 
does not pose 
major obstacles 
as to the 
implementation 
of JESSICA in 
Portugal. Special 
attention has to 
be paid, however, 
to compliance 
with State aid 
limitations, as 
well as to public 
procurement 
impositions and 
banking law 
restrictions. 
Yes Yes BPI JESSICA Loans; Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos, SA, 
JESSICA Loans and Equity; 
Turismo de Portugal, 
JESSICA Loans. 
- Yes ± the EIB is 
the HF Manager. 
The EIB also 
provides co-
financing at 
Financial 
Intermediary level 
Region RO (Brasov) 2010 Evaluation 
recommended EIB 
assistance in setting 
up a Holding Fund. 
National banks 
have appetite for 
JESSICA through 
fund manager roles 
- a pilot JESSICA 
would be the most 
suitable option to 
try this 
- Yes No - - - 
Member State SK 2010 No JESSICA has 
been set up since 
the evaluation, but a 
State Housing 
Development Fund 
(FI) was set up in 
2013 (not managed 
by the EIB). 
There is a 
quantifiable market 
gap in both the 
demand and the 
supply sides in 
financing urban 
development 
including housing... 
'considerable 
potential for 
a JESSICA-type 
financial 
engineering 
mechanism' (p.5) 
Private investors' 
contribution to 
JESSICA is 
difficult to 
forecast, mostly 
because most 
private banks 
already offer 
funds for housing 
refurbishment. 
Yes No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Member State SI (undated
) 
- The implementation 
of JESSICA FIs 
would provide long-
term sustainable 
and strategically 
directed financial 
support which 
would benefit the 
Slovene economy 
at large' (p.10) 
- Tes No - - - 
Region ES (Andalucia) 2009 - JESSICA is the 
ideal tool to meet 
this need as it 
would enable 
investments to be 
cofinanced by 
means of public-
private 
collaborations' 
(p.3) 
- Yes Yes There are two JESSICA 
HFs covering this region: 
FONDO DE CARTERA 
JESSICA-Andalucía and 
WKHPXOWLUHJLRQ+)³)RQGR
de Cartera JESSICA 
FIDAE- Fondo de Inversion 
en Diversificcacion y 
$KRUURGH(QHUJLD´-fondo 
de inversión en 
diversificación y ahorro de 
energía and Fondo de 
Cartera JESSICA FIDAE-
Fondo de Inversión en 
Diversificación y Ahorro de 
Energía. 
2011 Yes - the EIB is 
the HF Manager 
for both HFs. 
There are three 
JESSICA FIDAE 
FIs (managed by 
Santander, BBVA 
and Ahorro 
Corporacion) and 
one in JESSICA 
ANDALUCIA (AC 
JESSICA 
Andalucía 
managed by 
Ahorro 
Corporacion, see. 
page. 44)  
Region ES (Galicia) 2010 - Galicia... would be 
a very favourable 
territory for use of 
the JESSICA tool' 
(p.109) 
Galicia has no 
widespread 
experience in the 
development of 
business lines by 
means of publicǦ
private 
partnership. 
Yes Yes There is one JESSICA HF 
covering this region: the 
PXOWLUHJLRQ+)³)RQGRGH
Cartera JESSICA FIDAE ± 
Fondp de Inversion en 
Diversificacion y Ahorro de 
(QHUJLD´ 
2011 Yes ± the EIB is 
HF Manager. 
There are three 
JESSICA FIDAE 
FIs (managed by 
Santander, BBVA 
and Ahorro 
Corporacion, see 
page. 44). 
Region ES (Castilla-La 
Mancha) 
2011 NB: evaluation was 
carried out after 
work to design a 
JESSICA initiative 
had commenced in 
July 2010. The 
evaluation notes the 
proposed HF 
manager: 'the EIB... 
could contribute its 
experience as an 
entity specialising in 
the structuring and 
finance of 
infrastructure' 
(p.48). 
n/a - n/a Yes There is one JESSICA HF 
covering this region: the 
PXOWLUHJLRQ+)³)RQGRGH
Cartera JESSICA FIDAE ± 
Fondp de Inversion en 
Diversificacion y Ahorro de 
(QHUJLD´ 
2011 Yes ± the EIB is 
HF Manager. 
There are three 
JESSICA FIDAE 
FIs (managed by 
Santander, BBVA 
and Ahorro 
Corporacion, see 
page. 44) 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
Region ES (Cataluña) 2013 - The conclusions 
from the in-depth 
policy analysis 
indicate 
considerable 
opportunities for 
Catalonia to deploy 
FIs to support a 
range of strategic 
objectives...' (p.5) 
- Yes No - - - 
Member State SE 2009 - A number of 
potential JESSICA 
projects were 
identified that were 
able to generate 
cashflow. 
Additional work is 
needed to 
develop projects 
into credible 
investment 
opportunities. 
Most are not 
showing high 
returns so there 
is need for public 
sector 
investment. 
Yes No - - - 
Region UK (London) 2008 - JESSICA is a 
strategically 
important delivery 
mechanism... 
London requires 
JESSICA support to 
make this step 
change' (p.3) 
There are 
imperfect market 
conditions that 
make these 
intervention 
projects 
prohibitively risky 
investments for 
the private 
sector' (p.3) 
Yes Yes London Green Fund (HF). HF established 
2009. Specific 
fund 
established 
2011. 
Yes - the EIB is 
the HF Manager, 
but it is not the 
Fund Manager for 
the specific fund 
(this is managed 
by Amber 
Infrastructure 
Ltd, London). 
Region UK (Wales 2008 - ... it is essential 
that new methods 
are explored that 
enable social and 
economic goals to 
be addressed... 
JESSICA offers this 
opportunity' (p.6) 
- Yes No - - - 
Region UK (North West) 2009 - A number of 
scenarios (i.e. 
actual projects) 
have been explored 
in urban centres 
throughout the 
North West which 
have shown that 
JESSICA has the 
potential to unlock 
regeneration 
schemes' (p.4) 
- Yes Yes ' for the NW ROP; specific 
fund 'Chrysalis limited 
Partnership'; specific fund 
Northwest Evergreen LLP. 
HF established 
2009. Specific 
fund 
established 
2012 and 2011 
respectively. 
Yes - the EIB is 
the HF Manager, 
but it is not the 
Fund Manager for 
either of the 
Specific Funds. 
Region UK (North East) 2010 Potential benefits: 
flexible mechanism, 
access to expertise, 
integrated and 
holistic approach in 
regeneration. 
The study 
concludes that from 
the work 
undertaken to date 
the implementation 
of a JESSICA fund 
in the North East 
- Yes No - - - 
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Member State/R Member State Year Notes Needs identified Shortcomings 
or 
disadvantages 
identified? 
In favour? 
Strongly/Yes/
No 
Has a JESSICA 
FI been 
implemented? 
If yes, which? If yes, when? EIB 
involvement 
would provide 
considerable 
advantages to the 
region' (p.17) 
Source: EPRC Research 
Methodological note: 
 
To identify established JESSICA and JEREMIE-type funds, all instruments with a Holding Fund structure under Article 44 (1)(a) and Article 44 
(1)(b) of the implementing regulations were identified through keyword searches of the two sources detailed above. Where necessary, this 
was supplemented with web searches. In this way the methodology captured funds that are not necessarily identified as JESSICA or JEREMIE 
by name, but which adhere to the Holding Fund structure under the respective Article 44 sections and fall under the label of µ-(66,&$- or 
JEREMIE-W\SH¶IXQGV 
Once identified, the spatial scale of each evaluation and fund was recorded in order to provide a better appraisal of whether or not EIB/EIF 
recommendations were subsequently put in place (without implying direct causality, which cannot be established on the basis of this 
methodology alone). Finally, Tables 1 and 2 were compiled based on this information. Note that the final column in each table does not 
reflect the total number of JESSICA/JEREMIE FIs in each respective Member State or region. Rather, it reflects only those in which a 
minimum of one JESSICA or JEREMIE has been implemented and is managed by the EIB/EIF. 
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ANNEX 4: EIB AND NON-EIB HOLDING FUNDS 
EIB Holding Fund Manager 
MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Fund 
Manager  
Year HF set 
up 
OP contribution 
to HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
BG            
 
JEREMIE 
Bulgaria  
a.  EIF 2009 349.00 242.55 69.50 432.88 124.03 13.70 3.93 
 
JESSICA 
Bulgaria 
b. EIB 2010 33.00 30.28 91.76 11.75 35.61 2.25 6.82 
CY            
 
JEREMIE 
Cyprus 
a.  EIF 2009  20.00 9.83 49.15 12.65 63.25 1.66 8.30 
EL            
 
JEREMIE 
Greece 
a.  EIF 2007 250.00 86.16 34.46 87.39 34.96 12.58 5.03 
 
JESSICA 
Greece 
b. EIB  2010 258.00 20.67 8.01 9.27 3.59 1.07 0.41 
ES            
 JESSICA FIDAE b. EIB 2011 127.64 17.76 13.91 9.02 7.07 3.32 2.60 
 
JEREMIE 
Extremadura  
a. EIF 2011 24.60 24.60 100.00 13.80 56.10 0.00 0.00 
 
JESSICA 
Andalucía  
b. EIB 2011 85.71 85.71 100.00 30.11 35.13 10.52 12.27 
FR            
 
JEREMIE 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
a. EIF 2008 30.00 9.22 30.73 21.41 71.37 0.99 3.30 
 JEREMIE Paca a. EIF 2012 20.00 - - - - 1.16 5.80 
IT            
 JEREMIE Sicilia  a. EIF 2010 15.00 0.00 0.00 3.68 24.53 1.1 7.33 
 
Calabria - Risk 
Sharing FI 
a. EIF 2011 45.00 45.00 100.00 1.50 3.33 2.10 4.67 
 
JESSICA 
Sardegna 
b. EIB 2011 40.99 66.30 161.75 - - 2.27 5.54 
 JEREMIE a. EIF 2008 90.00 9.00 10.00 1.30 1.44 - - 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Fund 
Manager  
Year HF set 
up 
OP contribution 
to HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
Campania 
 
JESSICA 
Campania 
b. EIB 2011 100.00 100.00 100.00 - - - - 
LT            
 
JEREMIE 
Lithuania 
a. EIF  2008 41.97 34.96 83.30 28.43 67.74 6.97 16.61 
 
JESSICA 
Lithuania 
b. EIB 2009 163.42 122.00 74.65 80.44 49.22 7.16 4.38 
MT            
 JEREMIE Malta  a. EIF 2010 12.00 0.21 1.75 9.71 80.92 49.22 8.17 
PL            
 
JESSICA 
Mazovia 
b. EIB 2011 45.29 37.72 82.40 26.20 57.85 1.55 3.42 
 
JESSICA 
Wielkopolska 
b. EIB 2009 66.26 62.33 94.07 57.39 86.61 1.55 4.45 
 
JESSICA 
Pomorskie 
b. EIB  2010 59.02 58.02 98.32 48.73 82.57 2.40 4.07 
 
JESSICA West 
Pomorskie 
b. EIB 2009 36.39 35.61 97.86 34.65 95.22 1.11 3.05 
 
JESSICA 
Silesia 
b. EIB 2010 62.83 63.22 100.00 23.12 36.80 2.82 4.49 
PT            
 
JESSICA 
Portugal 
b. EIB 2009 132.50 92.78 70.02 59.29 44.75 4.90 3.70 
RO            
 
JEREMIE 
Romania 
a. EIF 2010 150.00 147.30 98.20 117.63 78.42 6.74 4.49 
SK            
 
JEREMIE 
Slovakia 
a. EIF 2009 100.00 6.58 6.58 11.53 11.53 5.52 5.52 
UK            
 
JESSICA NW 
England 
b. EIB 2009 133.10 96.01 72.13 9.14 6.87 3.76 2.82 
 
JESSICA 
Scotland 
b. EIB 2010 60.00 17.75 29.58 3.89 6.48 0.97 1.62 
 
London Green 
Fund  
b. EIB 2009 152.39 107.95 70.84 88.36 57.98 3.98 2.61 
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* In those cases where funds reaching the sub-fundFIs exceeded the total commitment to holding funds, this was calculated as 100% in 
order to not to skew the analysis 
** Those cases where management fees were 0% have not been included in the analysis 
Source: European Commission (2015d) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing financial engineering 
instruments, September 2015, Brussels, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2015/summary-of-data-on-the-progress-made-in-financing-and-
implementing-financial-engineering-instruments-2014  
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Non-EIB Holding Fund Manager 
MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
CZ            
 
State Fund for 
Housing 
Development 
b. 2012 
State Fund for 
House 
Development 
24.48 0.00 - - - 3.2 13.07 
EL             
 
Energy 
Savings in 
Existing House 
c. 2010 
National 
Entrepreneursh
ip and 
Development 
Fund 
241.00 73.83 30.63 67.2 27.88 0.07 0.03 
 
Entrepreneurs
hip Fund 
(TEPIX) 
a. 2010 
National 
Entrepreneursh
ip and 
Development 
Fund 
540.00 252.1 46.69 251.92 46.65 0.28 0.05 
ES            
 JEREMIE IDEA a. 2009 Agencia IDEA 378.01 379.01 100.26 129.3 34.21 7.3 1.93 
FR            
 
FCPR JEREMIE 
Auvergne 
a. 2009 SOFIMAC 25.20 - - - - 0.77 3.06 
HU            
 
Venture 
Finance 
Hungary plc 
a. 2007 
Venture 
Finance 
Hungary plc 
849.11 798.82 93.96 733.05 86.33 15.12 1.78 
IT            
 
JEREMIE FSE ± 
Finlombarda 
 
 
a. 2008 
Istituito Presso 
Finlombarda 
20.00 20.00 100.00 17.00 85.00 0.50 2.5 
 
Fondo di 
garanzia per 
piccolo s medi 
imprese di cui 
alla Legge 
a. 2013 
Minstero per lo 
sviluppo 
Economico 
(MISE) 
45.00 45.00 100.00 - - - - 
 
Fondo per le 
Imprese 
a. 2013 Sviluppo 265.00 - - - - - - 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
 
Fondo 
Regionale Di 
Capitale Di 
Rischio A 
Compartecipaz
ione Publico/ 
Privata 
a. 2011 
Zenike Meta 
Ventures 
10.37 7.00 67.50 - - 0.00 0.00 
 
Fondo 
Regionale 
Rotativo Di 
Finanza 
Agevolata 
c. 2012 
Unifidi Emilia-
Romagna 
9.98 9.50 95.19 - - 0.00 0.00 
 
Fondo 
Regionale 
Rotativo Di 
Finanza 
Agevolata A 
Compartecipaz
ione Privata 
a. 2013 
Unifidi Emilia-
Romagna 
13.97 22.00 157.48 21.18 151.61 0.00 0.00 
 
Asse I Fondo 
di 
Partecipazione 
a. 2013 Lazio Innova 
SpA 
82.50 82.50 100.00 25.54 34.38 - - 
 
Asse Ii Fondo 
Di 
Partecipazione  
c. 2011 Lazio Innova 
SpA 
50.00 50.00 100.00 3.33 6.66 0.00 0.00 
 
JEREMIE Fesr - 
Milano 
a. 2008 FINLOMBARDA 
SpA 
20.00 20.00 100.00 0.67 3.35 0.71 3.55 
 
Fondo Energia, 
Campobasso 
c. 2011 Finmolise SpA, 
Campobasso 
20.70 20.70 100.00 - - -  
 
Fondo Univco 
Anticrisi, 
Campobasso 
a. 2009 Finmolise Spa, 
Campobasso 
30.60 30.60 100.00 10.52 34.38 0.78 2.55 
 
Costituzione Di 
Un Fondo Di 
Rotazione Per 
Il 
Finanziamento 
Agevolato 
Degli 
Investimenti 
a. 2009  Venetto 
Sviluppo 
67.41 67.41 100.00 144.07 213.72 1.36 2.02 
 Fondo Di c. 2012  Venetto 29.40 29.40 100.00 1.10 3.74 0.00 0.00 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
180 
MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
Rotazione Per 
Investimenti 
Finalizzati Al 
Contenimento 
Dei Consumi 
Energetici 
Sviluppo 
 
Partecipazioni 
Minoritarie E 
Temporanee Al 
Capitale Di 
Rischio Di 
Imprese 
Innovative 
a. 2010  Venetto 
Sviluppo 
15.00 15.00 100.00 5.22 34.80 1.14 7.60 
 
Sistema Delle 
Garanzie Per 
Investimenti 
Nell 
Innovazione E 
Per 
L'imprenditoral
ita 
a. 2010 CONFIDI 39.40 38.37 97.39 82.54 209.49 0.00 0.00 
LT            
 
Enterpreneurs
hip Promotion 
Fund 
a. 2009 UAB 14.48 14.48 100.00 14.48 100.00 0.66 4.56 
 INVEGA a. 2009 UAB 186.5 170.31 91.32 170.31 91.32 1.38 0.74 
LV            
 
JEREMIE Latvia a.  2008  Latvian 
Guarantee 
Agency 
70.83 31.44 44.39 24.31 34.32 4.83 6.82 
NL            
 
HF 
Economische 
Investergingen 
Den Haag 
b, c. 2012 HF 
Economische 
Investergingen 
Den Haag 
8.86 7.76 87.58 0.07 0.79 0.00 0.00 
PL            
 BGK, Warsaw a. 2012  BGK, Warsaw 7.23 6.71 92.81 3.48 48.13 0.32 4.43 
 BGK Warsaw  a. 2009  BGK, Warsaw 70.66 19.22 27.20 13.78 19.50 4.7 6.65 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
 BGK, Warsaw a. 2012  BGK, Warsaw 49.11 47.88 97.50 40.74 82.96 3.13 6.37 
 BGK, Warsaw a. 2012 BGK, Warsaw 16.05 24.38 151.90 10.91 67.98 0.81 5.05 
 
Dolnoslaski 
Fundusz 
Powierniczy  
a. 2009  BGK, Warsaw 99.27 115.82 116.67 108.48 109.28 3.35 3.37 
 
Fundusz 
Powierniczy 
JEREMIE 
Wojewodztwa 
a. 2009  BGK, Warsaw 70.32 80.06 113.85 87.49 124.42 
 
3.07 4.37 
 
JEREMIE 
Wielkopolska 
a. 2009  BGK, Warsaw 121.75 206.6 169.69 193.78 159.16 4.29 3.52 
 
JEREMIE 
Lodzkie 
a. 2009  BGK, Warsaw 44.77 55.85 124.75 45.41 101.43 2.67 5.96 
 
Kujawsko-
Pomorski 
Fundsz 
Pozyczkowy 
Torun 
a. 2010  Kujawsko-
Pomorski 
8.78 8.65 98.52 5.72 65.15 0.69 7.86 
 
National 
Capital 
Warsaw Fund 
a. 2009  National Capital 
Warsaw Fund 
70.66 19.22 27.20 13.78 19.50 4.70 6.65 
 
Zachodniopom
orski JEREMIE 
a. 2009 BGK, Warsaw 67.25 96.07 142.86 86.31 128.34 3.6 5.35 
PT            
 
FINOVA - Porta a. 2008  PME 
Investimentos 
311.31 324.08 104.10 288.01 92.52 7.59 2.44 
 
FOAEA - 
Acores 
a. 2010 Portugal 
Capital 
Ventures 
0.95 0.00 0.00 0.17 17.89 - - 
SI            
 
PIFI a. 2009 Slovene 
Enterprise Fund 
80.84 44.8 55.42 69.08 85.45 2.04 2.52 
UK            
 
Finance for 
Business NE 
a. 2009  NE Finance 162.57 139.36 85.72 139.36 85.72 29.77 18.31 
 
Finance Wales 
plc 
a. 2009 Finance Wales 
plc 
170.45 170.45 100.00 157.29 92.28 0.00 0.00 
 
Finance 
Yorkshire 
a. 2009 Finance 
Yorkshire 
118.22 102.40 86.62 102.40 86.62 0.00 0.00 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
 
London SME 
Investment 
Fund 
a. 2012  SME Wholesale 
Finance 
21.39 16.98 79.38 16.15 75.50 0.14 0.65 
 
LCIF a. 2009 University of 
East Anglia 
24.83 43.10 173.58 16.23 65.36 3.99 16.07 
 
North West 
Business 
Finance Ltd 
a. 2009 North West 
Business 
Finance Ltd 
195.72 140.39 71.73 140.39 
 
71.73 0.00 0.00 
 
South West 
Loan Fund 
Truro 
a. 2009  South West 
Investment 
Group 
13.64 13.25 97.14 17.55 128.67 0.00 0.00 
MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Fund 
Manager  
Year HF set 
up 
OP contribution 
to HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs 
(EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Manageme
nt Costs & 
Fees as 
%** 
BG            
 
JEREMIE 
Bulgaria  
a.  EIF 2009 349.00 242.55 69.50 432.88 124.03 13.70 3.93 
 
JESSICA 
Bulgaria 
b. EIB 2010 33.00 30.28 91.76 11.75 35.61 2.25 6.82 
CY            
 
JEREMIE 
Cyprus 
a.  EIF 2009  20.00 9.83 49.15 12.65 63.25 1.66 8.30 
CZ            
 
JESSICA 
Moravia-Silesia 
b. EIB 2010 - --- - - - - - 
EL            
 
JEREMIE 
Greece 
a.  EIF 2007 250.00 86.16 34.46 87.39 34.96 12.58 5.03 
 
JESSICA 
Greece 
b. EIB  2010 258.00 20.67 8.01 9.27 3.59 1.07 0.41 
ES            
 JESSICA FIDAE b. EIF 2011 127.64 17.76 13.91 9.02 7.07 3.32 2.60 
 JEREMIE a. EIB 2011 24.60 24.60 100.00 13.80 56.10 0.00 0.00 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
Extremadura  
 
JESSICA 
Andalucía  
b. EIB 2011 85.71 85.71 100.00 30.11 35.13 10.52 12.27 
FR            
 
JEREMIE 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
a. EIF 2008 30.00 9.22 30.73 21.41 71.37 0.99 3.30 
 JEREMIE Paca a. EIF 2012 20.00 - - - - 1.16 5.80 
IT            
 JEREMIE Sicilia  a. EIF 2010 15.00 0.00 0.00 3.68 24.53 1.1 7.33 
 
Calabria - Risk 
Sharing FI 
a. EIF 2011 45.00 45.00 100.00 1.50 3.33 2.10 4.67 
 
JESSICA 
Sardegna 
b. EIB 2011 40.99 66.30 161.75 - - 2.27 5.54 
 
JEREMIE 
Campania 
a. EIF 2008 90.00 9.00 10.00 1.30 1.44 - - 
 
JESSICA 
Campania 
b. EIB 2011 100.00 100.00 100.00 - - - - 
LT            
 
JEREMIE 
Lithuania 
a. EIF  2008 41.97 34.96 83.30 28.43 67.74 6.97 16.61 
 
JESSICA 
Lithuania 
b. EIB 2009 163.42 122.00 74.65 80.44 49.22 7.16 4.38 
MT            
 JEREMIE Malta  a. EIF 2010 12.00 0.21 1.75 9.71 80.92 49.22 8.17 
PL            
 
JESSICA 
Mazovia 
b. EIB 2011 45.29 37.72 82.40 26.20 57.85 1.55 3.42 
 
JESSICA 
Wielkopolska 
b. EIB 2009 66.26 62.33 94.07 57.39 86.61 1.55 4.45 
 
JESSICA 
Pomorskie 
b. EIB  2010 59.02 58.02 98.32 48.73 82.57 2.40 4.07 
 
JESSICA West 
Pomorskie 
b. EIB 2009 36.39 35.61 97.86 34.65 95.22 1.11 3.05 
 
JESSICA 
Silesia 
b. EIB 2010 62.83 63.22 100.00 23.12 36.80 2.82 4.49 
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MS Fund Name 
Art. 44 
(1) (a) 
(b) or 
(c) 
Year 
HF Set-
up 
Fund 
Manager 
OP 
contribution to 
HF (EUR 
million) 
OP contribution 
to HF reaching 
FIs (EUR million) 
OP contribution to 
HF reaching FIs as 
%* 
OP contribution 
reaching final 
recipients  
(EUR million) 
OP 
contribution 
reaching final 
recipient as % 
Management 
Costs & Fees 
(EUR million) 
Managem
ent Costs 
& Fees as 
%** 
PT            
 
JESSICA 
Portugal 
b. EIB 2009 132.50 92.78 70.02 59.29 44.75 4.90 3.70 
RO            
 
JEREMIE 
Romania 
a. EIF 2010 150.00 147.30 98.20 117.63 78.42 6.74 4.49 
SK            
 
JEREMIE 
Slovakia 
a. EIF 2009 100.00 6.58 6.58 11.53 11.53 5.52 5.52 
UK            
 
JESSICA NW 
England 
b. EIB 2009 133.10 96.01 72.13 9.14 6.87 3.76 2.82 
 
JESSICA 
Scotland 
b. EIB 2010 60.00 17.75 29.58 3.89 6.48 0.97 1.62 
 
London Green 
Fund  
b. EIB 2009 152.39 107.95 70.84 88.36 57.98 3.98 2.61 
* In those cases where funds reaching the FIs exceeded the total commitment to holding funds, this was calculated as 100% in order to not to skew the 
analysis. 
** Those cases where management fees were 0% have not been included in the analysis 
Source: European Commission (2015d) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing financial engineering instruments, 
September 2015, Brussels, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2015/summary-of-data-on-the-progress-
made-in-financing-and-implementing-financial-engineering-instruments-2014  
 

